Need for Chaos and Dehumanization Are Robustly Associated with Support for Partisan Violence

Alexander Landry
Stanford University

James Druckman
Northwestern University and IPR

Robb Willer
Stanford University

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DRAFT

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Abstract

Recent, high-profile acts of partisan violence have stimulated interest among academics and the general public in the etiology of support for such violence. Here, Landry, Druckman, and Willer report results of an exploratory study that (1) measures support for partisan violence with both abstract items (e.g., general support for partisan violence) and support for more specific acts (e.g., support for a partisan motivated shooting), (2) follows recently established best practices by including attention checks to attenuate response bias, and (3) incorporates measures of a wide range of potential confounders as control variables. Across three data collections (total N = 2,003), including two with nationally representative samples, and tracking seven unique operationalizations of support for the use of violence against out-partisans, they find the most consistent and typically largest relationships with an individual's reported "need for chaos" (e.g., agreement with statements like: "Sometimes I just feel like destroying beautiful things") and the extent to which they dehumanize supporters of the opposing party. The researchers speculate this reflects a motivation to use extreme methods (need for chaos) toward one's political rivals, liberated from the moral restraints that inhibit harming fellow human beings (dehumanization). System justification and social dominance orientation were also both positively related to support for partisan violence, which may reflect partisans' desire to protect their preferred social order from out-partisans deemed to threaten it. Collectively, these results offer a framework for future research on support for partisan violence, highlighting the role of extreme orientations toward society and rival partisans.

American democracy has endured for nearly 250 years. Yet, many worry that it is unraveling. Scholars point the erosion of norms such that partisans privilege winning over democratic governance (e.g., Ahmed 2023). Among the most worrisome possibilities is the use of violence for partisan purposes. Despite a history of partisan violence (Kalmoe 2020), its likelihood seemed low a decade ago. Yet, violent events such as the attack on the then-Speaker of the House's husband, Paul Pelosi, and the U.S. Capitol insurrection on January 6, 2021, suggest a potential normalization. Citizens also have expressed worry, with 63% of Americans saying they are "very concerned" about the risk of politically motivated violence in a 2022 poll (Langer 2022; also see Georgetown University Institute of Politics and Public Service 2019, Walter 2022). What factors correlate with support for partisan violence? Do the variables associated with abstract support for partisan violence differ from those related to support for specific acts? What is the role of political (e.g., partisan animosity) as opposed to non-political factors (e.g., trait aggression)?

In addressing these questions, our goal is not to test a particular theory or make definitive causal claims, but rather, to clarify extant work on partisan violence in the U.S. context. Using several measures of support for partisan violence—including both general support and support for specific acts—and examining correlates that are both expressly political and non-political, we identify robust correlates across operationalizations of support for partisan violence. At the same time, we identify correlates that show different patterns of relations based on the measure of support for partisan violence used (abstract or specific). We view this exercise as necessary for the literature to clarify what variables, political and/or non-political, relate to distinct operationalizations of support for partisan violence.

Abstract and Specific Measures of Support for Partisan Violence

Partisan violence involves the use of violence to achieve a partisan goal, typically entailing the use of physical force to hurt, damage, or kill opposing partisans (Kalmoe and

Mason 2022b). It constitutes the ultimate violation of democratic norms, where distinct sides coordinate on a set of rules within which they work (e.g., Weingast 1997). When the sides who compete for office resort to violence, it signals the possible collapse of democratic governance. As the philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1877) describes, "When complete agreement could not otherwise be reached, a general massacre of all who have not thought in a certain way has proved a very effective means of settling opinion in a country." In short, partisan violence involves a rejection of the political system as a means of solving disputes, and hence a rejection of the norms that underlie liberal democracy.

One of the best-known measures of support for partisan violence, in the U.S., comes from Kalmoe and Mason's (2022b) agenda-setting book. Their measure of support for partisan violence asks four items, such as "How much do you feel it is justified for [IN-PARTY] to use violence in advancing their political goals these days?" and "How much do you feel it is justified for [IN-PARTY] to use violence if the [OUT-PARTY] party wins more races in the 2024 election?"[1] We hereafter refer to Kalmoe and Mason's (2022b) measure of support for partisan violence as *SPV*, in order to distinguish it from the general construct.

Westwood et al. (2022) raise two primary concerns with this approach to measuring support for partisan violence. First, they suggest that the term "violence" provides insufficient context, leading respondents to infer the specific act in question. They recommend instead using precisely worded scenarios that vary the severity of the specific act (e.g., property damage, assault, murder). This echoes the long-standing distinction in work on political tolerance that using abstract items, as opposed to concrete scenarios or acts, can yield distinct responses (e.g., Sullivan and Transue 1999). Second, they point out that inattentive survey responses are likely to increase apparent SPV, as there is no neutral mid-point and random

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[1] Their initial item is a slight variant of this one, asking "What if [OUT-PARTY] win the 2020 presidential election? How much do you feel violence would be justified then?"

measurement error would generate upward bias because all, but the bottom scale point, indicate support for at least some violence. An example of one of the more concrete measures of support for partisan violence from Westwood et al. (2022) is the following *shooting vignette* (from their study 2):

Iowa Man Arrested After Shooting A Woman at a [OUT-PARTY] Meeting

Steven Wright, 65, was arrested for attempted murder this afternoon in Des Moines. The Iowa local allegedly pulled a gun on a group of [OUT-PARTY] who were meeting in a neighboring house. Following a confrontation, Wright reportedly shot one of the attendees in the chest. Two witnesses reported that Wright was upset that [OUT-PARTY] were gathering in what Wright called a [IN-PARTY] part of town. After aggressively arguing for several minutes, Wright reportedly aimed his gun at the woman and fired while calling her "a [OUT-PARTY] maniac bent on ruining Iowa." The victim later told reporters that she is sure she was shot "because she was trying to help organize [OUT-PARTY] in her neighborhood." When deputies arrived, Wright was sitting on a couch next to a shotgun and stated that he was not coming out, the report states. Deputies were able to take him into custody without further incident. They located a pistol on his person with a magazine and six rounds of ammunition, the report continues.[2]

Westwood and colleagues queried respondents' support or opposition to the actions of Steven Wright and whether he was justified.[3] Recognizing that this vignette represents a relatively extreme case, Westwood et al. (2022: study 4) ask a set of vignettes to gauge attitudes about distinct acts of partisan violence that increase in severity, including assault with *rocks*, *arson*, assault with a *deadly weapon*, and *murder*.[4] We do this too in one of our studies.

Correlates

Just as there are multiple ways to measure support for partisan violence, scholars have proposed various correlates of such support. We focus on two types of variables (broadly conceived): political/partisan attitudes (i.e., attitudes that directly involve political objects)

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[2] Westwood et al. (2022) also include a non-political condition to compare partisan with non-partisan violence.
[3] Westwood et al. (2022) also asked whether Wright should face criminal charges.
[4] They also ask about protesting without a permit, and vandalism. We included these items in our study as well but do not report the results given they are not clear cases of violence (Westwood et al. 2022: 5).

and individual traits that expand beyond the purely political domain (Westwood et al. 2022: 8). Given this type of violence involves targeting a partisan group, it is sensible that it would include political variables. That said, one purpose of government is to monopolize the means of violence, and politics is built to be a domain in which competing interests and control of government are resolved peacefully, particularly between governing parties. Further strong laws and norms exist against partisan violence (e.g., unlike partisan animosity; Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Thus, support for partisan violence may also emerge from attitudes beyond purely political considerations.

Regarding political correlates, Kalmoe and Mason (2022b) demonstrate the relevance of *partisanship as a social identity* (PSID) (i.e., how strongly one identifies with their political party; Huddy et al. 2015), showing that it correlates with their SPV measure. Presumably, a strong identification with one's party provides partisans with the motivation to act violently to promote their party's interests. Along with an affiliation with one's own party is dislike of the out-party—the extent to which one dislikes out-partisans, the more they may be apt to support acts of violence against them (e.g., Finkel et al. 2020). Interestingly, though, Kalmoe and Mason (2022b) report no relationship of *partisan animosity* with SPV (also see Broockman et al. 2023, Mernyk et al. 2022, Voelkel et al. 2023). They also find no connection between SPV and partisans' left-right *ideological extremity*. We will nonetheless explore these variables across outcome measures.

Another outgroup-focused variable that has received less attention in the partisan violence literature but is a robust predictor of support for intergroup violence in other contexts, is the explicit denial of an outgroup's humanity. This *dehumanization* "is thought to motivate violence by imbuing the outgroup with despicable qualities of 'lower' animals" (Landry et al. 2023: 5; also see Cassese 2021, Martherus et al. 2021, Kteily and Landry 2022). If one views the other party as subhuman, then causing harm is likely not

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problematic—and perhaps even desirable.[5] Dehumanization removes moral safeguards that otherwise inhibit the use of violence (Kelman 1973, Bandura 1999). A final political correlate concerns animosity toward the political system itself: an *anti-establishment orientation* (AEO), which is "a deep-seated antagonism toward the established political order" (Uscinski et al. 2021: 879). Those with such an orientation are not invested in maintaining the political system and thus may support system-destabilizing violence. Indeed, Uscinski et al. (2021) report a significant relationship between AEO and acceptance of political violence.[6]

We characterize variables as "non-political" when they extend beyond the explicitly political domain. We do not mean to suggest there are no political implications of these factors, but they are attitudes or traits that manifest in social relationships more broadly (as intimated, the political versus non-political distinction is not definitive). The most straightforward non-political factor is *trait aggression*: one's propensity for aggressive interpersonal behavior (Kalmoe and Mason 2022b: 50). Those who are aggressive are more inclined to view violence as an acceptable means of resolving conflict (Anderson and Bushman 2002). Another relevant construct is a dispositional *need for chaos*: a desire to create disruption to gain social status (Arceneaux et al. 2021, Petersen et al. 2023). Those high in a need for chaos welcome destruction with little concern for what comes next, other than hoping to increase or protect their status (Arceneaux et al. 2021: 8). It provides motivation to use extreme methods. Thus, a need for chaos may be associated with support for political violence (Petersen et al. 2023: SM S8).[7]

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[5] Kalmoe and Mason (2022b) include an item about dehumanization as part of their moral disengagement battery.

[6] Notably, these authors do not invoke partisanship in their violence measures. Instead, they ask whether violence is an acceptable way to express disagreement and achieve important objectives.

[7] Petersen et al. (2023) link individuals' need for chaos to their support for engaging in distinct violent acts to promote their "group's" political rights and interests, where group is said to refer to political, religious, or social group.

Other relevant constructs are general ideologies concerning the proper social order (Webber et al. 2020: 107). We consider three: *system justification*, *social dominance orientation*, and r*ight-wing authoritarianism*. System justification is "the social psychological process whereby prevailing conditions—whether social, cultural, sexual, economic, legal, or political—are accepted, explained, and justified simply because they exist" (Jost 2020: 84). Social dominance orientation is a perspective where one supports social hierarchy and group-based dominance (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Right-wing authoritarianism entails a belief in submitting to authority figures and acting aggressively against those perceived to threaten the existing order (Altemeyer 1988). These perspectives differ from left-right political ideology, as the latter are typically specific policy views dictated by party platforms whereas the former are broader outlooks about the social order (Jost 2021).[8] Webber et al. (2020) suggest that those who cling to each of these orientations would oppose political violence against the state since it forms part of the extant social structure (e.g., it is the current system to be justified, maintains the dominance of particular groups). However, the implications for *partisan* violence are the inverse. For instance, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) make the point that violence can be used as a tool for sustaining intergroup hierarchies (social dominance) in societies (also see Henry et al. 2005). Similarly, partisans often view those from the other party as a threat to their preferred social order including maintaining the current status quo, a core component of both system justification and right-wing authoritarianism (e.g., Druckman and Shafranek 2020). Consequently, those high in system justification, social dominance, and/or right-wing authoritarianism may be more likely to support partisan violence to protect their idealized social order from being undermined by the other, competing side.

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[8] They also differ from AEO, as the latter refers strictly to one's attitudes toward the existing political system (rather than the broader social order).

We recognize that our overall focus on individual attributes means we ignore other types of variables. This includes contextual variables (e.g., messages, election outcomes) (Kalmoe and Mason 2022b), perceptual variables (e.g., how violent the other party is perceived to be) (Mernyk et al. 2022), and attitudes toward other social/demographic groups (e.g., racism, sexism) (Mason and Kalmoe 2022b). These variables may well matter, but our focus in this initial empirical foray is on political attitudes and individual dispositions.

Empirical Overview

Our empirical approach entailed measuring both abstract support for partisan violence as well as support for concrete acts of partisan violence. The general measures have the advantage of gauging what could be thought of as normative perspectives on partisan violence—i.e., as a general matter, to what extent does one support it? The more specific measures speak to how people would react to concrete instances that vary based on severity. Ultimately, we are interested in which correlates display consistent relationships across measures.

In light of recent recommendations for measuring support for partisan violence (Kalmoe and Mason 2022a, Westwood et al. 2022), all of our studies included attention checks (and excluded clearly inattentive respondents), included both abstract and general measures of violence support, and mostly symmetric scales. To be clear, while we will note overall mean levels of support for each measure, our interest lies in the correlates of support for partisan violence rather than in obtaining precise point estimates of such support.

Data

We conducted three studies to explore relationships between the correlates and various measures of support for partisan violence (see Table 1 for a summary of these studies). Study 1 was conducted with a convenience sample recruited from CloudResearch's Connect participant pool (Hauser et al. 2022). Studies 2-3 were conducted with samples from

Bovitz's Forthright Panel, quota-matched to 2020 ANES demographic data on the age, race, and gender compositions of supporters of the Democratic and Republican parties. All studies include only partisans (including self-identified independents who "lean" toward one party or the other), consistent with prior work on partisans' motivations and sentiments.[9] Details on the sample compositions for each study, as well as comparisons of the studies 2-3 samples with 2020 ANES demographic benchmarks, appear in the appendix. Throughout, our use of the word "correlate" is intentional, as we are unable to make causal claims with these observational data.[10]

In all three studies, we included Kalmoe and Mason's (2022b) SPV measure and Westwood et al.'s (2022) shooting vignette, allowing us to compare correlates across abstract and concrete measures. The former included Kalmoe and Mason's four items, measured on 0 to 100 scales (0 = never/not all justified, 100 = always/extremely justified). We merged these items into a single SPV scale (respective alphas, by study, = .95, .90, .94). The latter was Westwood et al.'s vignette with two follow-up items, asking about opposition or support for the attempted murder and how justified it was (both on 7-point scales; 1 = strongly oppose/extremely unjustified, 7 = strongly support/extremely justified; merged with respective correlations of .90, .73, .77).[11]

In studies 1 and 2, we also included a "willingness to engage in violence" (*WEV*) variable that asked respondents how likely they would be to engage in violence if an

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[9] Study 1 ended up with 17 participants who identified as pure Independents (i.e., they did not lean toward one of the major parties); we exclude them from the analyses. Patterns of results remain unchanged with these participants included. Studies 2-3 samples were composed entirely of partisans or leaners.

[10] As mentioned, we embedded attention checks in all our studies. In study 1, we included two catch items (e.g., "To ensure data quality, please select option number 3"), with any respondent failing either being excluded from our analyses. In study 2, we included the two catch items plus an additional catch item and a short mock vignette with a question about facts in the vignette. We excluded respondents who failed any of the attention checks. In study 3, we included the two catch items and any respondent who failed either was terminated from the survey.

[11] In their research, Kalmoe and Mason (2022) used 4- or 5-point scales while Westwood et al. (2022) asked about support on a five-point scale and justification as a dichotomous item. Our own use of distinct scales for the Kalmoe and Mason and Westwood et al. items was largely inadvertent (the use of 100-point scales for SPV follows Mernyk et al. 2022) and should not influence the relevance of distinct correlates, which is our focus.

opposing party candidate is declared the winner of a contested 2024 presidential election, on a 0-100 scale with higher scores indicating increased likelihood. This item comes from Mernyk et al. (2022); it mimics the SPV measure in its abstractness but instead captures willingness to act, which can differ from general support. Webber et al. (2020: 108) explain that "prescribing violence as an acceptable means… is often insufficient to motivate one to undertake violence as their personal obligation." It thus is not clear whether the correlates of support and willingness to act will be the same. Finally, in study 1, we included four additional specific acts of partisan violence from Westwood et al. (2022) that vary in severity: assault with rocks, arson, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder. For instance, the last item asked: "A [IN-PARTY] was convicted of murder. He was arrested by police after surveillance footage was found showing him stabbing a prominent [OUT-PARTY] to death. The [IN-PARTY] targeted the [OUT-PARTY] because he believed this [OUT-PARTY] had prevented him from voting in the last election as part of a conspiracy to stop [IN-PARTY] voters." Each was measured on 7-point scales with higher scores indicating greater support.

As displayed in Table 1, the key correlates in each study included partisanship as a social identity (PSID), partisan animosity, ideological extremity, need for chaos, aggression, and dehumanization. Studies 1 and 2 included a measure of anti-establishment orientation (AEO). Study 2 added system justification while study 3 included social dominance and right-wing authoritarianism. Each study also included various (control) demographics including partisanship, age, race, gender, and income. Details on the question wordings and alphas, where relevant for the correlates, appear in the appendix.

Table 1: Study Details

Study	Vendor (N)	Dates	Partisan Violence Measures	Correlate Measures
1	CloudResearch ($N = 281$)	Dec 12, 2022	• SPV • WEV	• PSID • Partisan animosity

			• Shooting Vignette • Violent Acts: assault with rocks, arson, assault with a deadly weapon, murder	• Ideological extremity • AEO • Need for chaos • Aggression • Dehumanization
2	Bovitz ($N = 721$)	Mar 14-23, 2023	• SPV • WEV • Shooting Vignette	• PSID • Partisan animosity • Ideological extremity • AEO • Need for chaos • Aggression • Dehumanization • System justification
3	Bovitz ($N = 1001$)	Jan 25-Jan 29, 2023	• SPV • Shooting Vignette	• PSID • Partisan animosity • Ideological extremity • Need for chaos • Aggression • Dehumanization • Social dominance • Right-wing authoritarianism

Results

We start by noting the average scores for the distinct support for partisan violence measures, re-scaling all to percentages (i.e., likelihood of supporting violence). Across studies 1-3, the average (abstract) SPV scores are 7.14, 10.17, and 11.06. The respective (concrete) shooting vignette scores are 3.83, 6.10, and 10.01. Thus, we find that the concrete items, where respondents have a clear sense of the act in question, register lower scores (respectively, $t_{280} = 3.74$, $p < .01$; $t_{720} = 6.84$, $p < .01$; $t_{1000} = 1.78$, $p = .075$), though the differences are not dramatic. We also find, as expected, that in study 1, for the other specific violent action items, the more severe the act, the lower the support (again re-scaled to percent likelihoods): the respective means for assault with rocks, arson, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder are 7.06, 5.40, 4.92, and 4.69. Finally, the WEV averages in studies 1 and 2 are

5.66 and 8.07; the former score falls just short of significantly higher than the shooting

vignette from that study while the latter is significantly higher ($t_{280} = 1.81$, $p = .07$; $t_{720} =$

3.43, $p < .01$). Thus, not only is abstract *support* for partisan violence higher than support for

concrete acts, but so is *willingness to engage in* abstract violence (which itself is lower than

support for abstract violence). This is an interesting result given the aforementioned

theoretical distinction between support for violence and willingness to actually act violently.

Even so, the differences are substantively modest.

Next, we turn to our analysis of correlates. Our analysis approach is to regress each

outcome variable on the correlates in each study (see Table 1) and the control variables as

simultaneous predictors. We present the results by outcome variable with a series of figures

that display the relationships between the correlates and each measure of support for partisan

violence in these multiple regression analyses. The underlying regressions, along with the

zero-order relationships among the correlates and the measures of support for partisan

violence, are available in the appendix.[12]

Figure 1 displays the results for SPV, showing the relevant standardized beta

coefficients and corresponding 95% confidence intervals (the party as a social identity and

partisan animosity intervals are indeed very small). Three findings stand out. First, across all

three studies, a need for chaos, aggression, and dehumanization of the other party

significantly increase with SPV. Second, in studies 2-3, system justification and social

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[12] We operationalize need for chaos by taking the average across items (see the appendix). Arceneaux et al. (2021) suggest instead creating four groups: low chaos, rebuilders, medium chaos, and high chaos. When we take that approach, our results remain consistent with what we report (the categories demonstrated substantively very large effects in the anticipated direction).

dominance orientation appear to matter.[13] As we anticipated, higher scores on these variables correlated with greater support for partisan violence.[14]

Figure 1: Correlates of SPV

Note. Results of multiple linear regression model with political party, age, race, gender, education, and (in studies 1-2) income included as covariates. Coefficients represent standardized betas with corresponding 95% confidence intervals.

Third, apart from dehumanization, the political variables do not display consistent relationships with SPV. PSID is significant in only one of the three studies, ideological extremity is significant in two of the three, and AEO never reaches significance. Partisan animosity is not significant in study 1 and is *inversely* related to SPV in studies 2-3. This

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[13] Republicans exhibit significantly higher system justification and social dominance scores, but interactions between partisanship and each fall short of significance.
[14] Kalmoe and Mason (2022b: 84-85) find evidence of sexism relating to SPV, which is consistent with our findings regarding system justification because those high in sexism also tend to be high system justifiers (e.g., Jost and Kay 2005).

replicates prior work finding either a null or negative relationship between partisan animosity and support for partisan violence (e.g., Mernyk et al. 2022, Kalmoe and Mason 2022b, Broockman et al. 2023, Voelkel et al., 2023). The preponderance of evidence thus suggests that partisan animosity—despite speculation to the contrary (Finkel et al. 2020)—is not a source of support for partisan violence. Our findings also highlight a crucial distinction between animosity and dehumanization.

In Figure 2, we move to WEV. Here, we find virtually identical results to SPV, the only minor exception being that animosity displays a significant negative relationship in study 1 for WEV (whereas it is not significant in study 1 for SPV). Otherwise, we again see consistent effects for a need for chaos, aggression, dehumanization, and system justification.

Figure 2: Correlates of WEV

Note. Results of multiple linear regression model with political party, age, race, gender, education, and (in studies 1-2) income included as covariates. Coefficients represent standardized betas with corresponding 95% confidence intervals.

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We now compare the results from the abstract measures with the more specific measures from Westwood et al. (2022). Recall, we included the shooting vignette across all three studies and, in study 1, also measured support for four additional acts of partisan violence. Figure 3 presents the results for the shooting vignette. The results mostly match those for SPV and WEV: a need for chaos, dehumanization, system justification, and social dominance significantly relate to support for partisan violence. Right-wing authoritarianism is also positively associated with support for partisan shooting, when measured in study 3. The political and party variables again have less consistent connections. Further, ideological extremity is significant in one case but in the opposite direction than one would expect (more extreme ideologues are less supportive of violence). The only definitive difference between this measure of violence and SPV/WEV is that aggression does not matter here (also see Westwood et al. 2022: 7). Presumably, considering oneself to be generally aggressive ("In general, I would be willing to use physical violence to fight others") may facilitate supporting violence in the abstract but is less related to specific acts. We find the same lack of significance for aggression when we turn to the other specific acts from study 1, displayed in Figure 4. However, as with all other measures of support for partisan violence, a need for chaos and dehumanization again display positive relationships. (Recall in study 1, we did not measure social ideologies.) Partisanship as a social identity also exhibits a positive relationship in the more severe cases (i.e., all but assault with rocks).

Figure 3: Correlates of Shooting Vignette

Note. Results of multiple linear regression model with political party, age, race, gender, education, and (in studies 1-2) income included as covariates. Coefficients represent standardized betas with corresponding 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 4: Correlates of Specific Violent Acts

Beta Coefficients with 95% CI

Note. Results of multiple linear regression model with political party, age, race, gender, education, and (in studies 1-2) income included as covariates. Coefficients represent standardized betas with corresponding 95% confidence intervals.

Discussion

Just five years ago, Lelkes and Westwood (2017: 486) commented that "violence and extermination are the most serious levels of prejudice. However, apart from scattered cases of

vandalism…, these levels are not yet concerns in American politics."[15] While the extent to which partisan violence threatens American democracy remains debated, many researchers, practitioners, and members of the public have become substantially concerned (e.g., Kalmoe and Mason 2022b). We set out to evaluate which individual level variables consistently correlate with support for partisan violence across operationalizations. We found the same set of correlates robustly exhibit relationships with each measure of support for partisan violence. These include a need for chaos and dehumanization. A need for chaos presumably motivates the use of extreme methods while dehumanization removes moral concerns about the use of violence, even in the political domain. Indeed, dehumanizing out-partisans make it less reprehensible, and even desirable, to inflict harm upon the putatively depraved subhumans (Bandura 1999, Kteily and Landry 2022). At the same time, and consistent a burgeoning body of other work (Broockman et al. 2023, Mernyk et al. 2022, Voelkel et al. 2023), we find that partisan animosity is *not* a positive correlate of support for partisan violence. It is thus crucial to differentiate animus from dehumanization. We speculate that dehumanization may go beyond "mere" dislike: by stripping the target of the moral regard afforded to fellow human beings, dehumanization may render them particularly vulnerable to extreme harm (Kteily and Landry 2022).

While we characterized need for chaos as non-political and dehumanization as political (given the target is the other party), a crucial open question is whether these two variables characterize violence attitudes across domains (e.g., with dehumanization being directed toward non-political groups). While others have pointed to a need for chaos and dehumanization separately as correlates of support for violence, there combination makes for

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[15] Even more recent, in their 2021 paper, Uscinski et al. (2021: 884) state, "Studies about support for political violence in the United States are few and far between…"

a powerful explanation for violent actions more generally: they reflect a motivation to employ violence and a target at whom to direct it.

Along with a need for chaos and dehumanization, system justification and social dominance orientation were also positively related to support for partisan violence. We suspect this reflects a desire on behalf of those scoring high on those scales to protect their preferred social order from out-partisans deemed to threaten it. This is an interesting dynamic as it reveals the nuance of political violence: these orientations typically correlate with less support for violence against the political system (e.g., the government) that constitutes the status quo (Webber et al. 2020). Yet, within the polity they could be used to justify violence against perceived threats to the system. This creates an intriguing, unlikely combination of someone inclined toward chaos endorsing violence to protect an existing system. This may reflect that chaos is often endorsed due to "an intense desire for social status" (Arceneaux et al. 2021: 1) and, in this case, it is protecting perceived status.

We also find, consistent with prior work (Westwood et al. 2022), that more abstract measures of partisan violence generate higher levels of acceptance than items that ask about a particular violent act. This inverts the classic finding that individuals express greater tolerance in the abstract than in specific cases (Sullivan and Transue 1999). Here, partisans are more accepting of, and willing to engage in, abstract than specific violence (and thus, presumably less tolerant of out-partisans in abstract versus specific cases). This could reflect the vividness of concrete acts priming norms against violence. The general questions may also elicit greater support because they conjoin multiple distinct acts. That said, it is just as interesting that the focal correlates are largely consistent across these distinct constructs.

At the same time, we found trait aggression to robustly relate to the abstract items but not the specific items, likely reflecting a distinction between considering oneself to be generally aggressive as opposed to thinking about acting on one's aggression in concrete

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instances. A final intriguing dynamic concerns the inconsistent relationships of (a) extremity of left-right political ideology and (b) anti-establishment orientation with support for partisan violence. The findings accentuate the importance of broadening conceptualizations of ideology beyond simple left-right political extremity to also consider views about the system (e.g., system justification) and social status (e.g., social dominance) (e.g., Jost 2021).

Collectively, these results raise as many, if not more, questions as they answer. Our hope is that they motivate further investigations into various types of political violence, leveraging multiple operationalizations and accounting for a range of variables. This will sharpen our understanding of the etiology of partisan violence and ways to counteract it.

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Study 1

On December 12, 2022, we recruited a convenience sample of 300 participants through CloudResearch, an online recruitment service demonstrated to provide high data-quality (see Douglas et al., 2023; Peer et al., 2022). Indeed, only two participants failed either of the two attention check items we embedded in the survey. We excluded these two participants, as well as 17 pure Independents (i.e., those who did not report leaning toward one of the two major parties),[16] leaving a final sample of 281 participants (55.9% Democrat, 44.1% Republican; M_{Age} = 41.23, SD_{Age} = 12.16; 55.9% male, 43.8% female, 0.4% other). This sample was predominately White (76.5% White, 9.6% Black, 7.8% Asian, 6% other), well-educated (62.6% obtained a Bachelor's degree or higher), and of moderate income (29.2% with an annual household income of under $40,000, 40.2% with an income of $40,000-$80,000, and 30.6% with an income over $80,000).

Study 2

From March 14-23, 2023, we recruited 751 political partisans, quota-matched to their respective parties' 2020 American National Election Survey demographics on age, race, gender, education, and income. Participants were recruited through the ForthRight panel managed by Bovitz Inc. After excluding participants who failed the three attention check items embedded in the survey, we were left with a final sample of 721 participants. Table A1 presents a comparison of the final sample to the demographic benchmarks.

Table A1

Study 2: Sample Comparison to 2020 ANES Demographic Benchmarks

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[16] Here and throughout, patterns of results remain unchanged when including participants who failed attention checks.

Democrats				Republicans		
	2020 ANES	**Study 2 Sample**			**2020 ANES**	**Study 2 Sample**
Age				***Age***		
18-24	12.7%	14.5%		18-24	7.1%	8.9%
25-34	17.3%	15.8%		25-34	13.7%	15.0%
35-44	17.2%	18.4%		35-44	15.6%	18.7%
45-54	14.9%	16.1%		45-54	17.2%	19.9%
55-64	17.0%	16.6%		55-64	21.1%	19.9%
65+	21.0%	18.7%		65+	25.2%	20.5%
Gender				***Gender***		
Male	43.3%	42.1%		Male	52.6%	55.5%
Female	56.7%	55.3%		Female	47.4%	44.5%
Non-binary / other		2.6%		Non-binary / other		
Race				***Race***		
White	53.4%	58.7%		White	82.5%	80.1%
Black	19.7%	23.7%		Black	2.7%	5.3%
Hispanic	16.1%	20.3%		Hispanic	7.8%	10.6%
Asian or native Hawaiian / pacific islander	4.7%	6.1%		Asian or native Hawaiian / pacific islander	2.8%	4.8%
Native American / Alaskan native	1.7%	0.5%		Native American / Alaskan native	1.8%	0.8%
Multiple races / Other	4.1%	11.1%		Multiple races / Other	2.4%	8.4%
Education				***Education***		
Less than HS	7.4%	8.7%		Less than HS	6.7%	4.8%
High school credential	23.6%	17.4%		High school credential	27.8%	19.6%
some post-high school, no bachelor's degree	26.5%	34.7%		some post-high school, no bachelor's degree	31.9%	33.9%
bachelor's degree	25.8%	25.5%		bachelor's degree	22.6%	27.5%
graduate degree	16.8%	13.7%		graduate degree	10.9%	14.3%
Income				***Income***		
Less than $25k		20.1%		Less than $25k		15.3%
$25,000 to $34,999		14.7%		$25,000 to $34,999		10.4%
$35,000 to $49,999		10.9%		$35,000 to $49,999		14.1%
$50,000 to $74,999		15.2%		$50,000 to $74,999		17.0%
$75,000 to $99,999		12.8%		$75,000 to $99,999		12.7%
$100,000 to $149,999		16.8%		$100,000 to $149,999		19.0%
$150,000 to $199,999		5.4%		$150,000 to $199,999		5.8%
$200,000 or more		4.1%		$200,000 or more		5.8%

Study 3

From January 25-29, 2023, we recruited 1,001 political partisans, quota-matched to their respective parties' 2020 American National Election Survey demographics on age, race, gender, education, and income. Participants were recruited through the ForthRight panel managed by Bovitz Inc.[17] Table A2 presents a comparison of the sample to the demographic benchmarks.

Table A2

Study 3: Sample Comparison to 2020 ANES Demographic Benchmarks

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[17] In this study, rather than excluding participants who failed the attention checks post-hoc, those who failed either of the two attention checks were immediately directed to the end of the survey (i.e., they did not complete any additional measures). In total, 79 respondents failed at least one of these checks (i.e., 6.8% of all those initially recruited for the study).

Democrats				Republicans		
	2020 ANES	**Study 3 Sample**			**2020 ANES**	**Study 3 Sample**
Age				*Age*		
18-24	12.7%	14.8%		18-24	7.1%	7.2%
25-34	17.3%	14.8%		25-34	13.7%	14.7%
35-44	17.2%	17.6%		35-44	15.6%	17.3%
45-54	14.9%	16.1%		45-54	17.2%	17.1%
55-64	17.0%	15.5%		55-64	21.1%	21.7%
65+	21.0%	21.3%		65+	25.2%	22.0%
Gender				*Gender*		
Male	43.3%	44.1%		Male	52.6%	46.7%
Female	56.7%	53.3%		Female	47.4%	53.3%
Non-binary / other		2.7%		Non-binary / other		2.7%
Race				*Race*		
White	53.4%	63.4%		White	82.5%	86.8%
Black	19.7%	20.7%		Black	2.7%	4.1%
Hispanic	16.1%	21.5%		Hispanic	7.8%	14.7%
Asian or native Hawaiian / pacific islander	4.7%	4.0%		Asian or native Hawaiian / pacific islander	2.8%	1.7%
Native American / Alaskan native	1.7%	0.8%		Native American / Alaskan native	1.8%	0.2%
Multiple races / Other	4.1%	11.1%		Multiple races / Other	2.4%	7.2%
Education				*Education*		
Less than HS	7.4%	9.4%		Less than HS	6.7%	6.8%
High school credential	23.6%	23.4%		High school credential	27.8%	27.5%
some post-high school, no bachelor's degree	26.5%	33.5%		some post-high school, no bachelor's degree	31.9%	34.3%
bachelor's degree	25.8%	22.2%		bachelor's degree	22.6%	22.2%
graduate degree	16.8%	11.5%		graduate degree	10.9%	9.2%
Income				*Income*		
Less than $25k		26.7%		Less than $25k		18.0%
$25,000 to $34,999		12.3%		$25,000 to $34,999		13.2%
$35,000 to $49,999		14.1%		$35,000 to $49,999		15.2%
$50,000 to $74,999		16.6%		$50,000 to $74,999		20.7%
$75,000 to $99,999		12.7%		$75,000 to $99,999		11.0%
$100,000 to $149,999		10.5%		$100,000 to $149,999		15.4%
$150,000 to $199,999		4.8%		$150,000 to $199,999		4.0%
$200,000 or more		2.4%		$200,000 or more		2.6%

Appendix B: Measures

Party as a Social Identity (Huddy et al., 2015) was measured with a single item, "How important is being a [political affiliation] to you?", corresponding to a 101-point slider scale (0 = Not at all important, 100 = Extremely important).

Partisan Animosity was measured with a standard feeling thermometer. Participants rated how warm or cold they felt toward out-partisans using a 101-point slider scale (0 = Extremely cold, 100 = Extremely warm). Scores were reversed such that greater values indicated colder feelings.

Ideological Extremity was measured with a single item, "In general, do you consider yourself to be liberal or conservative?" corresponding to a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Extremely liberal, 7 = Extremely conservative). We then computed extremity as the absolute distance from the neutral scale midpoint (4 = Middle of the road).

Anti-Establishment Orientation was measured with the 12-item scale developed by Uscinski et al. (2021). This measure includes items assessing conspiratorial ideation (e.g., "Even though we live in a democracy, a few people will always run things anyway"), populism (e.g., "Official government accounts of events cannot be trusted"), and a Manichean view that "Politics is a

battle between good and evil." Each item was measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). These 12 items formed a reliable measure (Study 1: a = .93; Study 2: a = .92). See Uscinski et al. (2021) for a full list of items.

Need for Chaos was measured with the 7-item scale developed by Petersen et al. (2020), which includes items such as "I think society should be burned to the ground" and "Sometimes I just feel like destroying beautiful things." Each item was measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). These seven items formed a reliable measure (Study 1: a = .84; Study 2: a = .87; Study 3: a = .87). See Petersen et al. (2020) for a full list of items.

Trait Aggression was measured with the following six items from the Buss–Perry Aggression Questionnaire (Buss and Perry 1992):
- Given enough provocation, I may hit another person
- There are people who pushed me so far that we came to blows
- If I have to resort to violence to protect my rights, I will
- In general, I would be willing to use physical violence to fight others
- In certain situations, I am quite willing to use physical violence to assert my interests
- I would never use physical violence myself (reverse-scored)

Participants evaluated how well each item described them on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely well). These six items formed a reliable measure (Study 1: a = .90; Study 2: a = .86; Study 3: a = .82).

Dehumanization was measured as the composite of two measures from Kteily et al. (2015): the Ascent of Man scale and Animalistic Trait attribution. The Ascent of Man scale presents participants with the image depicting folk notions of human evolutionary progress, with a series of five silhouette figures "ascending" from a quadrupedal ape-like human ancestor on the far left to a fully upright, modern human on the far right. Using a 101-point slider scale corresponding to this image, participants rated how evolved they considered out-partisans to be (0 = Extremely unevolved, 100 = Extremely evolved). Scores were reversed such that greater values indicated less perceived evolution (i.e., more dehumanization). For the Animalistic Trait attribution measure, participants rated how well eight blatantly dehumanizing animalistic traits (e.g., "savage", "barbaric", and "like animals") described out-partisans using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely well). We then standardized and combined the Ascent of Man and Animalistic Trait measures into a single measure of dehumanization (Study 1: a = .96; Study 2: a = .96; Study 3: a = .95).

System Justification was measured with the 6-item scale from Kay and Jost (2003), consisting of items such as "In general, the American political system operates as it should" and "In general, the American political system is fair." Participants responded to each item using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely so). These six items formed a reliable measure (Study 2: a = .88). See Kay and Jost (2003) for a full list of items.

Social Dominance Orientation was measured with the 4-item Dominance subscale of the SDO_7 developed by Ho et al. (2015), consisting of items such as "It is unjust to try to make groups equal" and "Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups." Participants responded

to each item using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). These four items formed a reliable measure (Study 3: a = .82). See Ho et al. (2015) for a full list of items.

Right-Wing Authoritarianism was measured with the 3-item Very Short Authoritarianism scale (Bizumic and Duckitt, 2018): "What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity"; "Our society needs tougher government and stricter laws"; "The facts on crime and the recent public disorders show we have to crack down harder on troublemakers if we are going to preserve law and order." Participants responded to these items using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). These three items formed a reliable measure (Study 3: a = .75).

Support for Partisan Violence (SPV) was measured with the 4-item scale from Kalmoe and Mason (2022; e.g., "How much do you feel it is justified for [IN-PARTY]s to use violence in advancing their political goals these days?") on 101-point slider scales (0 = Never/Not at all justified, 100 = Always/Extremely justified). These four items formed a reliable scale (Study 1: a = .95; Study 2: a = .90; Study 3: a = .94). See the text of the paper for the full list of items.

Willingness to Engage in Violence (WEV) was measured with a single item from Mernyk et al. (2022): "Think about the next presidential election in 2024. If a [OUT-PARTY] is declared the winner of a contested election, how likely would you be to engage in violence?" Participants responded using a 101-point slider scale (0 = Not at all likely, 100 = Extremely likely).

The Shooting Vignette from Westwood et al. (2022) read as follows:

Iowa Man Arrested After Shooting A Woman at a [OUT-PARTY] Meeting

Steven Wright, 65, was arrested for attempted murder this afternoon in Des Moines. The Iowa local allegedly pulled a gun on a group of [OUT-PARTY] who were meeting in a neighboring house. Following a confrontation, Wright reportedly shot one of the attendees in the chest. Two witnesses reported that Wright was upset that [OUT-PARTY] were gathering in what Wright called a [IN-PARTY] part of town. After aggressively arguing for several minutes, Wright reportedly aimed his gun at the woman and fired while calling her "a [OUT-PARTY] maniac bent on ruining Iowa." The victim later told reporters that she is sure she was shot "because she was trying to help organize [OUT-PARTY] in her neighborhood." When deputies arrived, Wright was sitting on a couch next to a shotgun and stated that he was not coming out, the report states. Deputies were able to take him into custody without further incident. They located a pistol on his person with a magazine and six rounds of ammunition, the report continues.

Using 7-point Likert scales, participants were asked "Do you support or oppose the actions of Steven Wright?" (1 = Strongly oppose, 7 = Strongly support) and "Was the shooter unjustified or justified?" (1 = Extremely unjustified, 7 = Extremely justified). We combined these items into a single index of support for the shooter (Study 1: a = .96; Study 2: a = .85; Study 3: a = .87).

The four other specific acts of violence from Westwood et al. (2022) read as follows.

Assault with Rocks: "A [IN-PARTY] was convicted of assault. He was arrested by police for throwing rocks at peaceful [OUT-PARTY] protesters. Although no one was seriously injured, paramedics bandaged a man with a head wound. Do you support or oppose this [IN-PARTY]'s actions?"

Arson: "A [IN-PARTY] was convicted of arson. He was arrested by police as he attempted to run from a fire he started at the local [OUT-PARTY] headquarters. Although he waited for the building to close for the night, several adjacent buildings were still occupied. Do you support or oppose this [IN-PARTY]'s actions?"

Assault with a Deadly Weapon: "A [IN-PARTY] was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. He was arrested by police after driving his car into a crowd of [OUT-PARTY] protesters. Although no one was killed, several individuals were seriously injured and one spent a month in the hospital. Do you support or oppose this [IN-PARTY]'s actions?"

Murder: "A [IN-PARTY] was convicted of murder. He was arrested by police after surveillance footage was found showing him stabbing a prominent [OUT-PARTY] to death. The [IN-PARTY] targeted the [OUT-PARTY] because he believed this [out-partisan] had prevented him from voting in the last election as part of a conspiracy to stop [IN-PARTY] voters. Do you support or oppose this [IN-PARTY]'s actions?"

Participants responded to each scenario using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly oppose, 7 = Strongly support).

Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics, Variable Intercorrelations, and Regression Output

Table A3

Study 1: Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Main Correlates and Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)

Correlations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
1. Party as a Social Identity	--							
2. Ideological Extremity	.30***	--						
3. Partisan Animosity	.21***	.36***	--					
4. AEO	.02	-.03	.12	--				
5. Need for Chaos	-.02	.06	.09	.32***	--			
6. Aggression	-.05	.02	.09	.33***	.33***	--		
7. Dehumanization	.25***	.15*	.46***	.33***	.33***	.23***	--	
8. SPV	.11	.23***	.18**	.19**	.39***	.32***	.43***	
Descriptives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
M	54.05	1.72	66.40	4.27	1.82	2.67	0.03	7.13
SD	30.83	0.93	24.72	1.30	0.98	1.50	0.95	17.22
α	--	--	--	.93	.84	.90	.96	.95

Note. ***$p < .001$ **$p < .01$ *$p < .05$

Table A4

Study 1: Results of Multiple Linear Regression (Dependent Variable: SPV; see Figure 1)

	Unstandardized b	95% CI for b	Standard Error	Standardized β	p
Party as a Social Identity	-0.001	[-0.06, 0.06]	0.03	-.002	.973
Ideological Extremity	4.03	[1.95, 6.16]	1.10	.22	< .001
Partisan Animosity	-0.06	[-0.13, 0.02]	0.04	-.09	.120
AEO	-0.39	[-2.26, 1.55]	1.00	-.03	.704
Need for Chaos	3.89	[0.45, 7.05]	1.66	.22	.025
Aggression	1.58	[-0.24, 3.30]	0.93	.14	.087
Dehumanization	6.12	[2.90, 9.40]	1.68	.34	< .001
Party (1 = Democrat, 2 = Republican)	1.49	[-1.67, 4.78]	1.68	.04	.387
Age	-0.01	[-0.14, 0.12]	0.07	-.01	.828
Black	-2.18	[-7.54, 4.39]	3.07	-.04	.442
Asian	1.06	[-6.65, 9.94]	4.28	.02	.808
Biracial/Other Race	2.09	[-3.62, 9.57]	3.44	.03	.543
Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female)	-3.35	[-6.81, -0.20]	1.67	-.10	.053
Income: Under $40,000	0.33	[-4.31, 4.63]	2.27	.01	.911
Income: $40,000-$80,000	2.62	[-1.77, 7.30]	2.26	.08	.256
Education: Less than Bachelors	0.27	[-4.33, 4.83]	2.42	.01	.916
Education: Bachelors	4.84	[0.59, 9.43]	2.21	.14	.029

Note. Regression performed with 1,000 bootstrapped resamples. "White", "over $80,000", and "advanced (post-Bachelor) degree" served as contrast categories for race, income, and education, respectively.

Table A5

Study 1: Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Main Correlates and Willingness to Engage in Violence (WEV)

Correlations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Party as a Social Identity	--						
2. Ideological Extremity	.30***	--					
3. Partisan Animosity	.21***	.36***	--				
4. Anti-Establishment Orientation	.02	-.03	.12	--			
5. Need for Chaos	-.02	.06	.09	.32***	--		
6. Aggression	-.05	.02	.09	.33***	.33***	--	
7. Dehumanization	.25***	.15*	.46***	.33***	.33***	.23***	--
8. WEV	.17**	.14*	.02	.17**	.32***	.27***	.31***

Descriptives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
M	54.05	1.72	66.40	4.27	1.82	2.67	0.03	5.66
SD	30.83	0.93	24.72	1.30	0.98	1.50	0.95	17.11
α	--	--	--	.93	.84	.90	.96	--

Note. ***$p < .001$ **$p < .01$ *$p < .05$

Table A6

Study 1: Results of Multiple Linear Regression (Dependent Variable: WEV; see Figure 2)

	Unstandardized b	95% CI for b	Standard Error	Standardized β	p
Party as a Social Identity	0.07	[0.01, 0.13]	0.03	-.002	.040
Ideological Extremity	2.36	[0.52, 4.28]	0.99	.22	.020
Partisan Animosity	-0.12	[-0.22, -0.02]	0.05	-.09	.020
AEO	0.24	[-1.74, 2.54]	1.13	-.03	.836
Need for Chaos	3.08	[-0.18, 6.36]	1.65	.22	.074
Aggression	1.89	[0.38, 3.49]	0.80	.14	.012
Dehumanization	4.39	[1.44, 7.29]	1.52	.34	.012
Party (1 = Democrat, 2 = Republican)	-0.42	[-4.33, 3.18]	1.89	.04	.807
Age	-0.10	[-0.25, 0.03]	0.07	-.01	.142
Black	-4.39	[-9.73, 0.73]	2.68	-.04	.103
Asian	0.93	[-7.12, 10.35]	4.47	.02	.846
Biracial/Other Race	7.71	[-0.65, 16.45]	4.35	.03	.080
Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female)	-0.11	[-3.20, 3.28]	1.70	-.10	.948
Income: Under $40,000	-2.87	[-7.63, 1.51]	2.30	.01	.231
Income: $40,000-$80,000	1.44	[-3.70, 6.48]	2.53	.08	.565
Education: Less than Bachelors	-2.90	[-8.73, 2.77]	2.94	.01	.341
Education: Bachelors	0.65	[-4.87, 6.19]	2.70	.14	.790

Note. Regression performed with 1,000 bootstrapped resamples. "White", "over $80,000", and "advanced (post-Bachelor) degree" served as contrast categories for race, income, and education, respectively.

Table A7

Study 1: Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Main Correlates and Shooting Vignette

Correlations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Party as a Social Identity	--						
2. Ideological Extremity	.30***	--					
3. Partisan Animosity	.21***	.36***	--				
4. Anti-Establishment Orientation	.02	-.03	.12	--			
5. Need for Chaos	-.02	.06	.09	.32***	--		
6. Aggression	-.05	.02	.09	.33***	.33***	--	
7. Dehumanization	.25***	.15*	.46***	.33***	.33***	.23***	--
8. Shooting Vignette	.23***	.03	.01	.12	.36***	.15*	.34***

Descriptives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
M	54.05	1.72	66.40	4.27	1.82	2.67	0.03	1.23
SD	30.83	0.93	24.72	1.30	0.98	1.50	0.95	0.85
α	--	--	--	.93	.84	.90	.96	.96

Note. ***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05*

Table A8

Study 1: Results of Multiple Linear Regression (Dependent Variable: Shooting Vignette; see Figure 3)

	Unstandardized *b*	95% CI for *b*	Standard Error	Standardized *β*	*p*
Party as a Social Identity	0.01	[0.003, 0.01]	0.001	.21	.003
Ideological Extremity	-0.03	[-0.14, 0.08]	0.06	-.03	.587
Partisan Animosity	-0.01	[-0.01, -0.002]	0.002	-.17	.007
AEO	-0.05	[-0.14, 0.07]	0.05	-.07	.393
Need for Chaos	0.25	[0.02, 0.45]	0.11	.29	.025
Aggression	0.02	[-0.09, 0.13]	0.05	.03	.736
Dehumanization	0.27	[0.09, 0.49]	0.10	.30	.017
Party (1 = Democrat, 2 = Republican)	0.09	[-0.09, 0.25]	0.09	.05	.335
Age	0.00	[-0.01, 0.01]	0.004	-.01	.883
Black	-0.17	[-0.48, 0.12]	0.15	-.06	.253
Asian	0.02	[-0.32, 0.38]	0.18	.01	.935
Biracial/Other Race	0.10	[-0.24, 0.47]	0.18	.03	.589
Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female)	-0.05	[-0.24, 0.13]	0.10	-.03	.586
Income: Under $40,000	0.03	[-0.23, 0.27]	0.13	.02	.800
Income: $40,000-$80,000	0.02	[-0.18, 0.23]	0.11	.01	.858
Education: Less than Bachelors	-0.12	[-0.34, 0.07]	0.11	-.07	.287
Education: Bachelors	0.02	[-0.21, 0.29]	0.13	.01	.855

Note. Regression performed with 1,000 bootstrapped resamples. "White", "over $80,000", and "advanced (post-Bachelor) degree" served as contrast categories for race, income, and education, respectively.

Table A9

Study 1: Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Main Correlates and Assault with Rocks

Correlations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Party as a Social Identity	--						
2. Ideological Extremity	.30***	--					
3. Partisan Animosity	.21***	.36***	--				
4. Anti-Establishment Orientation	.02	-.03	.12	--			
5. Need for Chaos	-.02	.06	.09	.32***	--		
6. Aggression	-.05	.02	.09	.33***	.33***	--	
7. Dehumanization	.25***	.15*	.46***	.33***	.33***	.23***	--
8. Assault with Rocks	.14*	.09	.14*	.18**	.35***	.23***	.45***

Descriptives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
M	54.05	1.72	66.40	4.27	1.82	2.67	0.03	1.42
SD	30.83	0.93	24.72	1.30	0.98	1.50	0.95	1.16
α	--	--	--	.93	.84	.90	.96	--

*Note. ***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05*

Table A10

Study 1: Results of Multiple Linear Regression (Dependent Variable: Assault with Rocks; see Figure 4)

	Unstandardized b	95% CI for b	Standard Error	Standardized β	p
Party as a Social Identity	0.001	[0.00, 0.01]	0.002	.04	.563
Ideological Extremity	0.07	[-0.08, 0.21]	0.07	.05	.362
Partisan Animosity	-0.004	[-0.01, 0.00]	0.002	-.09	.093
AEO	-0.03	[-0.14, 0.08]	0.06	-.04	.565
Need for Chaos	0.24	[0.03, 0.45]	0.11	.20	.029
Aggression	0.05	[-0.07, 0.17]	0.06	.06	.445
Dehumanization	0.50	[0.24, 0.73]	0.12	.41	.002
Party (1 = Democrat, 2 = Republican)	0.20	[-0.07, 0.48]	0.14	.09	.155
Age	0.001	[-0.01, 0.01]	0.01	.01	.871
Black	-0.27	[-0.48, 0.12]	0.22	-.07	.203
Asian	0.02	[-0.67, 0.19]	0.25	.00	.943
Biracial/Other Race	0.11	[-0.33, 0.63]	0.25	.02	.663
Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female)	-0.14	[-0.36, 0.11]	0.12	-.06	.254
Income: Under $40,000	0.12	[-0.19, 0.43]	0.16	.05	.478
Income: $40,000-$80,000	0.20	[-0.07, 0.48]	0.14	.08	.158
Education: Less than Bachelors	-0.07	[-0.38, 0.25]	0.16	-.03	.672
Education: Bachelors	0.18	[-0.12, 0.49]	0.15	.08	.244

Note. Regression performed with 1,000 bootstrapped resamples. "White", "over $80,000", and "advanced (post-Bachelor) degree" served as contrast categories for race, income, and education, respectively.

Table A11

Study 1: Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Main Correlates and Arson

Correlations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Party as a Social Identity	--						
2. Ideological Extremity	.30***	--					
3. Partisan Animosity	.21***	.36***	--				
4. Anti-Establishment Orientation	.02	-.03	.12	--			
5. Need for Chaos	-.02	.06	.09	.32***	--		
6. Aggression	-.05	.02	.09	.33***	.33***	--	
7. Dehumanization	.25***	.15*	.46***	.33***	.33***	.23***	--
8. Arson	.16**	.06	.05	.13*	.36***	.15*	.31***

Descriptives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
M	54.05	1.72	66.40	4.27	1.82	2.67	0.03	1.32
SD	30.83	0.93	24.72	1.30	0.98	1.50	0.95	1.02
α	--	--	--	.93	.84	.90	.96	--

Note. ***$p < .001$ **$p < .01$ *$p < .05$

Table A12

Study 1: Results of Multiple Linear Regression (Dependent Variable: Arson; see Figure 4)

	Unstandardized b	95% CI for b	Standard Error	Standardized β	p
Party as a Social Identity	0.004	[0.001, 0.01]	0.002	.13	.036
Ideological Extremity	0.01	[-0.13, 0.15]	0.07	.01	.871
Partisan Animosity	-0.01	[-0.01, 0.00]	0.002	-.11	.077
AEO	-0.03	[-0.13, 0.10]	0.06	-.03	.671
Need for Chaos	0.31	[0.07, 0.56]	0.12	.30	.015
Aggression	-0.01	[-0.12, 0.11]	0.06	-.01	.897
Dehumanization	0.25	[0.04, 0.45]	0.11	.23	.035
Party (1 = Democrat, 2 = Republican)	0.07	[-0.16, 0.30]	0.12	.03	.592
Age	-0.003	[-0.01, 0.01]	0.01	-.04	.527
Black	-0.15	[-0.49, 0.21]	0.17	-.04	.404
Asian	0.07	[-0.38, 0.53]	0.24	.02	.803
Biracial/Other Race	-0.11	[-0.43, 0.21]	0.16	-.03	.491
Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female)	-0.14	[-0.37, 0.06]	0.11	-.07	.195
Income: Under $40,000	0.01	[-0.31, 0.29]	0.15	.01	.943
Income: $40,000-$80,000	0.15	[-0.12, 0.42]	0.14	.07	.277
Education: Less than Bachelors	-0.03	[-0.33, 0.28]	0.15	-.02	.809
Education: Bachelors	0.18	[-0.13, 0.50]	0.16	.09	.271

Note. Regression performed with 1,000 bootstrapped resamples. "White", "over $80,000", and "advanced (post-Bachelor) degree" served as contrast categories for race, income, and education, respectively.

Table A13

Study 1: Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Main Correlates and Assault with a Deadly Weapon

Correlations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Party as a Social Identity	--						
2. Ideological Extremity	.30***	--					
3. Partisan Animosity	.21***	.36***	--				
4. Anti-Establishment Orientation	.02	-.03	.12	--			
5. Need for Chaos	-.02	.06	.09	.32***	--		
6. Aggression	-.05	.02	.09	.33***	.33***	--	
7. Dehumanization	.25***	.15*	.46***	.33***	.33***	.23***	--
8. Assault with a Deadly Weapon	.25***	.02	.04	.15*	.34***	.18**	.38***

Descriptives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
M	54.05	1.72	66.40	4.27	1.82	2.67	0.03	1.30
SD	30.83	0.93	24.72	1.30	0.98	1.50	0.95	0.96
α	--	--	--	.93	.84	.90	.96	--

Note. ***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05*

Table A14

Study 1: Results of Multiple Linear Regression (Dependent Variable: Assault with a Deadly Weapon; see Figure 4)

	Unstandardized b	95% CI for b	Standard Error	Standardized β	p
Party as a Social Identity	0.01	[0.004, 0.01]	0.002	.23	< .001
Ideological Extremity	-0.06	[-0.20, 0.08]	0.07	-.05	.421
Partisan Animosity	-0.01	[-0.01, -0.001]	0.002	-.16	.008
AEO	-0.02	[-0.13, 0.10]	0.06	-.03	.733
Need for Chaos	0.22	[0.00, 0.45]	0.11	.23	.052
Aggression	0.03	[-0.08, 0.14]	0.06	.04	.625
Dehumanization	0.34	[0.14, 0.55]	0.10	.34	.004
Party (1 = Democrat, 2 = Republican)	0.03	[-0.18, 0.25]	0.11	.02	.787
Age	-0.001	[-0.01, 0.01]	0.004	-.01	.878
Black	-0.28	[-0.59, 0.00]	0.15	-.09	.072
Asian	-0.04	[-0.44, 0.32]	0.19	-.01	.841
Biracial/Other Race	0.07	[-0.24, 0.40]	0.16	.02	.670
Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female)	-0.14	[-0.36, 0.05]	0.11	-.07	.213
Income: Under $40,000	-0.05	[-0.35, 0.20]	0.14	-.02	.740
Income: $40,000-$80,000	0.01	[-0.24, 0.25]	0.12	.01	.915
Education: Less than Bachelors	-0.04	[-0.28, 0.20]	0.12	-.02	.704
Education: Bachelors	0.13	[-0.14, 0.40]	0.14	.07	.394

Note. Regression performed with 1,000 bootstrapped resamples. "White", "over $80,000", and "advanced (post-Bachelor) degree" served as contrast categories for race, income, and education, respectively.

Table A15

Study 1: Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Main Correlates and Murder

Correlations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Party as a Social Identity	--						
2. Ideological Extremity	.30***	--					
3. Partisan Animosity	.21***	.36***	--				
4. Anti-Establishment Orientation	.02	-.03	.12	--			
5. Need for Chaos	-.02	.06	.09	.32***	--		
6. Aggression	-.05	.02	.09	.33***	.33***	--	
7. Dehumanization	.25***	.15*	.46***	.33***	.33***	.23***	--
8. Murder	.19**	.02	-.01	.15*	.39***	.18**	.31***

Descriptives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
M	54.05	1.72	66.40	4.27	1.82	2.67	0.03	1.28
SD	30.83	0.93	24.72	1.30	0.98	1.50	0.95	0.93
α	--	--	--	.93	.84	.90	.96	--

Note. ***$p < .001$ **$p < .01$ *$p < .05$

Table A16

Study 1: Results of Multiple Linear Regression (Dependent Variable: Murder; see Figure 4)

	Unstandardized b	95% CI for b	Standard Error	Standardized β	p
Party as a Social Identity	0.01	[0.002, 0.01]	0.002	.19	.006
Ideological Extremity	-0.03	[-0.18, 0.12]	0.08	-.03	.704
Partisan Animosity	-0.01	[-0.01, -0.001]	0.003	-.16	.030
AEO	-0.01	[-0.12, 0.11]	0.06	-.02	.821
Need for Chaos	0.29	[0.05, 0.51]	0.12	.31	.016
Aggression	0.03	[-0.07, 0.14]	0.06	.05	.596
Dehumanization	0.23	[0.05, 0.44]	0.10	.24	.027
Party (1 = Democrat, 2 = Republican)	-0.02	[-0.20, 0.18]	0.10	-.01	.888
Age	0.00	[-0.01, 0.01]	0.004	.00	.931
Black	-0.32	[-0.60, -0.07]	0.13	-.10	.021
Asian	-0.09	[-0.48, 0.32]	0.20	-.03	.646
Biracial/Other Race	-0.03	[-0.36, 0.44]	0.20	-.01	.887
Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female)	-0.09	[-0.30, 0.12]	0.10	-.05	.386
Income: Under $40,000	-0.08	[-0.38, 0.18]	0.14	-.04	.593
Income: $40,000-$80,000	-0.06	[-0.31, 0.19]	0.12	-.03	.625
Education: Less than Bachelors	0.00	[-0.20, 0.20]	0.10	.00	.979
Education: Bachelors	0.22	[-0.02, 0.45]	0.13	.12	.093

Note. Regression performed with 1,000 bootstrapped resamples. "White", "over $80,000", and "advanced (post-Bachelor) degree" served as contrast categories for race, income, and education, respectively.

Table A17

Study 2: Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Main Correlates and Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)

Correlations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Party as a Social Identity	--							
2. Ideological Extremity	.30***	--						
3. Partisan Animosity	.16***	.24***	--					
4. Anti-Establishment Orientation	.11**	.14***	.21***	--				
5. Need for Chaos	.06	.07	-.01	.30***	--			
6. Aggression	-.06	-.05	.07	.33***	.41***	--		
7. Dehumanization	.25***	.20***	.59***	.36***	.25***	.16***	--	
8. System Justification	.13***	-.12**	-.30***	-.34***	-.04	-.08*	-.25***	--
9. Support for Partisan Violence	.06	.08*	-.05	.17***	.47***	.35***	.24***	.06
Descriptives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
M	69.11	1.58	63.68	4.38	1.78	2.84	-0.02	3.32	10.17
SD	27.14	1.04	25.23	1.31	1.05	1.51	0.91	1.25	17.97
α	--	--	--	.92	.87	.86	.96	.88	.90

Note. ***$p < .001$ **$p < .01$ *$p < .05$

Table A18

Study 2: Results of Multiple Linear Regression (Dependent Variable: SPV; see Figure 1)

	Unstandardized b	95% CI for b	Standard Error	Standardized β	p
Party as a Social Identity	0.01	[-0.03, 0.05]	0.02	.02	.656
Ideological Extremity	1.28	[-0.03, 2.45]	0.62	.07	.040
Partisan Animosity	-0.12	[-0.18, -0.06]	0.03	-.17	< .001
AEO	-0.15	[-1.29, 1.04]	0.59	-.01	.806
Need for Chaos	5.15	[3.45, 6.95]	0.90	.30	< .001
Aggression	2.33	[1.41, 3.26]	0.47	.20	< .001
Dehumanization	4.81	[3.01, 6.51]	0.91	.24	< .001
System Justification	1.51	[0.34, 2.51]	0.55	.11	.003
Party (1 = Democrat, 2 = Republican)	1.71	[-0.61, 4.01]	1.17	.05	.147
Age	-0.12	[-0.18, -0.05]	0.04	-.11	< .001
Black	3.76	[0.53, 7.02]	1.62	.08	.019
Asian	1.61	[-3.45, 7.04]	2.63	.02	.556
Biracial/Other Race	0.14	[-4.03, 4.02]	2.02	.00	.966
Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female)	0.14	[-2.11, 2.47]	1.16	.00	.909
Income: Under $40,000	-2.24	[-5.98, 1.39]	1.85	-.06	.215
Income: $40,000-$80,000	-3.68	[-7.12, -0.07]	1.77	-.09	.042
Income: $80,001-$120,000	-1.45	[-5.51, 2.76]	2.03	-.03	.464
Education: High School Only	-1.95	[-6.12, 1.80]	1.92	-.05	.305
Education: Some College	-1.73	[-5.46, 1.76]	1.84	-.04	.344
Education: Bachelors	0.08	[-3.75, 3.48]	1.80	.00	.970

Note. Regression performed with 1,000 bootstrapped resamples. "White", "over $120,000", and "advanced (post-Bachelor) degree" served as contrast categories for race, income, and education, respectively.

Table A19

Study 2: Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Main Correlates and Willingness to Engage in Partisan Violence (WEV)

	Correlations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1.	Party as a Social Identity	--							
2.	Ideological Extremity	.30***	--						
3.	Partisan Animosity	.16***	.24***	--					
4.	Anti-Establishment Orientation	.11**	.14***	.21***	--				
5.	Need for Chaos	.06	.07	-.01	.30***	--			
6.	Aggression	-.06	-.05	.07	.33***	.41***	--		
7.	Dehumanization	.25***	.20***	.59***	.36***	.25***	.16***	--	
8.	System Justification	.13***	-.12**	-.30***	-.34***	-.04	-.08*	-.25***	--
9.	Willingness to Engage in Partisan Violence	.10**	-.02	-.09*	.14***	.47***	.29***	.15***	.16***

Descriptives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
M	69.11	1.58	63.68	4.38	1.78	2.84	-0.02	3.32	8.07
SD	27.14	1.04	25.23	1.31	1.05	1.51	0.91	1.25	19.15
α	--	--	--	.92	.87	.86	.96	.88	--

Note. ***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05

Table A20

Study 2: Results of Multiple Linear Regression (Dependent Variable: WEV; see Figure 2)

	Unstandardized b	95% CI for b	Standard Error	Standardized β	p
Party as a Social Identity	0.06	[0.02, 0.11]	0.02	.09	.011
Ideological Extremity	-1.02	[-2.57, 0.47]	0.77	-.06	.193
Partisan Animosity	-0.08	[-0.15, 0.00]	0.04	-.10	.054
AEO	0.42	[-0.88, 1.64]	0.65	.03	.510
Need for Chaos	6.46	[4.50, 8.47]	1.01	.35	< .001
Aggression	1.36	[0.45, 2.31]	0.47	.11	.004
Dehumanization	2.66	[0.87, 4.51]	0.95	.13	.005
System Justification	2.95	[1.66, 4.22]	0.67	.19	< .001
Party (1 = Democrat, 2 = Republican)	1.75	[-0.92, 4.56]	1.37	.05	.219
Age	-0.18	[-0.27, -0.10]	0.04	-.16	< .001
Black	2.89	[-0.39, 6.34]	1.75	.06	.094
Asian	-3.88	[-7.59, 0.00]	1.93	-.05	-.048
Biracial/Other Race	-0.28	[-4.75, 4.26]	2.24	-.01	.903
Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female)	0.77	[-1.68, 3.13]	1.24	.02	.545
Income: Under $40,000	-0.89	[-4.61, 2.90]	1.96	-.02	.672
Income: $40,000-$80,000	-1.79	[-5.52, 1.79]	1.91	-.04	.349
Income: $80,001-$120,000	-0.90	[-5.24, 3.40]	2.22	-.02	.699
Education: High School Only	-2.47	[-6.29, 1.19]	1.88	-.06	.195
Education: Some College (Less than Bachelors)	-2.26	[-5.63, 1.23]	1.76	-.05	.203
Education: Bachelors	-0.19	[-3.89, 3.41]	1.85	.00	.912

Note. Regression performed with 1,000 bootstrapped resamples. "White", "over $120,000", and "advanced (post-Bachelor) degree" served as contrast categories for race, income, and education, respectively.

Table A21

Study 2: Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Main Correlates and Shooting Vignette

Correlations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Party as a Social Identity	--							
2. Ideological Extremity	.30***	--						
3. Partisan Animosity	.16***	.24***	--					
4. Anti-Establishment Orientation	.11**	.14***	.21***	--				
5. Need for Chaos	.06	.07	-.01	.30***	--			
6. Aggression	-.06	-.05	.07	.33***	.41***	--		
7. Dehumanization	.25***	.20***	.59***	.36***	.25***	.16***	--	
8. System Justification	.13***	-.12**	-.30***	-.34***	-.04	-.08*	-.25***	--
9. Shooting Vignette	.09*	.01	-.11**	.12**	.47***	.21***	.13***	.18***
Descriptives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
M	69.11	1.58	63.68	4.38	1.78	2.84	-0.02	3.32	1.37
SD	27.14	1.04	25.23	1.31	1.05	1.51	0.91	1.25	0.98
α	--	--	--	.92	.87	.86	.96	.88	.85

*Note. ***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05*

Table A22

Study 2: Results of Multiple Linear Regression (Dependent Variable: Shooting Vignette; see Figure 3)

	Unstandardized b	95% CI for b	Standard Error	Standardized β	p
Party as a Social Identity	0.002	[0.00, 0.004]	0.001	.06	.069
Ideological Extremity	-0.01	[-0.07, 0.06]	0.04	-.01	.736
Partisan Animosity	-0.01	[-0.01, -0.002]	0.002	-.13	.006
AEO	0.02	[-0.05, 0.09]	0.04	.03	.570
Need for Chaos	0.37	[0.24, 0.49]	0.06	.40	< .001
Aggression	0.01	[-0.04, 0.06]	0.03	.01	.710
Dehumanization	0.13	[0.03, 0.23]	0.05	.13	.011
System Justification	0.16	[0.09, 0.23]	0.03	.21	< .001
Party (1 = Democrat, 2 = Republican)	0.08	[-0.08, 0.24]	0.08	.04	.298
Age	-0.01	[-0.01, -0.004]	0.002	-.14	< .001
Black	0.21	[0.01, 0.40]	0.10	.08	.031
Asian	-0.29	[-0.49, -0.09]	0.10	-.07	.006
Biracial/Other Race	-0.05	[-0.27, 0.19]	0.12	-.02	.707
Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female)	0.03	[-0.09, 0.15]	0.06	.02	.656
Income: Under $40,000	0.12	[-0.06, 0.29]	0.09	.06	.179
Income: $40,000-$80,000	0.004	[-0.17, 0.17]	0.09	.00	.959
Income: $80,001-$120,000	0.13	[-0.06, 0.34]	0.10	.05	.194
Education: High School Only	0.01	[-0.19, 0.23]	0.10	.00	.962
Education: Some College (Less than Bachelors)	-0.01	[-0.17, 0.17]	0.09	.00	.946
Education: Bachelors	0.06	[-0.12, 0.24]	0.09	.03	.528

Note. Regression performed with 1,000 bootstrapped resamples. "White", "over $120,000", and "advanced (post-Bachelor) degree" served as contrast categories for race, income, and education, respectively.

Table A23

Study 3: Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Main Correlates and Support for Partisan Violence (SPV)

	Correlations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1.	Party as a Social Identity	--							
2.	Ideological Extremity	.30***	--						
3.	Partisan Animosity	.16***	.24***	--					
4.	Need for Chaos	.11**	.14***	.21***	--				
5.	Aggression	.06	.07	-.01	.30***	--			
6.	Dehumanization	-.06	-.05	.07	.33***	.41***	--		
7.	Social Dominance Orientation	.25***	.20***	.59***	.36***	.25***	.16***	--	
8.	Right-Wing Authoritarianism	.13***	-.12**	-.30***	-.34***	-.04	-.08*	-.25***	--
9.	Support for Partisan Violence	.06	.08*	-.05	.17***	.47***	.35***	.24***	.06
	Descriptives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	M	69.09	1.52	62.73	1.87	3.07	0.00	3.00	4.15	11.06
	SD	27.21	1.02	26.58	1.10	1.43	0.90	1.53	1.53	20.69
	α	--	--	--	.87	.82	.95	.82	.75	.94

*Note. ***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05*

Table A24

Study 3: Results of Multiple Linear Regression (Dependent Variable: SPV; see Figure 1)

	Unstandardized *b*	95% CI for *b*	Standard Error	Standardized *β*	*p*
Party as a Social Identity	0.07	[0.03, 0.11]	0.02	.09	< .001
Ideological Extremity	0.72	[-0.41, 1.79]	0.57	.04	.214
Partisan Animosity	-0.08	[-0.14, -0.03]	0.03	-.11	.005
Need for Chaos	8.12	[6.48, 9.56]	0.79	.43	< .001
Aggression	1.60	[0.70, 2.50]	0.46	.11	.002
Dehumanization	2.20	[0.89, 3.89]	0.72	.10	.003
Social Dominance Orientation	0.86	[-0.01, 1.90]	0.50	.06	.077
Right-Wing Authoritarianism	0.23	[-0.64, 1.02]	0.43	.02	.581
Party (1 = Democrat, 2 = Republican)	0.80	[-1.72, 3.29]	1.28	.02	.538
Age	-0.13	[-0.20, -0.06]	0.04	-.11	< .001
Black	-0.24	[-3.06, 2.64]	1.41	.00	.864
Hispanic	0.95	[-2.90, 5.04]	2.04	.01	.628
Biracial/Other Race	-3.07	[-6.86, 0.70]	1.91	-.03	.105
Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female)	-0.39	[-2.34, 1.86]	1.06	-.01	.730
Education: High School Only	0.35	[-3.24, 3.91]	1.84	.01	.841
Education: Some College (Less than Bachelors)	1.14	[-2.47, 4.95]	1.90	.03	.552
Education: Bachelors	-0.74	[-4.53, 2.95]	1.95	-.02	.743

Note. Regression performed with 1,000 bootstrapped resamples. "White" and "advanced (post-Bachelor) degree" served as contrast categories for race and education, respectively. Due to several participants not reporting their income (*n* = 50) we did not include in the main models for this study. However, substantive patterns of results remain unchanged when restricting the sample to those who reported their income and including it as a covariate.

Table A25

Study 3: Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Main Correlates and Shooting Vignette

Correlations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Party as a Social Identity	--							
2. Ideological Extremity	.30***	--						
3. Partisan Animosity	.16***	.24***	--					
4. Need for Chaos	.11**	.14***	.21***	--				
5. Aggression	.06	.07	-.01	.30***	--			
6. Dehumanization	-.06	-.05	.07	.33***	.41***	--		
7. Social Dominance Orientation	.25***	.20***	.59***	.36***	.25***	.16***	--	
8. Right-Wing Authoritarianism	.13***	-.12**	-.30***	-.34***	-.04	-.08*	-.25***	--
9. Shooting Vignette	.15***	-.03	-.04	.49***	.28***	.20***	.29***	.22***

Descriptives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
M	69.09	1.52	62.73	1.87	3.07	0.00	3.00	4.15	1.60
SD	27.21	1.02	26.58	1.10	1.43	0.90	1.53	1.53	1.27
α	--	--	--	.87	.82	.95	.82	.75	.87

Note. ***p < .001 **p < .01 *p < .05

Table A26

Study 3: Results of Multiple Linear Regression (Dependent Variable: Shooting Vignette; see Figure 3)

	Unstandardized b	95% CI for b	Standard Error	Standardized β	p
Party as a Social Identity	0.01	[0.004, 0.01]	0.001	.13	< .001
Ideological Extremity	-0.08	[-0.16, -0.01]	0.04	-.07	.031
Partisan Animosity	-0.003	[-0.01, 0.00]	0.002	-.06	.078
Need for Chaos	0.41	[0.31, 0.51]	0.05	.36	< .001
Aggression	0.02	[-0.02, 0.07]	0.02	.03	.290
Dehumanization	0.13	[0.04, 0.22]	0.05	.09	.008
Social Dominance Orientation	0.13	[0.07, 0.18]	0.03	.15	< .001
Right-Wing Authoritarianism	0.10	[0.05, 0.15]	0.02	.12	< .001
Party (1 = Democrat, 2 = Republican)	-0.16	[-0.31, 0.00]	0.08	-.06	.044
Age	-0.01	[-0.01, -.004]	0.002	-.11	< .001
Black	0.05	[-0.14, 0.26]	0.10	.02	.581
Hispanic	0.03	[-0.21, 0.27]	0.12	.01	.792
Biracial/Other Race	-0.04	[-0.32, 0.26]	0.15	-.01	.751
Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female)	-0.08	[-0.20, 0.05]	0.06	-.03	.218
Education: High School Only	0.09	[-0.12, 0.29]	0.10	.03	.374
Education: Some College (Less than Bachelors)	0.04	[-0.14, 0.23]	0.10	.02	.671
Education: Bachelors	0.08	[-0.15, 0.32]	0.12	.03	.495

Note. Regression performed with 1,000 bootstrapped resamples. "White" and "advanced (post-Bachelor) degree" served as contrast categories for race and education, respectively. Due to several participants not reporting their income ($n = 50$) we did not include in the main models for this study. However, substantive patterns of results remain unchanged when restricting the sample to those who reported their income and including it as a covariate.

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