Rules
and Responsibility: What Kinds of Rule Systems Encourage
Responsibility Rather Than Accountability
Carol
A. Heimer
Abstract
We have all encountered situations in which people
justify seemingly irrational behavior by referring to rules mandating
that behavior. This paper contrasts rules that are especially likely
to encourage counterproductive behavior (such as a focus on avoiding
blame rather than on achieving some desirable objective) with rules
that are more likely to encourage responsibility. The paper argues
that if rules are to encourage responsibility rather than only accountability,
they must provide for accurate and complex cognitive representations
of the situation being governed, flexible adjustment to local circumstances,
mechanisms to compensate for bounded imagination by requiring full
consideration of a small number of alternatives, and devices for
developing the moral competence of key actors. Examples from medical
care, marine insurance, environmental regulation, the regulation
of nuclear power, record keeping practices, and the organization
of academic life are used to illustrate the arguments.
Carol A. Heimer, Department
of Sociology, Northwestern University, and American Bar Foundation
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