Changes
in Tracking Policy in Japan:
Unintended Consequences of Detracking Policy
Takehiko
Kariya and James E. Rosenbaum
Abstract
This paper describes Japan's efforts to reform its high schools
by eliminating the hierarchy among high schools, and we identify
some unintended consequences of these reforms. We find that these
reforms are associated with the defection of the most able students
from the public schools and with the introduction of internal tracking
within schools. In a nation which traditionally had mediocre private
high schools and little internal tracking, we find that the prefectures
which were most progressive in implementing reforms suffered the
most serious flight of good students to private schools and the
highest incidence of tracking within public schools. Moreover, those
prefectures which have tried to reverse these reforms have found
that the undesired outcomes have not abated. These reforms succeeded
in creating greater equality among Japan's public schools, but they
have led to a great increase in inequality between private and public
schools and by an increase in internal tracking inside schools.
Takehiko Kariya,
University of Tokyo James E. Rosenbaum,School
of Education and Social Policy, Northwestern University
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