Unions,
Employers Associations, and Wage-Setting
Institutions in North and Central Europe, 1950-1992
Michael Wallerstein, Miriam
Golden, and Peter Lange
Abstract
It is commonly argued that wage-setting is everywhere becoming
less centralized due to changes in production, occupational structure,
and economic integration. In this paper we present new data on the
extent to which wage-setting institutions have changed since 1950
in countries in the northern half of continental Western Europe
where union coverage is high and wage bargaining has traditionally
been centralized at the industry or national level. In particular,
we present data on four dimensions often associated with the concept
of "corporatism" in industrial relations: the encompassingness of
collective bargaining, union concentration, the statutory authority
of the peak associations of unions and employers, and the centralization
of collective bargaining. The most notable feature of the data we
gather is the absence of a general trend toward greater decentralization.
At different points in time, decentralization in some fashion occurred
in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden, but not in the other five
countries we examine. We conclude with some speculations concerning
sources of stability and instability in centralized wage-setting
institutions.
Michael Wallerstein, Department of Political
Science, Northwestern University
Miriam Golden, Department of Political Science, University of
California at Los Angeles Peter Lange, Office of the Provost, Duke University
To Order:
Hard copies of IPR working papers cost $5.00 each (international orders are $10 each). We only accept checks drawn on U.S. bank and payable in U.S. funds. Checks or
money orders should be made payable to Northwestern University and sent to
the following address:
Publications Department - WP Orders
Institute for Policy Research
2040 Sheridan Rd., Evanston, IL 60208-4100.
For information, call 847-491-8712 or email ipr@northwestern.edu.
Please note that we do not accept credit cards.
