

**HOUSING MOBILITY STRATEGIES FOR CHANGING
THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY**

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According to Murphy's Law, anything that can go wrong will go wrong. A corollary of Murphy's Law is that while there are few ways to do things right, there are many ways to do things wrong. This paper presents the results of a residential integration program which has had dramatically positive results. While some skeptics have raised some doubts about the program, others have begun to test this program in other cities across the U.S. After summarizing studies of the Gautreaux program, this chapter considers how much attrition might reduce the observed effects. Speculations are presented about what makes this program have such strong effects, and by extension, what are the pitfalls that future versions of this program should try to avoid.

The concept of "geography of opportunity" suggests that places affect individuals' opportunities and life outcomes. Galster and Killen (1994) propose that individuals' lives would undergo profound changes if they moved to environments that offer different opportunities than their previous locations had provided. They suggest that geography influences social networks and normative contexts, and they review studies indicating influences on education, crime, and employment. However, since most geographic moves are chosen, research on geographic influences cannot completely control for the individual component. For instance, when surveys find a few low-income individuals in a middle-income neighborhood (or vice versa), one suspects that these may be atypical low-income individuals or else they would not be there. What is needed to test Galster and Killen's propositions is a randomized experiment, but such experiments are unusual. This paper describes such an experiment.

This paper reviews one of the largest and oldest programs of this sort: the Gautreaux Program in Chicago. The Gautreaux program gives low-income blacks housing vouchers to move to many different kinds of communities, including white middle-income suburbs and low-income black city neighborhoods. Because participants are assigned to city or suburban locations in a quasi-random manner, inferences can be made about the effects of residential moves. This paper reports the program's impact on adults' employment and on youths' education, employment, and social integration. The paper considers how much attrition might affect the observed effects.

The Gautreaux program has become a model which other cities have sought to follow. Boston, Cincinnati, Dallas, and Hartford have initiated programs, and other cities have considered programs (Feins, 1993; Fischer, 1991). In addition, the national Moving

to Opportunity (MTO) program will test a version of the Gautreaux program in five cities across the US.

Yet as we plan to replicate this program in other cities, we must consider what it is about this program that makes it work. A housing mobility program has many elements, and each may influence its operation and outcomes. The final section of this paper examines what elements of the Gautreaux program are crucial to its success and what pitfalls future programs should avoid..

If the speculations presented here are generally on target, they suggest some guidelines for future programs. This is not to say that every program must make the same choices. Programs must make their choices based on their own priorities and the ways they value various trade-offs. However, all programs must consider these details for they are likely to contribute to the effect of the program in important ways.

The Gautreaux Program

The Gautreaux program is the result of a 1976 Supreme Court consent decree in a lawsuit against the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) on behalf of public housing residents. The suit charged "that these agencies had employed racially discriminatory policies in the administration of the Chicago low-rent public housing program" (Peroff, Davis, Jones, 1979). Administered by the non-profit Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities in Chicago, the Gautreaux program allows public housing residents and those who had been on the waiting list for public housing as of 1981, to receive Section 8 housing certificates and move to private apartments either in mostly-white suburbs or in the city of Chicago. The program provides extensive housing services. Two full-time real-estate staff find landlords willing to participate in the program. Then placement counselors notify families as apartments become available, counsel them about the advantages and disadvantages of these moves, and take them to visit the units and communities. Since 1976, over 5000 families have participated, and over half moved to middle-income white suburbs.

Because of its design, the Gautreaux program presents an unusual opportunity to test the effect of helping low-income people move to better labor markets, better schools, and better neighborhoods. The United States does not have much experience with economic and racial integration of neighborhoods. Racial and economic homogeneity is the rule in most neighborhoods, so we generally do not know how low-income blacks are affected by living in middle-income white neighborhoods. Moreover, even when exceptions exist, we must suspect that blacks who break the residential barriers and get into white neighborhoods are themselves exceptional people, so their subsequent attainments may

reflect more about themselves than about the effects of neighborhoods. Therefore, when researchers study black employment in suburbs, it is hard to tell whether the suburbs increased black employment or whether the blacks who happen to live in suburbs are different, perhaps moving to the suburbs after getting a job (Jencks and Mayer, 1989). Similarly, most studies of black achievement in suburban schools cannot tell whether black children's achievement is due to the suburbs or to some unmeasured family assets or values which may have drawn these black families to the suburbs.

Gautreaux participants circumvent the ordinary barriers to living in the suburbs, not by their jobs, personal finances, or values, but by getting into the program. The program gives them rent subsidies that permit them to live in suburban apartments for the same cost as public housing. Moreover, unlike the usual case of black suburbanization -- working-class blacks living in working-class suburbs -- Gautreaux permits low-income blacks to live in middle-income white suburbs (Jencks and Mayer, 1989). Participants move to a wide variety of over 115 suburbs throughout the six-counties surrounding Chicago. Suburbs with less than 70% whites were excluded by the consent decree and very high-rent suburbs were excluded by funding limitations of Section 8 certificates. Yet these constraints eliminate only a small proportion of suburbs. The receiving suburbs ranged from working class to upper middle class and ranged from 30 to 90 minutes driving time to their former addresses.

The program tries to move more than one family to any neighborhood to provide some social support, but it also avoids moving many families to any neighborhood. While the program mandates did not specify how many families could move to any location, the program tried to avoid sending disproportionate numbers to any one community, and in fact they succeeded in this goal (Paul Fischer, unpublished). As a result, the program had low visibility and low impact on receiving communities.

Applying for the program is largely a matter of luck and persistent telephone dialing on registration day, since many more people try to call than can get through on the telephone lines. The program also has three selection criteria. The program tries to avoid overcrowding, late rent payments, and building damage by not admitting families with more than four children, large debts, or unacceptable housekeeping. But none of these criteria was extremely selective, and all three only reduced the eligible pool by less than 30 percent.² Although these selection criteria make this an above average group compared to housing project residents, they are not a "highly creamed" group. All are very low-income blacks, are current or former welfare recipients, and have lived most of their lives in impoverished inner-city neighborhoods.

In any case, the program's procedures create a quasi-experimental design. While all participants come from the same low-income black city neighborhoods (usually public housing projects), some move to middle-income white suburbs, while others move to low-income black urban neighborhoods. In principle, participants have choices about where they move, but, in actual practice, participants are assigned to city or suburb locations in a quasi-random manner. Apartment availability is determined by housing agents who do not deal with clients and is unrelated to client interest. Counselors offer clients units as they become available according to their position on the waiting list, regardless of clients' locational preference. Although clients can refuse an offer, very few do so, since they are unlikely to get another. As a result, participants' preferences for city or suburbs have little to do with where they end up moving.

Suburban Obstacles

Despite the superior economic and educational opportunities in the suburbs, there may be obstacles to poor people benefitting from these opportunities. Virtually all of the mothers in Gautreaux have received public aid, most for five years or more, many have never had a job, and half grew up in families on public aid. They may lack the skills, motivation, or work experience necessary to obtain work. Moreover, they may face discrimination in the suburban labor market. One may wonder if they can get jobs in the suburbs.

Similarly, the children lack the home advantages of their suburban classmates, and their city schools may not have prepared them for the more demanding suburban schools. We must wonder if these suburban difficulties are only temporary setbacks or whether these difficulties will make their educational attainments be inferior to those of city movers who don't experience such difficulties. We must also wonder whether these low-income black youth face rejection and harassment or do they interact with and get support from their middle-income classmates? The following sections review our evidence on these questions.

Adults and Childrens' Studies: Methods and Sample

The remainder of this paper summarizes studies of the Gautreaux program, comparing families moving to white middle-income suburbs with families moving to low-income black city neighborhoods. The city movers are a good comparison group for judging the effects of the suburban move, since both groups meet the same selection criteria and get improved housing. But city movers are a particularly stringent comparison group since they receive better housing and move to better city

neighborhoods than they had in the housing projects. We expect that housing- project residents would fare considerably worse than either of the Gautreaux groups. In effect, the suburban effects (relative to city movers) in this study may be considered "lower-bound" effects.

To examine adults' employment, we surveyed 332 adults and conducted detailed interviews with another 95 individuals.³ The first study of children interviewed one randomly selected school-aged child (aged 8-18) from each of 114 families in 1982, and the second study followed up the same children in 1989 when they were adolescents and young adults and examined their educational and employment outcomes.⁴ As implied by the quasi-random assignment procedure, suburban and city movers are highly similar in most attributes in both samples (Table 1a and 1b)

Will low-income blacks get jobs in the suburbs?

There are a number of reasons to expect that low-income blacks may not get jobs in the suburbs. After living in low-income environments for many years, these mothers and children may have motivational problems that prevent them from doing well even after their opportunities improve (Lewis, 1968; Mead, 1986). Employer discrimination or applicants' lack of skills may also prevent low-income blacks from getting jobs. In addition, Gautreaux adults were educated in poor urban schools, and many lack job training or job experience.

Suburban movers were more likely to have jobs than city movers. Although both groups started from the same baseline, after moving, suburban movers were over 25 percent more likely to have had a job than city movers. While 50.9 percent of city movers had a job after moving, 63.8 percent of suburban movers did.

Table 2a compares city and suburban movers on their pre- and post-move employment status. Among respondents who were ever employed before, suburban movers were about fourteen percent more likely than city movers to have a job after moving. In contrast, for those who had never been employed before their move, 46 percent found work after moving to the suburbs while a comparable figure for the city was only 30 percent. For this group of "hard-core unemployed," suburban movers were much more likely to have a job after moving than city movers.⁵

City and suburban movers did not differ in hourly wages or number of hours worked per week (Table 2b). Among those who had a job both before and after moving, both city and suburban movers reported gains in hourly wages and no change in hours worked.⁶ The roughly 20% gain in wages for both suburban and city movers may represent gains from moving out of housing projects, but, since we lack a control group

(individuals similar to those selected in Gautreaux who remained in housing projects), we have no basis for testing this. Of course, attrition may also contribute to these gains, but attrition is likely to be small, and it can cut both ways: some attrition comes from wage gains over program income limits.

When asked how the suburban move helped them get jobs, all suburban participants mentioned the greater number of jobs in the suburbs. Improved physical safety was the second most mentioned factor. Adults reported that they did not work in the city because they feared being attacked on the way home from work, or they feared that their children would get hurt or get in trouble with gangs. The suburban move allowed mothers to feel free to go out and work. Many adults also mentioned that positive role models and social norms inspired them to work. These comments support Wilson's contention about the importance of role models and social norms (Wilson, 1987). Seeing neighbors work, Gautreaux adults reported that they felt that they too could have jobs, and they wanted to try. In the city, few adults saw neighbors working.

In sum, the employment rates of suburban movers surpassed those of city movers, particularly for those who had never had a job before in their lives. Whatever prevented some people from being employed in the past--lack of skills or lack of motivation--was not irreversible, and many took jobs after moving to suburbs. This program helped close the gap between low-income black adults and their white middle-income neighbors.

Will early disadvantages keep children from benefitting from suburban schools?

Housing moves may have even greater impact on children than on adults, since children are in a more formative stage and are still acquiring education. However, being less mature, children may have even more difficulty coping with the challenges posed by the suburban move. The nature of obstacles is similar to those for adults. Children's low-income background may make them less prepared or less motivated than middle-income suburban children; they may have attitudes and habits deemed "undesirable" by suburban teachers and employers; or racial discrimination may deny them full access to suburban resources. For any or all of these reasons, they may have lower achievement than their city counterparts who do not face these barriers. On the other hand, suburban movers will benefit from better educational resources and greater employment prospects in the suburbs, and their fellow suburban students may serve as role models for achievement. Of course, we do not know which process will operate or, if both do, which will win out.

Given the childrens' initial poor preparation in city schools and their social disadvantage, we wondered how they would do in the suburban schools. In 1982, we studied how the Gautreaux program affected children, comparing Gautreaux children who moved within the city and those who moved to the suburbs (Rosenbaum, Rubinowitz, and Kulieke, 1986; Rosenbaum, Kulieke, and Rubinowitz, 1988).⁷ The two groups were similar in average age, proportion of females, and mothers' education. The families were predominantly female-headed in both the suburban (86%) and city (88%) groups.

We found that suburban movers initially had difficulties adapting to the higher expectations in the suburban schools, and their grades suffered in the first years in the suburban schools. However, by the time of our study, after one to six years in the suburbs, their grades and relative school performance (judged by their mothers) were the same as those of city movers. In addition, compared to city movers, suburban movers had smaller classes, higher satisfaction with teachers and courses, and better attitudes about school. Although the mothers noted instances of teacher racial bias, the suburban movers were also more likely than city movers to say that teachers went out of their way to help their children, and they mentioned many instances of teachers giving extra help in classes and after school.

It is hard to measure academic standards, and first study had no systematic indicator. Yet the suburban movers clearly felt that the suburban schools had higher academic standards. They reported that the city teachers did not expect children to make up work when they were absent, to do homework, to know multiplication in third grade, or to write in cursive in fourth grade. "Passing grades" in the city did not indicate achievement at grade level, and even "honor roll" city students were sometimes two years behind grade level.

These mothers were in a good position to notice these differences when their children moved from the city to suburban schools. One mother commented:

[The suburban school] said it was like he didn't even go to school in Chicago for three years, that's how far behind he was. And he was going every day and he was getting report cards telling me he was doing fine.

Indeed, another mother reported an empirical test:

The move affected my child's education for the better. I even tested it out...[I] let her go to summer school by my mother's house [in Chicago] for about a month...she was in fourth grade at that time...Over in the city, they were doing third grade work; what they were supposed to be doing was fourth grade.

The city curriculum seemed to be one to three years behind the suburban schools (Rosenbaum, Kulieke, and Rubinowitz, 1988, p. 32).

While many suburban movers seemed to be catching up to the higher suburban standards by the time of the interviews, most had only been in the suburbs a few years, and most were still in elementary school, so it was hard to know how they would do later. Many of these children were still struggling to catch up, and it was not clear if they would succeed. Therefore, we were eager to do a follow-up study to see how things were turning out for these children.

The Study of Youth

To study later outcomes, we interviewed these children and their mothers in 1989.⁸ By this time, they had an average age of 18.

However, before turning to those results, we describe the schools that youths attended. In 1990, the Illinois Department of Education collected average standardized test scores for all schools in the state. For the schools attended by our sample, the suburban schools' average eleventh grade reading test score (259) was just above the state average (250), but significantly higher than the city schools' average (198). On the ACT, the college admissions test most often taken in Illinois, suburban schools' scores (21.5) were close to the state average (20.9), but significantly higher than the city schools' scores (16.1). Moreover, there was almost no overlap between the scores of city and suburban schools these children attended. While less than 6 percent of the city sample attended schools with ACT averages of 20 or better (i.e., roughly the national average), over 88 percent of the suburban sample attended such schools. Just as the 1982 study suggested higher standards in suburban elementary schools, these results indicate that the higher standards in the suburbs continued in high school.

Of course, higher standards create new challenges as well as new opportunities. The suburban movers must face much higher expectations than they have been prepared for in the city schools. The higher levels of achievement in suburban schools may be a barrier to poorly prepared students and may lead to increased dropping out, lower grades, lower tracks for those still in school and to less college attendance and less employment for those over age 18. The results of this study contradict those expectations, as indicated in Table 3.

Drop Outs

More city movers dropped out of high school than did suburban movers (20% in the city vs. less than 5% in the suburbs).

Grades

Although test scores were not available for individual respondents, grades provide a good indication of how students are achieving relative to their peers and whether students' work is judged acceptable by teachers. We found that suburban movers had virtually the same grades as city movers (a C+ average in city and suburbs). Since the national HSB survey of high school sophomores indicates that suburban students get about a half grade lower than city students with the same achievement test scores, the grade parity of the two samples implies a higher achievement level of suburban movers (Rosenbaum and Kaufman, 1991).

College Preparatory Curricula

Most high schools offer different curricula to college-bound and noncollege-bound youth, and these curricula affect college opportunities (Rosenbaum, 1976, 1980). Researchers find that blacks are under-represented in college tracks in racially integrated schools (Coleman, et al., 1966; Oakes, 1985; Rosenbaum and Presser, 1978). Indeed, after being desegregated, the Washington, D.C. public schools initiated a tracking system, which a court ruled to be undercutting integration (Hobson vs. Hansen, 1967). Given the higher standards and greater competition in suburban schools, we might expect suburban movers to be less likely than city movers to be in college-track classes. The results showed the opposite. Suburban movers were more often in college tracks than city movers (40.3% vs. 23.5%).

College Attendance

Higher suburban standards might be a barrier to these youth's attending college. The results indicate the opposite. Suburban movers had significantly higher college enrollment than city movers (54% vs. 21%).

Four-year Colleges

The type of college is also important. Four-year colleges lead to a bachelor's degree, two-year junior or community colleges lead to an associate's degree, and trade schools lead to a certificate. Moreover, while transfers to four-year colleges are theoretically possible, in fact trade schools almost never lead to four-year colleges, and two-year colleges rarely do. Only 12.5% of students in the Chicago city colleges ultimately complete a 4-year college degree (less than half the rate of some suburban community colleges in the area (Orfield et al., 1984).

Among the Gautreaux youth attending college, almost fifty percent of the suburban movers were in four-year institutions, whereas only twenty percent of the city movers were. Of those not attending four-year institutions, two-thirds of the suburban movers were working toward an associate's degree while just half of the city movers were.

Clearly, the suburban students have not suffered from the challenging competition in the suburbs. Indeed, they have benefitted from the higher academic standards in the suburbs.

Youths' Jobs

For those youth who were not attending college, a significantly higher proportion of the suburban youth had full-time jobs than city youth (75.0% vs. 41.4%). Suburban youth also were four times as likely to earn over \$6.50/ hour than city youth (21% vs 5%). The suburban jobs were significantly more likely to offer job benefits than city jobs (55.2% vs. 23.1%).

Will residential integration lead to harassment and rejection of youth?

blacks are significantly more isolated than either Hispanics or Asians (Massey and Denton, 1987). Research also documents extensive antagonism to racial integration. While the majority of whites have become increasingly supportive of racial integration in principle, the majority remain opposed to any government intervention to promote such integration (Schuman and Bobo, 1988). blacks moving into predominantly white areas have faced threats, physical attacks, and property damage (Berry, 1979). Throughout the past several decades, black families who moved into white neighborhoods of Chicago were driven from their homes by racial violence (Squires, et al., 1987). Yet incidents of harassment, while dramatic, may not reflect the views of all residents, and other neighbors may willingly interact with black newcomers. We can examine the harassment, threats and fears that blacks face in white schools in which they are a racial and socio-economic minority.

___ We expected that the suburban youth would experience more harassment than the city movers. The most common form of harassment was name-calling. In the suburbs, 51.9% of the Gautreaux youth reported at least one incident in which they were called names by white students, while only 13.3% of the city movers experienced name calling by whites. Of course, there are few whites in the urban schools to call anyone names. However, 41.9% of the city movers experienced name-calling by blacks. As hypothesized, city movers do receive significantly less harassment than suburban movers, but the city movers do receive a great deal of name-calling, too.

A second, more severe, indicator of harassment was measured by asking respondents how often they were threatened by other students. As expected, many suburban movers were threatened by whites: 15.4% of the suburban movers reported being threatened by whites a few times a year or more. However, 19.4% of city movers were threatened this often by blacks. Moreover, when we consider those who were threatened at least once a

year (by blacks or whites), city movers are as likely to receive a threat as suburban movers (22.7% city vs. 21.2% suburb).

A third, more severe, indicator of harassment is whether youth were hurt by other students. When asked how often they were actually hurt by others at school, very few members of either group reported such incidents. A similar proportion of both city and suburban movers say they have never been hurt by other students (93.5% city, 94.1% suburb).

In sum, the expected difference is not confirmed: suburban movers are not more likely to be threatened or hurt by others at school than city movers.

Social Acceptance: Will residential integration lead to social integration?

Given the daily headlines about troubled race relations in American society and schools, social integration might seem hopeless. But daily life is too mundane to make the headlines, and daily life may tell a very different story. This study looks at whether these black youth experience acceptance, friendships and positive interactions with white classmates, and it assesses the relative frequency of positive and negative interactions.

School desegregation has been extensively studied (Gerard and Miller, 1975; Patchen, 1982; St. John, 1975; Hawley, 1981). However, this form of desegregation has some attributes that may limit its benefits. Because blacks rarely live near whites, many of the school desegregation programs entail special busing efforts, and a busload of students may create high visibility, backlash and stigma. In addition, as children spend long periods of time every day riding together on a bus, these commutes reinforce the sense of togetherness of blacks to each other and their separateness from those who live near the school. Moreover, the logistics of commuting make after-school activities more difficult. Thus, busing as a method of creating desegregation creates its own limits on racial interaction.

In contrast, this study examines a program which creates both residential and school integration. As a result, children live in apartment buildings occupied largely by middle-income whites, they arrived in the suburban schools as community residents, not as outsiders in a busing program, and they came to school in the same buses as their white neighbors. Moreover, this program accomplishes residential integration with little visibility and in small numbers that raise little threat, thus reducing the likelihood of backlash and stigma.

Youth in this program also must face an additional barrier--socio-economic differences. Researchers know even less about socio-economic integration than they know about racial integration. Gautreaux children face both kinds of barriers

simultaneously. These low-income blacks enter schools and communities that are overwhelmingly white and middle-class. Even the blacks they meet are different, since their families are middle-class.

Given these barriers, observers have worried that youth in such a program would remain socially isolated (Yinger, 1979). Having spent over six years in all-Black urban housing projects, these children have learned different habits and tastes than their classmates, they have fewer economic resources than their classmates, and they have a different skin color than most of their classmates. There is a great risk that these youth will have difficulty being accepted by their suburban, middle class, white classmates.

Several questions in the survey and interview were designed to capture a sense of children's sense of social acceptance. Both city and suburban movers tended to agree somewhat with the statement, "I feel I am a real part of my school" (on a five point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree), and there were no significant differences between the groups (city =3.55; suburb =3.37, n.s.). On the item, "Other students treat me with respect", the suburban movers had more positive responses than the city movers, although the difference was not significant (city =3.93; suburb =4.00, n.s.). We asked the children how they believed others saw them in a series of questions including, "Are you considered a part of the 'in-group?'" , "Do others think you do not fit in?" , "Do others see you as popular?" , and "Do others see you as socially active?" For each of these items, no significant differences were found between the city and suburban movers on a three point scale(0- Not at all, 1-Somewhat, or 3-Very, see Table 4). Both groups showed positive social integration for all questions.

Contrary to our expectation, the suburban movers were just as accepted by their peers as the city movers. The majority of the children in both groups felt that they fit into their schools socially, and were regarded by others as at least somewhat socially active and popular.

Friendships.

We expected that the suburban movers might have fewer friends than city movers. Given that the suburbs were overwhelmingly white, the suburban movers came in contact with fewer black peers than city movers. However, suburban movers had almost as many black friends as city movers. The mean number of black friends in the suburbs was 8.81, while the mean number of black friends in the city was 11.06 (difference not significant).

The suburban movers had significantly more white friends than city movers. The mean number of white friends was 7.37 for suburban movers and 2.37 for city movers

($t= 4.71$; $p<.0001$). While only 17.3% of the suburban youth reported no white friends, 56.3% of the city sample did ($t= 3.43$; $p<.001$). Only one of the city movers and one of the suburban movers reported having no friends at all.

Interactions.

Moreover, suburban youth spent significantly more time with white students outside of class than city movers (Table 5). Compared with city movers, the suburban movers more often did things outside of school with white students ($t=3.65$; $p<.001$), did homework with white students ($t=2.92$; $p<.005$), and visited the homes of white students ($t=3.75$; $p<.000$). When asked how friendly white students were, the suburban movers again were significantly more positive than the city movers ($t=3.24$; $p<.002$, cf. Table 6). When the same questions were asked about socializing with black students, no significant differences existed between city and suburban movers (Table 3).

To get an overview, two index variables were computed based on the summed responses to each of the three items for interactions with whites and for interactions with blacks. The findings suggest that the suburban movers divided their time almost equally between blacks and whites, while the city movers spent significantly more of their time with blacks than with whites (Table 7). The experience of the suburban movers seems to reflect a more racially integrated peer network, despite the small numbers of blacks and in suburban schools. As one suburban mover reported, "We went into a new school and had the opportunity to be with white people, Indian people, just a mix of races and actually get to know people and have people get to know you."

Are Harassment and Acceptance Inversely Related?

News accounts of racial harassment are particularly disturbing because the stories often carry the implication that harassment and threats reflect rejection by the entire community. Sometimes that may be true, but it seems possible that it is not true.

Our results indicate that negative behaviors are associated with each other. White name calling is associated with white threats ($r=.53$, $p<.01$). Positive behaviors are also associated with each other. Doing activities with whites is associated with visiting with whites in their homes ($r=.85$, $p<.01$)

However, negative behaviors do not predict an absence of positive behaviors. In fact, the experience of the suburban movers indicates that the two are not usually associated, and they are sometimes positively correlated. Suburban movers who report being threatened by whites are slightly (but not significantly) more likely to participate in school activities ($r=.11$, n.s.), do activities with whites after school ($r=.05$, n.s.), or to

visit with whites in their homes ($r=.09$, n.s.). Those reporting being called names by whites are also slightly more likely to do activities with whites after school ($r=.08$, n.s.) and to visit with whites in their homes($r=.17$, n.s.).

These correlations are not statistically significant, but they are substantively very important. They indicate that many of the same individuals who are being threatened and harassed by whites are also being accepted by whites, interacting with whites, going to each others' homes, and participating in school activities. That doesn't make the threats and name calling pleasant, but it makes it easier for these youth to feel a part of these white suburban schools. As we shall see, these positive interactions with whites also make it easier for some youths to dismiss the threats and name-calling.

How much does attrition reduce these effects?

One critique of this study is the absence of information on the drop-outs from the program. If substantial numbers drop out, then the results could be quite different. In the survey of heads of households, we made extensive efforts to locate everyone, yet we were only able to locate about two-thirds of the sample, and the rate was somewhat lower for suburban movers (60%). Of course, most studies find great difficulties in locating low-income people.

It should be noted that people may not be found for either positive or negative reasons. Some people may have left the program because they got good jobs and their incomes exceeded the program's limit. Indeed, the study actually located some people who had such successful outcomes. On the other hand, some people may have left the program because of negative outcomes: dissatisfaction, poor jobs, poor children's outcomes. There is no way of knowing what percentage of those we did not find had positive or negative outcomes. We can only conclude that our results may either understate or overstate the program's effects.

Although we don't know exactly how many people left the suburbs, we can still estimate how much attrition could affect our results. Since we located 60% of our suburban movers in the suburbs, 40% is the upper limit for attrition. It is not likely that all of these 40% moved back to the city. But as a mental exercise, we can pretend that they all did, and we can also assume that their success rates are the same as the city-movers' rates. These assumptions allow us to see how much suburban attrition might reduce our findings.

We can use these hypothetical assumptions to recalculate the adults' employment findings. The 224 suburban adults came from an original pool of $(224 / .60 =) 373$ adults, and the additional 149 individuals we did not find will be assumed to have a city-rate of

employment of 50.9%, so 76 would have been employed. Adding those hypothetical 76 to the actual 143 adults with jobs and dividing by the total of 373 yields an employed rate of 58.7%. Thus, while the actual findings for employment were 50.9% city, 63.8% suburbs, the hypothetical difference is 50.9% city, 58.7% suburbs-- using the extreme (and unlikely) assumption that all unfound people returned to the city. If we use a more realistic assumption that half of all unfound people returned to the city, the results would be 50.9% city, 61.3% suburbs.

In sum, even taking extreme assumptions yields a substantial suburb- city difference in employment. More realistic assumptions yield a difference that is not far from the original finding. Moreover, most of the youths' outcomes show even larger differences, so if these procedures are applied to the youths' outcomes, the most extreme adjustments still yield very impressive benefits to the suburban movers.

It would be desirable to get better information on those people who we did not find. In particular, we would like to know how many returned to the city, their reasons for moving, and the relative distribution of positive and negative reasons. Indeed, such data could have practical implications for helping new movers to cope with the suburban move. However, that information is not likely to alter our conclusions. Even a worst-case scenario yields substantial benefits to suburban movers.

What aspects of the program contribute to its outcomes?

As proposed at the outset, a corollary of Murphy's Law might suggest that there are few ways to do things right, but many ways to do things wrong. The rest of this paper presents speculations about what makes this program have such strong effects, and by extension, what are the ways that it could be done wrong.

In 1985, still at the height of the Reagan years, the results of the first study of the Gautreaux program went out over the newswires and were ignored by all but a few local newspapers. In 1988, as the luster of the Reagan years was subsiding, a journalist discovered the Gautreaux program and many major newspapers carried the story of the 1985 study (later studies were still ongoing). Today, stories about housing mobility appear regularly in every major newspaper. Housing mobility is beginning to be seen as a panacea.

Obviously, I will not say anything to discourage the enthusiasm for this approach. My research findings have persuaded me of its value. However, "housing mobility" is not a single entity, and all forms of "housing mobility" will not have the same effects. I am voicing these cautions because I do not want the current enthusiasm to prevent us from being attentive to the important details that make the program successful. If the

details are done badly, then the aphorism may be an apt warning: "The devil is in the details."

While the Gautreaux program had remarkably positive effects, those results probably depend on the program having done a lot of things right. This is not to say that the Gautreaux program was perfect. Nor did the Gautreaux program do everything it could to increase success. As we will note, the program intentionally made some choices to lower costs and reduce potential benefits.

Alexander Polikoff, the lawyer who took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court and helped design the consent decree, and Kale Williams and his staff at the Leadership Council who implemented the Gautreaux program, made many big and small decisions about the form the Gautreaux program would take. As Kale Williams reports, some practices emerged without conscious decisions, but they nonetheless became enduring features of the program. Obviously, given the observed outcomes, they did something right. The following analysis examines the many details that I believe were relevant to these outcomes. Of course, these are speculations; it is not possible to analyze the separate effects of various program components.

A federal program, Moving to Opportunity (MTO), is now being started to test the Gautreaux approach in five cities across the U.S. In addition, many localities are adapting aspects of this program. These programs need to make many specific decisions about how to implement the program in their particular settings. I hope that these speculations may help these programs think through their decisions.

If my speculations are generally on target, they suggest some guidelines for future programs. This is not to say that every program must make the same choices. Programs must make their choices based on their own priorities and the ways they value various trade-offs. However, I do believe that all programs must consider these details for they are likely to contribute to the effect of the program in important ways.

Essential features of the Gautreaux program

A useful way to consider the details of the Gautreaux program is to consider hypothetical alterations of what was done and to speculate about their implications. To do this, one must ask the question, "How could the Gautreaux program be done differently?" A program that moves people to new places can basically vary four features-- people, places, services, or expectations. Ignoring these possible variations, some people have assumed that any program that moves any people to any suburbs will have results similar to the Gautreaux program. This is probably not true. Indeed, the program would probably work very differently if it had varied any of these

features. There are a number of ways the program could have been done differently. I shall review such possibilities.

Consistent with our corollary of Murphy's Law, there are many kinds of people who may not match the demands of this program. The program can choose people who cannot handle the rigors of this program, the costs of the program, or the behavioral norms required by the program. Alternatively the program could be so selective that it chooses people who would succeed even without the program and proclaim their personal successes as program effects.

The program could choose many kinds of wrong places. Places can be inappropriate in a number of ways. A program can choose areas that are too expensive, too racist, too vulnerable to white flight or to "black middle class flight."

The program can also provide the wrong amount of help. It can provide too little help and the program won't succeed. It can provide too much help and the program will be too costly to be politically feasible.

The program can also present the wrong expectations. Expectations are a very real constraint on programs since unrealistically high expectations will quickly be disappointed and lead to abandoning the program before it has time to succeed.

The following sections will review these various concerns, as well as some others.

People who may not match the program's demands

There is a tradeoff between seeking to move the maximum number of people to better housing and seeking to move only the kind of people who are likely to benefit. The Gautreaux program chose the latter strategy, and it developed clear criteria.

There are many kinds of people who might have difficulty benefitting from this program. The program can choose people who cannot handle the rigors of this program, the costs of the program, or the behavioral norms required by the program.

The Gautreaux program took a number of steps to help improve the chances of getting people who were appropriate. The Gautreaux program selected people who had good rent-payment records and did not have large debts that would prevent their paying rent, and those who did not cause property damage to their apartments that would lead to their eviction from suburban apartments. These two criteria eliminated about 12% and 13% of eligible families. The program also selected families who did not have 4 or more children who wouldn't fit in the available 2-3 bedroom apartments, but this criterion only eliminated about 5% of eligible families.

These steps seem very reasonable. But not all social programs have taken such steps. Well intentioned social programs sometimes seek to help the "most needy." This is

certainly a worthy group to serve, but this particular group may be ill-suited to a mobility program. If the "most needy" have large outstanding debts or lack experience at making regular budgeting to pay rent, then they are likely to run into difficulties in paying their rent regularly. If they don't know how to take care of apartments, or if they have violent family members or visitors, then property damage will be likely. These circumstances will not only lead to their eviction, but also to the landlord's refusal to participate further in the program. Even one such eviction can spread a bad reputation about the program, leading many landlords to avoid taking any more program participants.

Another related problem can arise from taking the "most needy." Boston's program took people on the public-housing waiting list, people who generally were desperate for any kind of housing. According to informal reports (I know of no systematic information on the Boston program), one consequence was that these people were not very patient about waiting until an appropriate integrated neighborhood was available; they wanted a roof over their heads right now.

Programs that are concerned about community acceptance might use other criteria. While the Gautreaux program did not do this, some have suggested that such programs should screen out people with felony records. Some protesters of the Baltimore residential mobility program (MTO) were quoted as being concerned about felons moving into their neighborhoods.

The Gautreaux program seeks to integrate low-income people into the private sector housing market. Therefore, the program must select people who can meet the expectations of the private sector: regular rent-payment and lack of property destruction. It must also select people who can wait until appropriate housing becomes available.

One important side-effect of this strategy is that the Leadership Council came to be known and trusted by landlords. The Leadership Council's selection procedures became an unofficial warranty about participants' capabilities. Informal reports suggest that even landlords who harbored prejudices against low-income blacks felt they could trust the people selected by the Leadership Council. In effect, the Leadership Council informally certified participants in ways that overcame landlords' prejudices. This is similar to the process by which some job training programs serve as warranties of people's job skills and work habits (Kariya and Rosenbaum, 1994).

Avoiding selecting people who would benefit anyway

On the other hand, it is crucial that the program not be so selective that it only chooses people who would succeed without the program. This program was not very selective. On the basis of the above-noted criteria which eliminated 12%, 13%, and 5% of

applicants, I estimate that the Gautreaux program eliminated about one-third of eligible applicants. The program is selective, but it is not so selective that it can be called creaming.

As an aside, people have commented on the Gautreaux families featured on television reports, such as those on Sixty Minutes, CNN, ABC World News Tonight, etc. Those families are articulate, and observers have noted that they don't seem like typical housing project residents. That is true, and they aren't typical Gautreaux participants either. The reason why articulate families appear on television is because television producers want to feature articulate families. Average families don't make good TV.

It is noteworthy that the Gautreaux program did not apply more restrictive criteria. For instance, the program did not conduct a check on previous neighbors' complaints, did not check on children's problems in school, did not check on mothers' work histories. These are all plausible criteria. They would probably have improved the success rate of the program, and the Gautreaux program could have chosen to use them, but it did not.

It is important to note that such selection criteria were apparently unnecessary. The program had quite good results without these criteria. While the Gautreaux program suggests that some selection criteria may be necessary, it also indicates that some other potential selection criteria are not necessary to lead to generally successful outcomes.

Places which may not match the program's demands

There is a tradeoff between seeking to move the maximum number of people to better housing and seeking to move people only to the right kinds of places. The Gautreaux program chose the latter strategy, and it developed clear criteria for defining the right kinds of places.

Places can be inappropriate in a number of ways. A program can choose areas that are too expensive, too racist, too vulnerable to white flight or too vulnerable to "middle-class-flight" by the black middle class. The Gautreaux program was sensitive to all of these potential problems.

If housing is too expensive, then the program is subject to political criticism. In addition, increased costs per unit limit the number of families who can be helped. The housing-expense limitation is built into the Section 8 program. While some waivers were obtained to include some upper-middle class communities, some suburbs still had rent levels that were beyond the scope of Section 8.

A map indicating the locations of placements reveals very few places in the six-county area surrounding Chicago where Gautreaux participants don't live, and most of those

places are in the more distant outreaches of this large area, where 2-hour driving distances, not expense reduced participation. Fewer than 10 suburbs had no housing units with rents within Section 8 guidelines.

Participants live in over 115 suburbs surrounding Chicago, and they are widely distributed across these communities. Even upper-middle class suburbs tend to have pockets of more reasonable rents amidst their high-priced housing. While some economic segregation occurred within some suburbs, this wasn't necessarily "class" segregation since many participants reported that they interacted with young highly-educated neighbors. These are apparently families who started their families in apartments with affordable rents.

The Gautreaux program only eliminated two communities because of "intractable racism." Cicero and Berwyn have a long history of violent attacks on black residents, and they have active Ku Klux Klan groups. The program sent no families to those areas.

The Gautreaux program also eliminated communities because they were considered too near a "tipping point." While some research has tried to be precise about specifying the level of the tipping point at around 7% black (Farley, et al.), it seems likely that this proportion depends on historical conditions and the rate at which the community has arrived at this proportion. A community that has quickly shifted from 0% to 7% is likely to be much more upset and prone to resist integration than one that has moved to this rate over a decade. In many metropolitan areas, there are communities that went from predominantly white to predominantly black in less than a decade. To avoid contributing to such a process, the Leadership Council sent no Gautreaux families to suburbs which were thought to be near a "tipping point."

The program was also careful not to send too many families to any one location in a single year. If a town received ten families each year over ten years, that will be seen quite differently than if one hundred families move there in a single year.

As a court-ordered desegregation program, the Gautreaux program was not allowed to send black families to predominantly black suburbs. Other programs, such as MTO, are allowed to do so, and so they run the risk of contributing to another kind of "tipping point." Black middle-class residents might be alarmed if they felt that MTO was sending too many low-income residents to their suburb.

It would be all too easy for this to happen. If a program has many families needing to be placed, and only a few communities where those families feel comfortable, the easiest way to place many more families is to send them to the same locations. This is an old story from the bad old days of "real estate block-busting." After a cynical realtor has instigated neighborhood panic, it is easy to maintain a high volume business of moving

new families in. Of course, we do not expect MTO staff to have such a cynical motivation, but they could inadvertently contribute to the same kinds of "block busting." It is easier for a staff person to fall into a habit of sending people to a few well-known places than to discover new ones. And while the program may see their 300 families as a small number relative to the suburb's population of 50,000, a sudden annual inflow of 300 families can be seen by the community as a threat, particularly if rental housing is concentrated in one part of town.

Participants' choices also contribute to such a process. Given a choice about where to move, low-income blacks are likely to choose suburbs with substantial black populations where they do not have to worry about racial discomfort. Yet this free choice process is likely to lead to racial and economic resegregation, as whites and middle-class blacks fear the worst and flee. Indeed, the regular Section 8 program relies on free choice, and it sometimes creates these results. Similarly, the national housing voucher experiment found that given free choices about where to move, most recipients moved to areas very similar to the areas they left (Cronin and Rasmussen, 1981).

Yet large influxes of low-income blacks can upset middle-class blacks just as they upset middle-class whites, leading to fears of increased crime and deterioration of land values. Indeed, middle-class blacks may perceive their middle-class status as more precarious than their white counterparts do. Some Gautreaux participants reported that white neighbors were sometimes more friendly than middle-class black neighbors, who seemed to act "snooty" and "too good to be friendly with us." We suspect that middle-class blacks may worry that these low-income blacks will be stigmatized, and some of that stigma will spill over to them. While we do not have any systematic information about the magnitude of this concern, we expect that middle-class black suburbs may be concerned about large influxes of low-income blacks.

Unfortunately, MTO programs could inadvertently fall into such a process. Because MTO legislation seeks to avoid the issue of race, it has no guidelines to prevent large numbers of moves into middle-class black areas. Nor does it have any guidelines to avoid moves into areas that might be near a "tipping point." This is a serious shortcoming in the legislation, and we can only hope that the national program will develop program guidelines that prevent such practices and that local programs will be as sensitive to these issues as the Leadership Council has been. It would be a tragedy if this well-intentioned program inadvertently upset the racial or economic balance in a community by panicking residents.

Providing the right amount of help.

The Gautreaux program provides a mixed picture on this dimension. In order to help families find housing in areas far from the central city, the Gautreaux program provided extensive help in locating housing. The program had two people locate landlords willing to participate, and it had four housing counselors to take participants to see the housing. Without this help, it was assumed that participants would not be aware of housing opportunities in white suburbs and couldn't visit these suburbs given the poor public transportation in the suburbs.

While the Gautreaux program provided extensive help in locating housing, it provided very little help to families after the move. One staff person served up to 200 new participants for their first 6 months after moving. This person could not provide extensive help, and their main function seems to be referrals to other sources of help in their new communities. Post-move help was limited in order to reduce program costs.

As a result, the total cost of the Gautreaux program was about \$1000 per family. This is an average which takes all the Gautreaux program costs and divides them by the number of families served in a year. The number was somewhat more in years when fewer families were helped, and somewhat less when more families moved, so there may be some economies of scale.

In setting up the program, there was a concern that if the program provided more help, it would be too costly to be politically feasible in other locations. There was also the opposite concern that it might provide too little help and thus not succeed. It is noteworthy that the program had great benefits despite the minimal post-move help it provided. Apparently, most families were able to cope with the difficulties they encountered.

Providing the right expectations

Programs can fail by providing excessive expectations. Expectations are a very real constraint on programs since unrealistically high expectations will quickly be disappointed, and lead to abandoning the program before it has had time to succeed.

This is a great concern for the national MTO program. Founded in part on the long-term results of the Gautreaux program, MTO may be expected to show the same benefits right away. This is particularly so because policy-makers must make extravagant promises for the program in order to convince Congress and local policy-makers to support the program. Moreover, evaluations have been mandated, and their early results will be expected to show immediate benefits.

Thus an over-simple model of change may ignore difficulties that arise in the early years. An over-simple model might posit that if middle-class areas are beneficial, their benefits will show up immediately in test score improvements. However, the Gautreaux program research (Rosenbaum, 1993; Kaufman and Rosenbaum, 1992) suggests that low-income suburban movers experience enormous difficulties in their first 1-3 years after moving. The emotional reactions to these difficulties might lead to test score declines in the first few years, even though increases may occur thereafter. The experience may be similar to moving to a foreign land, where some neighbors are hostile and the school curriculum is years more advanced than one's former school. Indeed, some children reported that the dialect of white suburban teachers was hard to understand initially. Test score gains may not emerge immediately in such circumstances.

An alternative model may even hypothesize that short-term losses are necessary for long-term gains. This might be termed the "no pain, no gain" model. If children move to areas where the schools are no harder than the city schools they had attended, they may experience fewer difficulties, and their scores won't decline in the first years. Such unchallenging placements might not hurt test scores in the short term, but they might not lead to the degree of long-term gains noted in the suburban Gautreaux children. This potential trade-off between short term and long term is a speculation, but, if true, it indicates that short-term evaluations could give the wrong message.

Does the Gautreaux program deprive the central city of its leaders?

Some have criticized the Gautreaux program for removing the most qualified people from the central city. This would be a serious problem if true. The central cities certainly need good black leaders. Yet the people who are selected for Gautreaux program are not able to exert strong leadership in their communities. They are mostly single mothers on AFDC struggling to survive and keep their children safe. When we see their ability to go out and get jobs in the suburbs, this is a new behavior for many of them, and one they were not able to do in the housing projects.

The concern about the loss of leaders and talent in the inner city is a serious one. But as Wilson (1987) documented, this is a loss that began two decades ago when the black middle-class began moving to the suburbs. The black middle-class could provide leadership, jobs, and positive models to the central city. The Gautreaux mothers cannot do this nearly as well.

Program cost

The program costs \$1000 per family for placement services, and then it costs a Section 8 housing certificate to maintain people in private apartments. A Section 8 certificate costs approximately \$6000 per year. Of course, Section 8 is already a large national program, so the incremental costs of converting a subset of existing Section 8 certificates to housing mobility is a one-time charge of \$1000 per family.

In contrast, the costs of maintaining families in housing projects are much more expensive. The cost of renovating a single unit in a housing project is \$50,000 to \$90,000 in various cities (Bridgeport (Ct.), Chicago, Cleveland, Washington). This is just for renovation which must be done every 10-15 years; it does not include annual costs for operations and maintenance. It also does not include land costs or the decreases to land values (and taxes) of surrounding property. Nor does it include the social and personal costs that concentrated poverty imposes on the people in these buildings. The costs of housing projects are much greater than the costs of the Gautreaux program.

The other aspect of the costs question is that Gautreaux takes money that could be applied to improving the city. This is wrong on two counts. First, the incremental costs of Gautreaux over the existing Section 8 program is only \$1000 per family. This is very little money compared to existing urban programs. Second, no one would advocate doing Gautreaux instead of the city. Both should be done.

The Gautreaux program can only be a small program

Many people criticize the Gautreaux program saying that it can only move a small number of families. This is probably mistaken. While such a program can only move a small number of families into any single neighborhood over the course of a few years, the program could move relatively large numbers over a decade if it includes many scattered neighborhoods in a hundred suburbs surrounding major cities. The key is widely scattered locations.

We can get a rough estimate of the potential magnitude of the program by taking some crude numbers. The Chicago metropolitan community has a population of roughly 7 million, of whom 4 million live in the suburbs. Most suburbs are over 90% white. If a program selected only the "upper half" of families in the Chicago Housing Authority buildings, roughly 50,000 families comprising 150,000 individuals, and moved half of them to city apartments and half to suburban apartments, then such a program would have negligible influence on any suburban community. If these 75,000 individuals were evenly spread among 4,000,000 people in the suburbs, that would change the suburban

population by less than 2%. A 90% white suburb would become 88% white. This is not the kind of change that panics anyone.

These numbers are larger than anything that is likely to happen. There is no source of funding for a program to move 50,000 families in the Chicago vicinity over the next decade. So these rough estimates are all about a hypothetical upper-limits program that is beyond the scope of implementation. The point is that suburbs are would not be greatly altered by a mobility program that is much larger than anything that is likely to be implemented, if the program involves wide variety of areas.

Of course, housing availability is an additional potential constraint. But if government can create a ten-year housing mobility program, then the housing industry is likely to be able to build new housing to accommodate this new population along with other population growth over the course of a decade. Moreover, as noted, the fact that the program would last a decade or more would further reduce the psychological impact of this program.

Serious problems only arise if the program does not involve a wide variety of areas. Indeed, even a small program of only 300 families a year (smaller than the Gautreaux program) could create panic and rejection if it is narrowly focussed on only a few communities.

However, while the Gautreaux idea can be expanded to be a much larger program, it still seems likely that small programs probably have stronger benefits than large ones. If 3 low-income families move to a middle-income neighborhood (of 500 residents), the neighbors and church may provide extensive hospitality. If 30 families move in, neighbors may be friendly, but 30 may be too many to give hospitality. Yet the children of 30 families will be scattered across many teachers and so still may receive extra individualized help in school. If 300 families move in, conflict and panic may more likely than hospitality and help.

Numbers also alter the internal dynamics of movers. Children in three new families must interact with neighbors if they are to have friends at their same age. If children in 30 new families live very close together, they can interact with each other and constitute a segregated enclave. The greater ease and comfort of segregated interaction may keep new movers from reaching out to white middle-class neighbors.

This is all speculation. If true, it suggests the possibility that numbers do affect the strength of effects of the moves and that, as numbers increase, the amount and kinds of help decline.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

These results show that residential integration can significantly contribute to the aims of improving employment, education and social integration of low-income blacks. The suburban move greatly improved adults' employment, and many adults got jobs for the first time in their lives. The suburban move also improved youths' education. Compared with city movers, the children who moved to the suburbs are more likely to be (1) in school, (2) in college-track classes, (3) in four-year colleges, (4) in jobs, (5) in jobs with benefits and better pay. The children who went to college or who got jobs with benefits or better pay are on the way toward parity with whites. The suburban move also led to a considerable amount of social integration, friendships, and interaction with white neighbors in the suburbs.

These results provide strong support for the propositions advanced by Galster and Killen (1994). Galster and Killen indicate that "segregated environments discourage educational attainment" and employment, and the present findings provide strong support for the effects of moves out of such environments. Moreover, unlike the evidence they cite which relies on multivariate controls, the present findings are based on quasi-random assignment of families to neighborhoods. Since multivariate analyses have difficulty controlling for all the factors which lead to individuals' neighborhood choices, this social experiment provides a useful alternative approach. Galster and Killen also propose a number of propositions about the mechanisms involved in leading to these outcomes, particularly information, norms, and social networks. We find indications of different social networks in the social interaction findings. While this study lacked systematic indicators of information and norms, these are important issues for future research.

Of course, the social integration was not total, and while harassment declined over time, some degree of prejudice remained. The mothers and youth developed ways of dealing with it, and these unpleasant events were offset by considerable acceptance by many white neighbors and classmates.

Similarly, the children's achievement gains were not immediate. Indeed, virtually all suburban movers experienced great difficulties, and many got lower grades in the first year or two. However, these difficulties were an unavoidable part of adjusting to the higher suburban standards and gaining from the move.

Some critics doubt that housing vouchers programs can achieve the integration goals because low-income blacks will not choose to move to middle-income white suburbs. Indeed, a Detroit survey found that few blacks would choose all-white neighborhoods as their first choice (Farley et al., 1979). Moreover, some previous efforts to use housing

vouchers to encourage racial integration were unsuccessful. The national Experimental Housing Allowance Program "had virtually no impact on the degree of economic and racial concentration experienced by participants" (Cronin and Rasmussen, 1981, p. 123). Similarly, Project Self-Sufficiency in Cook County moved very few black participants to white suburbs (Rosenbaum, 1988). In both programs, participants were reluctant to make these moves because of strong personal ties to their former neighbors, fear of discrimination, and unfamiliarity with the distant suburbs that could have offered them better job prospects.

The results of the Gautreaux program cannot be considered conclusive evidence contradicting these prior studies. Program design features -- the lack of real choice about city or suburban locations -- which strengthen the research conclusions also limit any conclusions about low-income blacks' locational choices without those kinds of constraints. Still, the results are somewhat encouraging. They suggest that housing vouchers can succeed in moving low-income families to suburbs with better schools and better labor markets, and that adults and children will benefit from such moves. This program was able to overcome the reluctance that these families might have felt, in part because the poor quality of life in the city limited the attractiveness of staying there. It is noteworthy that participation is voluntary, and demand for the programs slots is high.

The Gautreaux program indicates that success is possible, but that it requires extensive additional housing services. Real-estate staff are needed to locate landlords willing to participate in the program, and placement counselors are needed to inform families about these suburbs, to address their concerns about such moves, and to take them to visit the units and communities. Like participants in other voucher programs, Gautreaux participants were reluctant to move to distant suburbs that they had never seen before, and few would have moved without the counselors' encouragement and visits to the suburban apartments. When contrasted with the failures of previous housing voucher programs, the successes of this program indicate the value of having real estate staff and housing counselors.

The study also suggests some ways that the Gautreaux program could be improved. Transportation was the greatest difficulty that people faced in the suburbs. The suburbs had little or no public transportation, so travel was extremely difficult. Mini-bus service is probably not practical because few families move to any one location, and a special mini-bus runs the risk of increasing visibility and labelling of participants. If the program could help people finance the purchase of a car, more people might get jobs, children would have an easier time being in after-school activities, and participants would face fewer frustrations with daily tasks. Child-care assistance would also have been

extremely helpful, since suburban movers cannot rely on relatives. Finally, while this housing program improved employment more than most education or training programs, Gautreaux participants might have gotten better jobs if the program had also provided additional education or training.

Of course, voucher programs alone are not sufficient to move large numbers of families because of the limited number of housing units available. But if national policy made a long-term commitment to expanding the Section 8 program and increasing suburban moves, then builders and developers could make long-term investments in building apartments to respond to this program over the next decade. Such a program would not be cheap. However, as Alexander Polikoff has noted, the alternative is to sink many billions of dollars into current public housing that keeps people in areas of the city that hinder their employment and educational opportunities. As we have seen, that has great human costs for these people and great costs to society in reducing adults' access to the labor force and childrens' access to good education.

The Gautreaux studies support the basic premise of the concept of geography of opportunity-- moving people to better areas can improve their attainments. The Gautreaux program shows that moves to better neighborhoods can improve adults' self-sufficiency and can improve the opportunities for their children. We have shown that the magnitude of these benefits is likely to be great, even after adjusting for the level of program attrition.

We have noted a number of pitfalls that such programs must strive to avoid. Programs must select appropriate people, appropriate places, appropriate services, and they must project appropriate expectations. This does not mean that the program must be very selective and very small, but it does need to be thoughtful about making its operations effective. Nonetheless, the potential benefits make housing vouchers a promising approach, and it is worthwhile to invest more in programs that can lead to these outcomes.

This strategy had the consequence of making the Leadership Council have the trust of landlords. The Leadership Council's selection procedures became an unofficial warranty about participants' capabilities. Informal reports suggest that even landlords who harbored prejudices against the larger class of low-income people felt they could trust the people selected by the Leadership Council. In effect, the Leadership Council informally certified participants in ways that overcame landlords' prejudices.

This study also has implications for non-voucher programs. The results indicate three key factors that helped Gautreaux adults get jobs in the suburbs: personal safety, role models, and access to jobs. If these factors were improved in the city, they might

also help city residents. In fact, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA), at the initiative of its director, Vincent Lane, has recently made impressive efforts to improve safety, role models, and job access in public housing projects. To improve the safety of the housing projects, the CHA has initiated security measures. To provide positive models, the CHA has initiated a mixed-income housing development, Lake Parc Place, that includes working residents who are positive models to their unemployed neighbors. To improve access to suburban jobs, some housing projects have also provided mini-bus service to the suburbs. These are the same factors that Gautreaux adults noted as helping them, so they are promising efforts. However, it is not certain how thorough and successful these efforts will be or whether they will result in greater employment. Even improved security may not make the projects as safe as suburbs, and one-hour commutes may limit the attractiveness of taking a mini-bus to low-paying jobs. It will be some time before we know the success of such programs.

The Gautreaux studies clearly indicate that residential mobility can lead to great gains in employment, education and social integration for low-income blacks. Contrary to pessimistic predictions of "culture of poverty" models, the early experiences of low-income blacks do not prevent them from benefitting from suburban moves. This program indicates that geographic location has large effects on opportunities. Programs that help people escape areas of concentrated poverty may improve employment and educational opportunities.

NOTES

1. The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Spencer Foundation, and the Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research, Northwestern University, provided support for the studies reported here. Nancy Fishman, Julie Kaufman, Marilynn Kulieke, Patricia Meaden, Susan J. Popkin, Len Rubinowitz made major contributions to these studies. This paper benefitted greatly from the comments of Alexander Polikoff, Kale Williams, and George Galster made important comments to this draft. Of course, the ideas expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of any other individual or organization.

2. The Section 8 program is a federal program that subsidizes low-income people's rents in private sector apartments, either by giving them a Section 8 certificate which allows them to rent apartments on the open market or by moving them into a new or rehabilitated building where the owner has taken a federal loan that requires some units to be set aside for low-income tenants.

3. Our refusal rate on the interviews was less than seven percent. There are no systematic differences between the interview and survey respondents, but the interview sample is used only for qualitative analysis. Responses to the self-administered questionnaire were consistent with those from the in-person interviews. For a complete description of the sample, instrument, and other analyses, see Rosenbaum and Popkin, 1990.

4. Low-income people move often and so they are difficult to locate over a seven-year period. We located 59.1%, a reasonably large percentage for such a sample. Of course, one must wonder what biases arise from this attrition, and whether we were more likely to lose the least successful people (because they were harder to find) or the most successful ones (because they got jobs in distant locations). We suspect both happen, but if one happens more often, then the 1989 sample could be seriously different from the original 1982 sample.

The mothers from the program's early years are less educated than those in the above adults survey because they are older and come from an earlier cohort when high school drop-outs were more common.

5. The suburban advantage arises because city movers decline in employment. The 15.4% decline in employment by the city movers is virtually the same as the 16.3% decline found in the Current Population Surveys between 1979 and 1989 among poorly-educated central-city black adult males, while their noncentral-city CPS counterparts have little or no decline (Danzinger and Wood, 1991, Tables 5 and 6). Although selectivity concerns are a threat to differences in the CPS data, the quasi-random assignment makes selectivity less of a threat in our study, which finds the same city/suburban differences as the CPS. Apparently, the suburban move permitted low-income blacks to escape the declining employment rates in central cities over the 1980s. Moreover, multivariate analyses find that suburban movers are significantly more likely to have a job than city movers, even after controlling for many other factors. This analysis finds that some of these other factors also influence employment: previous work experience, years since move, age (inversely), and young children (inversely). Employment is reduced by low internal sense of control and being a long-term AFDC recipient (five years or more), but not by being a second generation AFDC recipient. Employment is barely influenced by education, and it is not at all affected by post-move GED or college. For details of these analyses, see Rosenbaum and Popkin, 1990.

6. Multivariate analyses on post-move hourly wages and on hours worked per week (controlling for the same variables, plus months of employment and the pre-move measure of the dependent variable [wages or hours, respectively]) confirm the above findings: Suburbs have no effect on either dependent variable. Job tenure, pre-move pay, and the two "culture of poverty" variables (internal control and long-term AFDC) have significant effects on post-move wages. Job tenure, pre-move hours worked, and post-move higher education have significant effects on post-move hours worked. None of the other factors had significant effects. For details of these analyses see Rosenbaum and Popkin (1990)

7. For a complete description of the sample, instrument, and other analyses, see Rosenbaum, Kulieke, and Rubinowitz, 1988.

8. For a complete description of the sample, instrument, and other analyses, see Rosenbaum and Kaufman, 1991.

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Housing Mobility Strategies for Changing the Geography of Opportunity

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Abstract

The concept of "geography of opportunity" suggests that places affect individuals' opportunities. While the multivariate analyses Galster and Killen (1994) review cannot control completely for individual self-selection to neighborhoods, this paper examines a residential integration program in which low-income blacks are randomly assigned to middle-income white suburbs or low-income mostly-black urban areas. Compared with urban-movers, suburban-mover adults experience large higher employment, but no different wages or hours worked, and suburban-mover youth are more likely to graduate high school, be in college track, attend college, attend better colleges (4-year vs. 2-year colleges), and, if not in college, to be employed and to get jobs with better pay and important job benefits. The two groups of youth are equally likely to interact with peers, but suburban-movers are much more likely to interact with whites and only slightly less likely to interact with blacks. The paper considers how much attrition might reduce the observed effects and speculates about what makes this program have such strong effects and what pitfalls future programs should avoid.

Biography

James E. Rosenbaum is Professor of Sociology, Education, and Social Policy at Northwestern University. He received his B.A. at Yale, and M.A. and Ph.D. at Harvard. He specializes in research on work, education, and housing opportunities. He has published three books and many articles on these subjects. He is directing studies of low-income Black families in white suburbs, and a study of a mixed-income housing project, Lake Parc Place. His research has been described in national media and has contributed to the federal Moving to Opportunity program.

Table 1a. Characteristics of the Adult Study Sample: City-Suburban Comparison

	City N=108	Suburb N=224	Sig. ^a
Years on Gautreaux	5.85	5.37	n.s.
Age	36.67	35.39	n.s.
Age of youngest child	9.56	7.85	**
Number of children	2.51	2.56	n.s.
Years of Education pre-move	11.68	11.91	n.s.
Years of Education post-move	12.51	12.34	n.s.
Marital Status			
Married now (percent)	8.33	6.25	n.s.
Never Married (percent)	44.40	44.60	n.s.
Getting AFDC (percent)	53.70	47.80	n.s.
Long-term AFDC recipient ^b (percent)	68.50	59.80	n.s.
Second Generation AFDC (percent)	51.90	50.90	n.s.

Table 1b. Characteristics of the 1989 Children Sample: City-Suburban Comparison

	City	Suburb	Sig. ^a
Age	18.2	18.8	n.s.
Males	45.5%	56.8%	*
Mother not married	88%	86%	n.s.
Mother education years postmove	12.03	12.09	n.s.
Mother finished high school	43%	47%	n.s.

a. Significance of chi-square or t-test: *p<.01, **p<.01.

b. On AFDC for 5 years or more.

Table 2a. Percent of Respondents Employed Post-move by Pre-move Employment for City and Suburban Movers^a

Postmove Status	City			Suburb		
	Employed	Unemployed	Total	Employed	Unemployed	Total
Employed	42 (64.6%)	13 (30.2%)	55	106 (73.6%)	37 (46.2%)	143
Unemployed	23 (35.4%)	30 (69.8%)	53	38 (26.4%)	43 (53.8%)	81
Total	65	43	108	144	80	224

a. Numbers in parentheses are column percentages.

Table 2b. City and Suburban Comparison on Wages and Hours Worked

	Pre-Move Mean	Post-Move Mean	t	p
City Movers Post-move earners (N=55)				
Hourly wages	\$5.04	\$6.20	6.52	0.00
Hours/Week	31.92		33.27 -0.60	0.55
Suburban Movers Post-move earners (N=143)				
Hourly wages	\$4.96	\$6.00	6.50	0.00
Hours/Week	33.62	33.39	-0.60	0.55

Table 3. Youths' Education and Job Outcomes: City-Suburban Comparison

	City	Suburb	Sig.a
Drop-out of school	20%	5%	*
College track	24%	40%	**
Attend college	21%	54%	***
Attend four-year college	4%	27%	**
Employed full-time (if not in college)	41%	75%	****
Pay under \$3.50/hour	43%	9%	****
Pay over \$6.50/hour	5%	21%	****
Job benefits	23%	55%	****

a. Significance of chi-square or t-test: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.025, ****p<.005.

TABLE 4.

Are you considered part of the in-group?

Code	Suburb(n=49)	City(n=31)
Very much	32.7	32.3
Somewhat	44.9	51.6
Not at all	22.4	16.1
	t= .36	df= 67.6 n.s.

Do others see you as popular?

Code	Suburb(n=50)	City (n=31)
Very much	36.0	29.0
Somewhat	60.0	61.3
Not at all	4.0	9.7
	t= .95df=59.52	n.s.

Do others see you as socially active?

Code	Suburb (n=50)	City (n=31)
Very much	46.0	48.4
Somewhat	44.0	41.9
Not at all	10.0	9.7
	t= .18	df=63.40 n.s.

Do others think you do not fit in?

Code	Suburb(n=50)	City (n=30)
Very much	2.0	3.3
Somewhat	16.0	26.7
Not at all	82.0	70.0
	t= 1.13	df=52.42 n.s.

Table 5. Frequency of activities involving white students by percent.

How often do white students do things with you outside of school?

Code	Suburb (n=52)	City (n=30)
Almost every day	44.2%	6.7%
About once a week	13.5	16.7
About once a month	1.9	16.7
A few times a year	23.1	10.0
Never	17.3	50.0

t=3.65; p<.001

How often do white students do schoolwork with you?

Code	Suburb (n=52)	City (n=30)
Almost every day	40.4%	23.3%
About once a week	21.1	16.7
About once a month	21.2	13.3
A few times a year	9.6	0.0
Never	7.7	46.7

t=2.92; p<.005

How often do white students visit your home or have you to their home?

Code	Suburb (n=52)	City (n=29)
Almost every day	28.8%	6.9 %
About once a week	25.0	10.3
About once a month	7.7	13.8
A few times a year	19.2	17.2
Never	19.2	51.7

t=3.75; p<.0001

Table 6. Frequency of activities involving black students by percent.

How often do black students do things with you outside of school?

Code	Suburb (n=52)	City (n=31)
Almost every day	59.6%	54.8%
About once a week	19.2	32.3
About once a month	5.8	6.5
A few times a year	11.5	6.5
Never	3.8	--

t=.70 n.s.

How often do black students do schoolwork with you?

Code	Suburb (n=52)	City (n=31)
Almost every day	46.2%	64.5%
About once a week	25.0	16.1
About once a month	7.7	9.7
A few times a year	11.5	--
Never	9.6	9.7

t=1.34 n.s.

How often do black students visit your home or have you to their home?

Code	Suburb (n=52)	City (n=31)
Almost every day	50.0%	25.8 %
About once a week	25.0	45.2
About once a month	3.8	22.6
A few times a year	15.4	3.2
Never	5.8	3.2

t=.43 n.s.

Table 7. Comparisons of index variables measuring time spent with black friends vs. time spent with white friends.

(Scale of 1-15)	Suburb (n=60) mean (std dev.)	City (n=38) mean (std. dev.)
Time with black friends	12.02 (3.09)	12.45 (2.17)
Time with white friends (3.48)	10.41 (3.64)	6.89
	t=3.05; p<.003	t=9.04; p<.000