Jeff Manza

Consider the political costs of laws barring current and former felons from voting:

- Al Gore would have won the 2000 presidential election if ex-felons had been permitted to vote
- Democrats would have made key gains in the U.S. Senate, controlling it through the 1990s if felons had been permitted to vote
- John F. Kennedy would have lost the 1960 election to Richard M. Nixon if contemporary levels of felon disfranchisement were the same then.

These are among the findings of a recent study by Jeff Manza (IPR-Sociology), Marcus Britton, IPR graduate fellow, and Christopher Uggen at the University of Minnesota. The authors examine specific U.S. Senate elections to test whether the inclusion of felon voters would have altered the balance of power, and whether applying contemporary rates of disfranchisement to past presidential elections would have changed the outcomes. The results strikingly show the political consequences of laws that disfranchise felons and ex-felons.

More and more citizens have temporarily or permanently lost the right to vote as incarceration levels have risen. Since the early 1970s, the number of people imprisoned has grown by more than 500%. Currently, 47 states bar felons from voting, and 15 of those states also bar many ex-felons from voting. The authors estimate that more than 4 million citizens are ineligible to vote because they are felons or ex-felons.

As incarceration rates and the number of ex-felons rise, it seems clear that disfranchisement will play an increasing role in deciding elections.

Both political parties have set a law- and-order agenda, but because felons are drawn disproportionately from the ranks of racial minorities and the poor, groups that have historically voted Democratic, disfranchisement laws are likely to benefit Republican candidates.

Testing this belief, the authors developed a methodology for determining election results had felons voted.

In Senate elections from 1970 to 1998, seven elections might have been overturned if felons had been allowed to vote. Since incumbents—once elected—overwhelmingly retain their seats, the authors speculate that Democrats would have controlled the Senate throughout the 1990s.

The felon vote also would have affected the presidential races of 1960 and 1976, both close elections won by Democrats. Under current levels of disfranchisement, 2.3 million voters would have been barred from voting in the 1960 race (the actual number then was 700,000). Taking away these votes based on turnout and party preference, the authors show that Kennedy would have lost the election by almost 500,000 popular votes. In the 1976 race, Jimmy Carter still would have won, but by a narrower margin of victory.

Although the authors do not report details of their preliminary analysis of the 2000 election, they note that “the Republican electoral college majority… would have been reversed, even if only ex-felons were granted the right to vote.”

The authors speculate that the impact would be more dramatic for mayoral or city council races because of the heavy concentration of felons in urban areas.

Beyond political costs, barring felons from voting also has social and legal costs. The authors ask whether disfranchisement laws are appropriate for ex-felons and those on probation and parole when these citizens are working on rehabilitation and re-entry into society. They also consider whether the large numbers of minorities who are felons put such laws at odds with the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendment that bars voting laws that discriminate against minorities.