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Burton A. Weisbrod
John Evans Professor of Economics
Faculty Fellow, Institute for Policy Research
Northwestern University
PhD, Economics, Northwestern University, 1958
b-weisbrod@northwestern.edu
Curriculum Vitae
Weisbrod has written or edited 15 books and nearly 200 articles
and papers on the economics and public policy analysis of nonprofit
organizations, education, health, the causes and consequences of
research and technological change in health care, poverty, manpower,
public interest law, the military draft, and benefit-cost evaluation.
His most recent research examines the comparative economic behavior
of for-profit, government, and private nonprofit organizations,
and the causes and consequences of the growing commercialism of
nonprofits. His latest book is To Profit or Not to Profit? The
Commercial Transformation of the Nonprofit Sector (Cambridge
University Press, 1998). Also the author of The Nonprofit Economy
(Harvard University Press, 1988), he is currently completing
a book tentatively titled Mission, Money, and the Business of
Higher Education, co-authored with Jeffrey Ballou and Evelyn
Asch.
Weisbrod served as a senior staff economist on the Council of Economic
Advisors to presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. He
consults widely for governments, foundations, nonprofit organizations,
and private firms in the United States and abroad.
From 1990 to 1995, Weisbrod served as director of Northwestern
University's Institute for Policy Research (IPR), then known as
the Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research. At the University
of Wisconsin-Madison, where he spent 26 years on the economics faculty
before coming to Northwestern, he founded and directed the Center
for Health Economics and Law and co-founded and directed the Training
Program in Health and Mental Health Economics, supported by the
National Institute of Mental Health. His elected positions include
membership in the Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences,
fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science,
in addition to being elected to its Governing Council for the 1998-2000
term, Executive Committee of the American Economic Association,
and president of the Midwest Economics Association.
Weisbrod was appointed by then-Secretary of Health and Human Services
Donna Shalala to the National Advisory Research Resources Council
of the National Institutes for Health for a four-year term from
1999 to 2003. From 2000 to 2005, Weisbrod was chair of the Social
Science Research Council (SSRC) Committee overseeing its program
on Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector; from 2002 to 2005 he was
a member of the National Academy of Sciences Panel on the Measurement
of Nonmarket Activity, and in 2005 he became a member of the new
IRS User Group Advisory Committee.
Other honors include being recipient of the Lifetime Distinguished
Research Award from the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations
and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA) in 1997, being named Phi Beta Kappa
Visiting Scholar for the 1998-99 academic year, and receiving, in
1993, the Carl Taube award from the American Public Health Association
for his collaborative research on evaluation of community mental
health programs.
Current and Recent Projects
Reward Structures and Economic Behavior in the Hospital
and Hospice Industries. This project investigates whether
nonprofits establish incentives (reward structures) that cause their
workers to behave differently than those in governmental or for-profit
organizations. In a series of studies of the hospital industry,
Weisbrod is using a unique data set that contains information on
base-salary and performance-based bonus compensation covering more
than 50 job types in 1,100 hospitals nationally. He is using these
data to analyze differences in nonprofit use of performance-based
bonuses relative to the other organizational types, as well as the
criteria hospitals use for rewarding "good" performance.
Another component of the project is examining compensation patterns
for CEOs and other senior executives, as well as lower levels of
the managerial and technical worker ladder. This collaborative research,
with Jeffrey Ballou of Northeastern University and IPR graduate
fellow Burcay Erus, is finding substantial differences in incentive
structures for CEOs across institutional forms, but none at middle
management or technical worker levels. During the 1992-97 period
when cost-containment pressure was mounting for hospitals, Erus
and Weisbrod—focusing on governmental relative to nonprofit
hospital behavior—found materially different compensation
structures among these organizations, all of which are subject to
a "nondistribution" constraint on their managerial rewards.
In the hospice industry, which is also characterized by a mixture
of nonprofit and for-profit providers, Weisbrod and former Northwestern
University research professor Richard Lindrooth are testing hypotheses
regarding the differential responses of these varied providers to
financial incentives coming from the Medicare program. In particular,
they are studying the responses to incentives that implicitly encourage
earlier admissions and hence, longer lengths of participation, in
hospice programs.
The Mixed Higher Education Industry. Ballou and
Weisbrod are working on a book based on the premise that to understand
behavior of the higher education industry, one must recognize the
distinct roles of the diverse institutional forms that comprise
it. The book proposes to provide a framework for understanding many
of the changes currently taking place in the higher education industry,
and particularly its increasing commercialization—that is,
the narrowing gap between the choices made by traditional nonprofit
and public universities relative to those made by profit-maximizing
firms. It will address such issues as the causes and consequences
of the rapid rise of for-profit higher education, the development
of distance learning programs by all three organizational forms,
and the impact of increasing cost pressures, and the resulting search
for new sources of revenue on universities' core missions.
Monitoring Government Contractors. Many of the
traditional tasks of government— providing for defense, educating
children, rehabilitating prisoners—are now outsourced to private
firms, both for-profit and nonprofit. In many communities across
the country, for example, public schools are now managed by for-profit
firms, and privately managed, for-profit prisons now exist in more
than half the states. The federal government contracts with civilian
firms like Brown and Root to provide the military with logistical
support, and President Bush has suggested that social services might
better be provided by "faith-based" institutions. In many
of these relationships, outputs are very hard to monitor reliably.
Higher test scores coupled with a profit for the management company,
for example, might or might not show that a school is "improving."
Research by Weisbrod and Erus looks at the monitoring problem from
the input side: What rewards and penalties (i.e., incentives) are
evident in the contracts between government agencies and the private
firms that perform an increasing array of activities that were once
the primary domain of government? By examining those incentives,
looking particularly at privately managed jails, this research attempts
to provide fresh insight on the changes in the historical division
of responsibility among the for-profit, governmental, and nonprofit
sectors.
Behavior of Nonprofit Organizations. Weisbrod
and Maxim Sinitsyn, a graduate student in economics, are completing
a study of the behavior of nonprofit organizations in for-profit
markets examining profitability of commercial activity in six nonprofit
sectors including health and education. One of the goals is to explain
the widespread and sustained unprofitability reported in activities
that appear to have no justification other than to reap profit.
Under Weisbrod's direction, several Northwestern undergraduate
students have studied the behavior of nonprofit organizations in
specific industries. Northwestern alumus Ankit Mahadevia, now in
medical school at Johns Hopkins, analyzed data for all California
hospitals over a 20-year period to determine whether provision of
"collective" goods such as research, education, and charity
care differs systematically among for-profit, nonprofit, and public
hospitals, as well as between church-related and secular nonprofits.
A paper is now in progress. Weisbrod is continuing work, initiated
with Jaime Baim, a June 2001 graduate, that investigates behavioral
differences among for-profit, nonprofit, and governmental hospitals
in their use of autopsies as a research instrument and as part of
medical education. Recent NU graduate Sina Foroohar continues working
with Weisbrod on the nonprofit symphony orchestra sector, studying
the association between an orchestra's revenue sources and the kinds
and popularity of music it chooses to perform. Senior Joseph Konopka
is examining the effect on the quality of academic scientific publication
of the growing dependence of universities on private sector research
funding.
Selected Publications
Books
Weisbrod, Burton W., ed. To Profit or Not to Profit: The Commercial
Transformation of the Nonprofit Sector (Cambridge University
Press, 1998). Editor and author or co-author of eight of the 15
chapters.
Weisbrod, Burton W. The Nonprofit Economy (Harvard University
Press, 1988).
Weisbrod, Burton W., with James C. Worthy, eds. The Urban Crisis:
Linking Research to Action (Northwestern University Press,
1997).
Scholarly Articles
Weisbrod, B. W., with J. P. Ballou. 2003. Managerial rewards and
the behavior of for-profit, governmental, and nonprofit organizations:
Evidence from the hospital industry. Journal of Public Economics
87(9): 1895-1920.
Weisbrod, B. W., with L. M. Segal. 2002. Volunteer labor sorting
across industries. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
21(3): 427-47.
Weisbrod, B. W., with B. Erus. 2003. Objective functions and compensation
structures in nonprofit and for-profit organizations: Evidence from
the "mixed" hospital industry. In The Governance of
Not-for-Profit Firms, E. Glaeser, ed., 117-42. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Weisbrod, B. W. 2002. An agenda for quantitative evaluation of
the nonprofit sector: Need obstacles and approaches. In Measuring
the Impact of the Nonprofit Sector on Society, P. Flynn and
V. A. Hodgkinson, eds., 273-90. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.
Weisbrod, B. W., with K. Kapur. 2000. The roles of government and
nonprofit suppliers in mixed industries. Public Finance Review
28(4): 275-308.
Weisbrod, B. W., with C. Okten. 2000. Determinants of donations
in private nonprofit markets. Journal of Public Economics 75(2):
255-72.
Weisbrod, B. W., with M. J. Roomkin. 1999. Managerial compensation
and incentives in for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. The Journal
of Law, Economics and Organization 15(3): 750-81.
Weisbrod, B. W., with C. LaMay. 1999. Mixed signals: Public policy
and the future of health-care R&D. Health Affairs 18(2):
112-25.
Weisbrod, B. W., with J. H. Goddeeris. 1999. Why not for-profit?
Conversions and public policy. In Government and Nonprofit Organizations:
The Challenges of Civil Society. E. T. Boris and C. E. Steuerle,
eds, 235-65. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute.
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