Guns and Democracy: Anti-System Attitudes, Protest, and Support for Violence Among Pandemic Gun-Buyers

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Abstract

The last decade has given rise to substantial concern about democratic backsliding in the U.S. Manifestations include decreased trust in government, conspiratorial beliefs, contentious protests, and support for political violence. Surprisingly, prior work has not explored how these attitudes and behaviors relate to gun-buying, an action that provides people with the means to challenge the state. The researchers address this topic by focusing on individuals who took part in the unprecedented gun buying surge during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using a survey with over 50,000 respondents, they find that—relative to other Americans—pandemic gun buyers are more likely to distrust government, believe in conspiracies, protest, and support political violence. Moreover, the authors find that gun buyers who hold anti-government views and attend protests are especially likely to say they bought guns for political reasons. The researchers' findings highlight a crucial dynamic underlying the recent spike in gun sales with consequences for American democracy.

In recent years, mistrust in the United States' government has been accompanied by instances of violence. From armed, and at times violent, protests to the conspiracy-driven insurrection that was attempted on January 6th 2021, the stability of American democracy has been called into question. Scholars, observing these developments, have increasingly turned their attention to the perils faced by the U.S. political system (e.g., Bartels 2020; Finkel et al. 2020; Graham and Svolik 2020; Clayton et al. 2021; Kingzette et al. 2021). This includes exploration of the public's trust in government (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015), its endorsement of conspiracy beliefs (e.g., Cassese, Farhart, and Miller 2020; Enders et al. 2022; Uscinski et al. 2021) its involvement in contentious protests (Bartusevičius et al. 2021), and its support for violence (Kalmoe and Mason 2022).

While these burgeoning literatures have produced wide-ranging insights, relatively little attention has been paid to how individuals' views of the system relate to their decision to purchase firearms. This gap is potentially consequential given that gun-buying involves taking an action (i.e., arming oneself) that can directly precede extra-systemic behaviors—including the use of violence. Moreover, gun ownership has long been associated with a sociopolitical worldview that portrays firearms as tools that, if deemed necessary, can be turned against others (including the state) to protect liberty (Lacombe 2021). And finally, gun-buying has spiked in recent years with a record-breaking number of Americans responding to tumultuous circumstances by acquiring firearms (Denham and Ba Tran 2021; Fisher et al. 2021; Tavernise 2021; Lacombe et al. 2022). As a result, we might expect those who buy guns— particularly during times marked by turmoil and conflict—to exhibit less trust in government, hold more conspiracy beliefs, engage in more contentious protests, and be more supportive of political violence, relative to other Americans. If so, it would suggest these attitudes and

behaviors, which are important and concerning on their own, also have a potentially troubling behavioral connection to gun-buying.

As mentioned, there is reason to expect that such a connection might exist, specifically among those who bought guns during difficult times, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Recent work indicates that the same economic, political, social, and public health crises that have ostensibly spurred mistrust and violence have *also* motivated many Americans to purchase firearms (Lang and Lang 2021; Lacombe et al. 2022). At least 17 million Americans, in fact, bought guns during 2020—an approximately 4 million person increase over the previous year—which shattered prior sales records and started a trend that continued into 2021 (Denham and Ba Tran 2021; M. Fisher et al. 2021; Tavernise 2021). The timing, circumstances, and magnitude of this surge raise important questions: Are those who have haven chosen to obtain the means for violence (i.e., guns) during the 2020-21 buying spike less trusting of the political system, more likely to hold conspiracy beliefs, and more likely to engage in protests—all of which could challenge the extant system? Are they more likely than other Americans to condone violence?

We address these questions using a large survey of more than 50,000 respondents, including many who purchased guns during 2020 and 2021. Our data enable us to assess gun-buyers' attitudes on the aforementioned outcomes: trust in government, endorsement of conspiracy beliefs, participation in protests, and support for violence (including for those who stormed the Capitol on January 6th, 2021). We also study individuals' motivations for buying guns in the first place. We find that those who bought firearms amidst the turmoil of the past few years, especially for political reasons, are more likely than others to be low in trust, conspiratorial, engage in protests, and support political violence (relative to Americans who

did not buy guns during the pandemic). Beyond contributing to the emerging literature on radical views among the U.S. public, our findings suggest that the recent gun-buying surge—by increasing the number of arms that are held by Americans who have low faith in the system and condone political violence at unusually high rates—may have palpable consequences for democracy.

The American Public and Democratic Stability

Democratic governance relies on the presumption of accountability and consensual agreement on certain shared norms. American politics in the 21st century has been defined by a monotonic rise in ideological polarization among elites and affective polarization among the mass public (e.g., McCarty 2019; Iyengar et al. 2019; Finkel et al. 2020). This has led scholars and pundits to express concern about the stability of American democracy. To be clear, the causal relationship between polarization and democratic stability remains ambiguous (Broockman, Kalla, and Westwood 2022; Voelkel et al. 2021); however, the former has certainly contributed to increased attention to the latter. This includes at least four phenomena that have the potential to upset democratic stability: trust in government, conspiracy theories, protests (particularly when aimed at governmental entities), and political violence. We discuss each in turn.

Trust in government plays a crucial role in ensuring regime legitimacy. While uncritical "blind faith" in government leaders can undermine democratic accountability (Almond and Verba 1963), a lack of trust can be no less detrimental. Citizens with low trust may be more likely to flout government policies (Levi and Sacks 2009). Hetherington and Rudolph explain that "if people perceive the architect of policies as untrustworthy, they will

reject its policies; if they consider it trustworthy, they will be more inclined to embrace them"

(also see Hetherington 2005, 51). A government whose policies are ignored can quickly lose

legitimacy, making extra-legal challenges to the state—such as the January 6th insurrection—

feel justified (e.g. Krekó 2015). Furthermore, when citizens do not trust the government to

handle crises such as COVID-19, the resulting economic shock, or the 2020 racial justice

protests (and occasional riots), they may resort to "self-help" modes of personal protection—

e.g., by arming themselves (Black 1983; Smith and Uchida 1988; Kelsay et al. 2018).

  Much has been written about the correlates of trust in government—for instance, the

extent to which partisans trust the government only when their party controls it (e.g.,

Hetherington and Rudolph 2015; Brady and Kent 2020). Our question differs insofar as we are

interested in whether purchasing a gun correlates with lower levels of trust in government. The

expectation for this possibility is straightforward: those who do not entrust the government to act

in their interest may be more likely to believe they need to take actions to protect themselves

from either the government itself or others from whom the government provides insufficient

protection. Put another way, they feel some threat to their safety or well-being. Recent work

provides reason to suspect that such sentiments may be especially popular among those who

bought guns during 2020-21, as such individuals were more likely than others to report threat-

based reasons (e.g., protection against government or crime) and less likely to report

hobbyist-oriented reasons (e.g., hunting or target shooting) for their purchases (Lacombe et al.

2022). With this in mind—and given the magnitude of the gun-buying spike and the context

in which it occurred—we focus on what we term "pandemic gun-buyers": individuals in

households where a firearm was purchased during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic,

when gun purchases spiked to record levels. That is, our acute focus is on those who bought

guns during the pandemic for the theoretical reasons just articulated, as well as for the practical reason that doing so will provide insights into the changing nature of American politics during a tumultuous period of time.

Even so, it is important to note that while pandemic gun-buyers are of particular interest, the sentiments in which we are interested have a longer history and did not emerge in a vacuum. Indeed, the National Rifle Association (NRA) has long promoted the view that guns are crucial for protecting against tyrannical government and the efforts of disloyal, unpatriotic groups (Lacombe 2021). Characterizing the Second Amendment's protection of a right to keep and bear arms as "America's first freedom," the NRA argues that private gun ownership is the key to protecting all of the other rights conferred by the Constitution: "Without the ability to physically defend the other provisions of our Constitution from encroachment, the remainder of the Bill of Rights become privileges granted by the government and subject to restrictions at the whim of government" (Cassidy 1989, 7). Mass-level gun owners have been shown to have adopted this outlook, publicly advocating for gun rights on the basis that they may be needed to prevent unwarranted governmental control (an implicit expression of low trust). As noted above, pandemic gun-buyers who are more likely to be motivated by threat than by hobbies may be even more likely to hold such views (Lacombe et al. 2022). *We thus expect a significant and negative correlation between pandemic gun purchasing and trust in government, all else constant (hypothesis 1).*

We next turn to conspiracy theories, which are efforts to explain an event by invoking the machinations of powerful people, who attempt to conceal their role while pursuing malevolent goals (Sunstein and Vermeule 2009). Conspiracy ideation comes in many guises—for example, believing that NASA faked the moon landing or that the government suppressed evidence that

the MMR vaccine causes autism. While many such theories involve governmental institutions, others concern industry (e.g., pharmaceutical manufacturers), marginalized groups (e.g., Muslims, Jews), or organizations (e.g., the Free Masons, Open Society Foundation) (Jan-Willem van Prooijen and Douglas 2017). Such beliefs lead people to feel a heightened sense of threat, which, in turn, reduces their capacity to distinguish between truth and falsehood (Newman, Lewandowsky, and Mayo 2022). This can endanger democratic governance: conspiracies have been shown to contribute to deleterious outcomes such as support for violence (e.g., Lamberty and Leiser 2019; Jolley and Paterson 2020; Baum et al. 2022) and the flouting of public health guidelines (e.g., Romer and Jamieson 2020; Sternisko et al. 2021). Furthermore, individuals who publicly endorse election fraud conspiracies have increasingly sought public office—including offices that oversee elections—making understanding the relationship between conspiracy theories and other behaviors particularly important (Levine and Chang 2022).

People often adopt conspiracy beliefs when they feel a lack of control, which leads them to illusory and accessible narratives that offer explanations that reduce anxiety and provide a sense of increased control (Landau, Kay, and Whitson 2015; van Prooijen 2017, 2019; van Prooijen and Douglas 2017; Levinsson et al. 2021). Threatening events, such as natural disasters and disease outbreaks, constitute a primary catalyst for people feeling less control. Šrol, Ballová Mikušková, and Čavojová (2021, 721) capture this dynamic in explaining that individuals "take a complex event—for example, an outbreak of a deadly virus—and provide an explanation of the event and someone to blame for it…" which indicates that "conspiracy theories may satisfy important epistemic motives, that is, the need to understand what is happening around us, as well as existential motives to regain the feeling of control, security, and meaning in the world after encountering some threatening event."

This line of thinking reveals the potential connection between pandemic gun purchasing and conspiracy beliefs. A threatening event such as COVID-19 occurs and stimulates a diffuse sense of threat. Such diffuse threat generates anxiety that leads to gun-buying; indeed, a developed literature shows that, in addition to purchasing guns for protection against criminals, people often purchase guns due to general anxieties as a way to counteract vague, diffuse threat (Carlson 2015; Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski 2017; Warner 2020). Similarly, the generalized feeling of anxiety sparked by a particular threat (such as COVID-19) may lead to the adoption of conspiracy beliefs unrelated to the threat itself (Oliver and Wood 2014, 945, 958; Lewandowsky, Gignac, and Oberauer 2013, 630; Uscinski and Parent 2014). *We thus expect a significant and positive correlation between pandemic gun purchasing and conspiracy beliefs, all else constant (hypothesis 2).*

Gun owners as a group are politically active; surveys repeatedly find that gun-owners are more likely to engage in electoral politics than other Americans (Joslyn 2020, 10). Less attention has been paid to their tendency to engage in contentious politics. If a politically engaged group has low trust in government and conspiracy beliefs, one might expect them to rechannel their political efficacy into political activities outside of "normal" electoral politics, such as protests. As Fisher et al. (2019, 1) explain, "protest is a notable way that citizens attempt to communicate their views on key issues. Protest is partly a response to citizens' concerns that they are not being represented well by governmental institutions." *We thus expect a significant and positive correlation between pandemic gun purchasing and engaging in protests, all else constant (hypothesis 3).* Of course, protests as a general matter need not be problematic for democratic stability, and indeed can lead to positive change (e.g., Reny and Newman 2021). However, we suspect—given lower trust—that we will find a *significant and*

positive correlation between pandemic gun purchasing and engaging in protests that directly challenge the state, all else constant (corollary to hypothesis 3).

Finally, we have reason to expect pandemic gun-buyers to go a step further and be more likely to support political violence. First, as mentioned above, extant work shows a strong correlation between conspiracy beliefs and support for political violence (e.g., Lamberty and Leiser 2019; Jolley and Paterson 2020; Baum et al. 2022); if gun owners are more likely to hold such beliefs, then they may also exhibit greater support for violence. Indeed, gun ownership has been tied to conspiracy theories arguing that a "deep state" is working to promote globalist policies, harsh criticism of the media as consisting of anti-American elites, and the portrayal of politicians as bureaucrats who are quietly advancing collectivism (Lacombe 2021). Second, work on support for political violence shows that one driver is anticipation that political opponents may be likely themselves to engage in violence; this necessitates preventive violent action (Mernyk et al. 2022). Since one reason to purchase a gun is for similar anticipatory self-protection, it may be that gun-buyers also are more likely to endorse violence. Third, the NRA and many gun owners have long advanced the notion that guns are necessary to protect American society from tyrannical government and treasonous actors, but they have not frequently claimed that the conditions under which they would be used for this purpose have actually been present. The events of 2020, however, may have led some individuals to believe that such conditions had arrived or were likely to arrive soon. The economic challenges caused by the pandemic, the polarized fights over public health measures, the safety concerns associated with summer's protests, and the political threats produced by the disputed presidential election made the sorts of concerns long associated with gun ownership unusually salient. Further, the rhetoric and actions of political leaders, most notably President Trump,

likely encouraged these feelings by playing into the notion that tyranny was on its way (or already happening). If so, the gun-buying surge may have been driven, in part, by individuals who are willing to support violent action. *We thus expect a significant and positive correlation between pandemic gun purchasing and support for violence, all else constant (hypothesis 4).*

Data and Methods

We recruited respondents through the PureSpectrum survey platform (https://www.purespectrum.com/) that aggregates and deduplicates paid panelists from multiple sources. The data, which were collected over four survey waves between September 2020 and June 2021, are quota-sampled on demographic benchmarks and weighted to reflect the U.S. population along dimensions of race/ethnicity, gender, age, education, geographic region, and county urbanicity. To minimize topical selection bias, we did not inform respondents of the purpose of the survey when they entered it, and questions covered a broad range of topics, mostly related to public health (the questions regarding guns also came late in the survey, making self-selection based on guns very unlikely). We filtered out inattentive and semi-automated respondents through multiple closed- and open-ended attention checks (to address growing concerns about fraud and inattention in online panels; Bell and Gift 2022). Emerging evidence suggests this general approach to data collection can perform as well as traditional probability sampling (Enns and Rothschild 2021; Lehdonvirta et al. 2021; Radford et al. 2022). Our full sample (after filtering) includes 54,248 total observations from 51,107 unique respondents. All descriptive statistics are weighted by race/ethnicity, gender, age, urban/suburban/rural location, region, and education based on census benchmarks.

To measure gun purchasing, we asked respondents whether they or a member of their household purchased a gun during the pandemic (see appendix A for exact wording).[1] For our trust hypothesis, we asked respondents how much they trusted various actors to do the right thing in handling COVID-19, measured on four-point scales from "not at all" to "a lot." The actors included key governmental institutions: the White House, Congress, the respondent's state government, and the respondent's city government. We focus on COVID-19 trust given the government's central role in making relevant public policy during the pandemic; note also that

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[1] We recognize that including whether a member of one's household purchased a gun makes the question an imperfect match to individual gun buyers. Even so, in some sense (albeit not entirely) we are interested in the relationship between *access* to a gun and one's beliefs. A member of a gun-owning household who supports anti-state violence and attends protests may pose a threat regardless of whether they purchased the weapon themselves or if was bought by their spouse, parent, or roommate. Moreover, to the extent that the respondent was not involved in the buying decision, we believe it would work against our hypotheses. Our use of this question wording follows that long used by Gallup (since 1959) (although they began also asking about personal ownership in 2000) and used in a litany of works on gun purchasing (see, among many others, Cook and Ludwig 2006; Filindra and Kaplan 2016; Joslyn et al. 2017; Joslyn 2020; Lacombe 2021). Finally, when the household question is asked, an affirmative response is overwhelmingly reflective of personal ownership (roughly 70%; see https://news.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx). In their analyses of the questions, (Smith, Laken, and Son 2015, 3) report "the personal ownership figures and the household ownership figures are quite consistent."

our measures envelope the key levels of government involved in policy making during COVID-19. We measured trust in these institutions in every wave and thus can assess any over-time differences.

We measure conspiracy beliefs with a set of seven distinct items—one set focused on governmental conspiracies (3 items) and another on science/government COVID-19 conspiracies (4 items). For the former, we asked whether the respondent agrees or disagrees with the ideas promoted by QAnon (one of the most discussed political conspiracy theories in the last several years); whether they believe that Trump won the 2020 election, otherwise known as the "big lie"; and confidence in the fairness of the 2020 election, for which there was no credible evidence of unfairness. We measured each of these conspiracy beliefs on a five-point scale and then binarized them such that the strongest belief in the conspiracy is coded as 1 and all other responses are coded as 0.[2] Our operationalization focuses on extreme responses, which are unambiguous indicators of conspiracy beliefs. We chose these statements given evidence on the breadth and depth of 2020 election conspiracies (Graham and Yair 2021; DiMaggio 2022) and the role of QAnon in the election (A. M. Enders et al. 2022).

With regard to the COVID-19 conspiracies, we asked respondents to classify the accuracy of a set of statements: "wearing a face mask increases the chance of getting coronavirus," "flu vaccines increase the chance of getting coronavirus," "there is a cure for coronavirus that is being withhold from the U.S. public," and "coronavirus was created by U.S. health institutions." For each item, answer options were "accurate," "inaccurate," or "not sure."

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[2] We used "Strongly agree" for QAnon and the Big Lie, and "not at all confident" for election fairness.

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We coded an answer of "accurate" as a conspiracy belief (getting a score of 1)—again, since it indicates an unambiguous belief—and answers of "inaccurate" and "not sure" as not a conspiracy belief (getting a score of 0). We selected these specific statements based on Google searches for prevalent conspiracies at the time and perusal of the CDC website area on common myths.

Turning to protests, we included a general measure from a larger composite on political participation that also asked about other behaviors, such as attending a town hall, posting on social media, etc. Specifically, the protest item asked respondents whether they attended a rally or protest in the last 6 months. This appeared in every wave. We further, on each wave, included a standalone protest question that asked whether the individual had attended a protest during a particular period such as the past month (September wave), in 2020 (January wave), the past year (April wave), or during the pandemic (June wave). In some waves, we included another measure of protest activity: whether the respondent had attended a protest since the start of the pandemic (with "yes" or "no" response options). If they answered yes, they reported whether the protest was about opposing racism and/or police violence; reopening, quarantine, or coronavirus restrictions; or election fairness. Recall our corollary to hypothesis 3 predicts that we will find a relationship between gun-buying and participation in protests that challenge the state, which in this case would most clearly be those about COVID-19 restrictions (imposed by the state) and election fairness (as overseen by the state).[3]

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[3] The racism/police violence protests also could be construed as challenging the state, but this connection is less clear since many attendees were likely motivated by racism in general (not

Finally, we measured support for violence with five items: whether the respondent would approve of others using violence in the case of an unfair election (on a 5-point scale from "strongly disapprove" to "strongly approve"); support for the January 6th insurrection at the Capitol (on a 5-point scale from "strongly oppose" to "strongly support"); feelings toward the January 6th attackers (a 0-100 feeling thermometer with higher being more positive, recoded to have a range of 5 like the other variables); and three outcomes pertaining to emotions felt in response to the January 6th insurrection: elation, enthusiasm, and pride respectively (on 5-point scales from "very slightly or not at all" to "extremely"). We opted to focus largely on January 6th to avoid vague items that may lead to measurement error (Westwood et al. 2022); however, our first item about election fairness and violence ensures that we also capture attitudes not tied to an event with an ideological slant.[4]

For each set of outcome variables, we analyze associations between pandemic gun-buying and respondents' beliefs and behaviors using linear regression with robust standard errors. We control for demographic traits (gender, age, race/ethnicity, household income, college attendance, region, urban/suburban rural residence, and parenthood), party, ideology (7-point scale with higher being more conservative), and an indicator for whether anyone in the household had been diagnosed with COVID-19. To isolate the effects of pandemic gun-

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only by the state) or did not necessarily think of their opposition to the police as opposition to government writ large.

[4] One would ideally like to know whether people who bought guns plan (or would be willing) to use them to commit acts of political violence. However, asking this question explicitly would be unlikely to elicit truthful responses.

buying (the focus of our hypotheses), as opposed to gun ownership in general, we also controlled for whether the respondent already owned a gun. Our analyses are *not* meant to be causal; we are not able to claim that gun-purchasing causes distrust in government, conspiracy beliefs, protest behaviors, or support for violence, or vice versa. Rather, our interest lies in detecting whether a relationship between gun purchasing and these attitudes exist, as that would signify crucial information about a highly impactful group (i.e., American gun owners). In short, while causal relationships are important, a high prevalence of conspiratorial thinking, government mistrust, street protests, and support for anti-state violence among individuals in households that have recently bought a gun is of immediate concern to American democracy, regardless of the causal direction.

Results

Trust

We start with hypothesis 1, which predicts a significant and negative relationship between pandemic gun purchasing and trust in governmental institutions. We present the results in Figure 1, plotting the impact of buying a gun and not buying a gun during COVID-19 on trust in each institution across every wave; the underlying models (which include the aforementioned control variables) appear in appendix B. The figure makes clear that, overall, those who bought a gun during the pandemic have less trust in government, at every level, than those who did not, consistent with hypothesis 1.

Trust in the White House, however, offers a slight twist: pandemic gun-buyers initially had significantly more trust in the White House than did other Americans (net of controls

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including party and ideology) prior to the election when Trump was president (by nearly 0.2 points on a 1-4 scale). This association disappeared during the presidential transition and then flipped once Biden took office. The direction of the trust result echoes other work that shows conditional trust among partisans in which they typically only trust an institution when it is controlled by their party (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015). However, given that we control for partisanship, the result here is not simply a product of gun purchasing acting as a proxy for Republican partisan identification. Rather, it shows that gun-buyers, regardless of party, are more trusting of Trump—a president who staunchly defended gun rights—and less trusting of Biden—a president who advocates greater gun restrictions.

We do not see such changes when it comes to Congress or state government—in these cases, as predicted, gun-buyers consistently demonstrate less trust (with the single exception of Congress in September 2020). When pooled across waves, gun-buyers are .07 points less trusting in Congress and .1 points less trusting in their state governments than those who did not buy a gun, after adjusting for covariates.[5] We see a similar trend in city government trust, with every wave showing a negative correlation that reaches statistical significance (.04 points on the 1-4 scale; $p<0.01$) when pooled across waves. This is a particularly difficult test given trust in city mayors tends to evade clear partisan assessments (e.g., Choi et al. Forthcoming.; Das et al. 2022). Overall, the results offer strong support for hypothesis 1—that those who purchased guns during the pandemic have less trust in governing institutions. It also suggests that many place the president—or, at the very least, then-President Donald Trump—in a

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[5] When pooling waves for regressions, we omit responses from respondents who have appeared in previous waves (6% of all observations).

different mental category than government in general (e.g., Nai, Martínez i Coma, and Maier 2019).

Figure 1: Association between pandemic gun-buying and trust in government

Linear regression with controls

Trust measured on a 4-point scale ("not at all" to "a lot").
N = 53,423 (Sep: 19,212, Jan: 9,313, April: 14,773, June: 10,027).
Bars show 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors.

Conspiracy Beliefs

Pandemic gun-buyers, as predicted by hypothesis 2, are significantly more likely to hold conspiracy beliefs.[6] First, we consider simple raw percentages, which are stark. In September 2020, 18% of pandemic gun-buyers believed the pandemic was created by U.S. health institutions (compared to 7% for other Americans), 25% thought a cure was being withheld from the public (13% for others), and 16% believed flu vaccines increased the risk of Covid (7% for others). In January 2021, 31.3% of pandemic gun-buyers reported being "not at all confident" in the fairness of the 2020 presidential election (19.5% for others), and 13.5% believed mask-wearing increased the risk of COVID-19 (7.3% for others). In April 2021, 43.3% of pandemic gun-buyers strongly agreed that "If votes were fairly counted, Donald Trump would have won the 2020 election" (18.4% for others), and 16.0% had both heard of and strongly agreed with "the ideas promoted by QAnon" (2.6% for others).

These sizeable gaps withstand the addition of statistical controls for party, ideology, demographic differences, and so on. Indeed, in Figure 2, we present the results from linear probability models, with the displayed coefficients representing the change in probability of observing the binary outcomes associated with moving from non-buyer to buyer after adjusting for covariates. (Corresponding tables appear in appendix B.) They show that gun-buyers exhibit a higher likelihood of believing *every* conspiracy belief we assessed. Clearly, as predicted by hypothesis 2, pandemic gun-buyers embraced conspiracies much more than other citizens, meaning the gun-owning community likely became one comprised of more conspiratorial thinkers (recall we control for prior gun ownership in our analyses).

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[6] Recall that we did not measure each conspiracy belief at each eave. Here we report statistics from the first wave in which each statement appeared.

Figure 2: Association between pandemic gun-buying and conspiracy beliefs

Linear regression with controls

Difference between gun-buyers and non-gun-buyers (all else equal)

Note: Not all outcomes appear in every wave; estimates are pooled with wave fixed effects.
N = 27,815 (1st outcome), 41,119 (2nd), 22,037 (3rd), 19,110 (4th), 8,734 (5th), 21,957 (6th), 21,965 (7th).
Points show difference in probability of endorsing (or strongly agreeing with) each statement.
Bars show 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors.

Protests

We next turn to protests. As discussed earlier, we measured protest behavior with

multiple distinct items. One item asked whether attending a rally or protest was one of the ways

they had participated in politics in the last six months. Here we find that, across waves, between

9.0% and 13.8% of pandemic gun-buyers reported attending a protest, compared to 4.6% and

5.3% of non-gun-buyers. We also included various forms of a question that asked about

attending protests over distinct periods of time (i.e., in the past month, during 2020, the past year, or during the pandemic). We again find between 14.3 % and 27.0% of pandemic gun-buyers reported attending a protest, rally, or vigil (depending on the time span) compared to 4.7% to 8.1% of non-gun-buyers. Finally, recall that, for respondents who reported having attended a protest, we also asked about the protest's cause. As of June 2021, 10.0% of pandemic gun-buyers reported attending a protest about "ending quarantine or lockdown restrictions" compared to a mere 1.0% of non-gun-buyers. Similarly, 8.9% had attended protests about "overturning unfair election results" (1.1% for others). Perhaps most surprisingly, 13.3% of gun-buyers reported attending a protest about "stopping racism or police violence" (4.5% for others); it is possible, although we do not have the data to determine, that many of these individuals were engaging in counter-protests.

As with the prior analyses, we conducted analyses with statistical controls (see appendix B for the full models), and gun-buying remains statistically significantly correlated with a higher likelihood of engaging in every single protest activity across waves (with one exception that falls just short of significance in one survey wave). These results can be seen in Figure 3.[7] This strongly supports hypothesis 3. When pooled across waves, those who reported buying a gun were 5 and 10 percentage points more likely to report attending a protest (depending on how the general protest participation question was asked). They were also 8 percentage points more likely

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[7] The political participation battery was only shown to a subset of respondents in two waves; hence the wide confidence intervals. Differences in the other questions across waves may result in part from changes in wording/format, as well as the time scale asked about (see the appendix A).

to list opposing racism or police violence as a reason for protesting, 7 percentage points more

likely to list COVID-19 related restrictions as a reason, and 4 percentage points more likely to

list the 2020 election as a reason. The results regarding the COVID-19 restriction and unfair

election protests also mean that we have strong support for our corollary to hypothesis 3 that

pandemic gun-buyers would exhibit increased engagement in protests that directly challenge the

state. (They just happen to be more likely to attend other types of protests as well.)

Figure 3: Association between pandemic gun-buying and protesting
Linear regression with controls

Difference between gun-buyers and non-gun-buyers (all else equal)

Note: Not all outcomes appear in every wave; estimates are pooled with wave fixed effects.
N = 30,198 (1st outcome), 49,691 (2nd) 17,177 (3rd), 49,699 (4th), 49,689 (5th).
Bars show 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors.

Violence

Our final set of items looks at perhaps the most concerning behavior included in our study—the endorsement of political violence. We included one hypothetical item asking about the use of violence in the case of an unfair election in 2024, as well as a set of questions about support for the violent January 6th insurrection; these consisted of general support for the insurrection, feelings towards those who carried it out, and whether they caused the respondent to feel three positive emotions—pride, enthusiasm, and elation.

On the item pertaining to the 2024 election, only 5.0% of non-gun-buyers said they somewhat or strongly approved of using violence; in contrast, three times as many pandemic gun-buyers approved of it (16.3%). We observed the same ratio for the subset choosing "strongly approve": 6.3% of pandemic gun-buyers versus only 2% of non-gun-buyers. As for the January 6th items, we find over a quarter of pandemic gun-buyers (27.8%)— in contrast to only 7.9% of non-buyers—said they somewhat or strongly supported the insurrection, a similar ratio to the 2024 election question. Among those who said they "strongly support" the attack, the ratio was even more extreme: 20.8% versus 4.1%. Approval of the attackers was higher among pandemic gun-buyers as well; 53.3% reported positive feelings (above the halfway point on the feeling thermometer), in contrast to 34.6% among non-gun-buyers. Finally, nearly half (47.1%) of pandemic gun-buyers said they felt one of the three positive emotions (pride, enthusiasm, elation) at least "a little," compared to 31% of non-gun-buyers.

Once again, we assessed these relationships with statistical controls. Figure 4, showing the results, strongly supports hypothesis 4; even when including controls, gun-buyers in every case exhibited significantly more support for political violence than non-gun-buyers. (Corresponding tables appear in appendix B.) Put differently and more specifically, in the wave

ending January 2021, gun-buyers were .27 points (on a 1-5 scale) more supportive of others using violence if the 2020 election was unfair. In the April 2021 wave, gun-buyers were .58 points more supportive the storming of the Capitol, and were .36, .29, and .32 points higher in pride, enthusiasm, and elation with respect to the January 6th insurrection, respectively (also on a 1-5 scale). In the April and June waves (pooled), pandemic gun-buyers were 10.0 points more approving of the attackers, on the original 0-100 thermometer scale (0.4 when rescaled to match the other outcomes).

Figure 4: Association between pandemic gun-buying and endorsement of political violence

Linear regression with controls

Difference between gun-buyers and non-gun-buyers (all else equal)

All outcomes on 5-point scale (approval of attackers rescaled from 0-100).
Not all outcomes shown every wave; wave fixed effects included where applicable.
N = 1,910 (1st outcome), 2,878 (2nd), 2,840 (3rd), 2,835 (4th), 2,841 (5th), 21,122 (6th).
Bars show 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors.

### *Auxiliary Evidence: Reasons for Gun-Buying*

The evidence thus far strongly supports our hypotheses, indicating rather clearly that pandemic gun-buyers hold very distinctive views: relative to non-buyers, they have less trust in government, hold more conspiracy beliefs, engage in more protests (including those against the state), and are more amenable to political violence. In this section, we offer some suggestive evidence geared at further isolating the psychological mechanisms that connect pandemic gun-buying to these views. We do so by looking at an item that asked individuals their motivations for purchasing firearms during the pandemic. Although one cannot reasonably ask respondents if they purchased a gun to commit violence, we did ask pandemic gun-buyers to select the reason(s) for their purchase and gave them a number of response options, including some pertaining to politics. We pooled together three responses that we consider "political reasons,"— "protection against the government," "because of the lockdown and restrictions," and "because of the election"—and contrast them with "hobby reasons" (hunting and target shooting), "protection reasons" (crime, protection from someone you know), COVID-19, and other.

Figure 5 shows the relationship between reported reasons for buying a gun and the outcome variables discussed above (controlling for other factors). (Corresponding tables appear in appendix B.) It shows that people who bought guns for political reasons have less trust in government than other pandemic gun-buyers. They also are more likely than other pandemic gun-buyers to believe conspiracy theories, especially those pertaining to the fairness of the 2020 election. Finally, they are more likely to engage in protests, particularly protests against unfair election results. As mentioned, we did not expect a clear result on violence given social desirability in survey responses, and we do not see a significant relationship except in the

approval of attackers outcome, which had a far larger sample size (the other violence outcomes were shown only in one wave and only to a small subset of respondents). Yet, otherwise, we find that even among pandemic gun-buyers—all of whom, as a group, were more likely than others to have low trust, conspiratorial beliefs, and engage in protest—those who bought consciously for political reasons are even more likely to exhibit these attitudes and actions. This constitutes additional evidence that this population, particularly its politically-motivated elements, hold views that could be problematic for democratic stability.

Figure 5: Among pandemic gun-buyers, association between buying guns for political reasons and all outcomes

Linear regression with controls

Note: Reasons for gun-buying were asked in the January, April, and June 2021 waves. Not all outcomes appear in every wave; estimates are pooled with wave fixed effects. The public health institutions conspiricacy is omitted, because it was not asked in those waves. All other outcomes are shown; all scales have been binarized. Points show difference in probability of endorsing each statement or choosing the response specified in parenetheses. Bars show 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors.

While the overall proportion of Americans who purchased a gun during the pandemic for political reasons may be small (1.2%), it still translates into several million people. Moreover, while few Americans have used guns against the state, many have both bought guns and engaged in peaceful protest. For example, of those who attended "Stop the Steal" rallies, 12.3% said they had purchased guns "because of the election," while 6.1% of those who attended anti-lockdown rallies reported purchasing guns "because of the lockdown and restrictions." In all, 2.7% of Americans attended a rally against either lockdowns or the election, and of those 9.4% purchased guns for political reasons (114 survey respondents). Thus, it seems likely that several hundred thousand American adults attended a protest against the government during the pandemic and bought a gun for a related purpose.

Conclusion

As the U.S. has entered a period characterized by contentious politics, a growing body of research has explored various aspects of civic and democratic health. Our analysis builds on and extends this line of inquiry by linking it to the study of guns, examining whether and how the decision to purchase firearms connects to individuals' trust in the political system, endorsement of conspiracy beliefs, participation in protests, and support for political violence. On these matters, the attitudes of individuals who have obtained the means for violence are particularly substantively important. We have chosen to focus specifically on pandemic gun-buyers; this group is of particular interest because they purchased firearms during a distinctly tumultuous and threatening period of U.S. history and, in so doing, were part of a historically large gun-buying surge. Indeed, because of the timing of these individuals' purchases—and in light of

longstanding sociopolitical themes associated with gun ownership—we have hypothesized that they are especially likely to hold anti-state views such as those listed above.

Our findings align closely with our hypotheses. We find that, all else equal, pandemic gun-buyers have lower trust in U.S. political institutions—including the White House, Congress, state, and city governments—than other Americans. Moreover, we find that they are more likely to endorse a number of conspiracy beliefs, including QAnon, the "big lie" pertaining to the 2020 election, and COVID 19. Further, they are also more likely to partake in protest events, including protest events against the state, such as those aimed at COVID restrictions or overturning election results. Finally, we find that pandemic gun-buyers are also more likely to endorse the use of political violence and to be favorable toward the January 6th insurrection. Nearly all of these trends are even more pronounced among pandemic gun-buyers who report buying guns for political reasons: COVID-19 lockdowns, protection against the government, and the election.

These findings have important analytical and substantive takeaways. Analytically, they suggest that gun-buying may be a way that some Americans respond to threatening circumstances and perceived breakdown of the political system. Along these lines, future work might continue to probe linkages between outcomes associated with civic and democratic health, on the one hand, and gun-buying on the other. Carlson's (forthcoming) study of gun sellers during 2020 is a very promising step forward in this regard. Substantively, our findings are consequential. They suggest there is a notable subpopulation of recently-armed Americans who hold anti-system views and are open to political violence. While this subpopulation has to date not acted against the government, its views are concerning against the backdrop of an already unstable and contentious set of circumstances.

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Online Supplementary Materials for "Guns and Democracy: Anti-System Attitudes, Protest, and Support for Violence Among Pandemic Gun-Buyers"

Anonymized Authors

August 23, 2022

A Question Wording and Coding

A.1 Gun-Related Variables

Pandemic gun-buyer

- September: Have you or a member of your household ever purchased a gun? (coded 1 if "Yes, in the last 3 months" or "Yes, 3 to 6 months ago", otherwise 0)

- January: Did you or a member of your household buy a gun in 2020? (coded 1 if "yes", 0 if "no")

- April: Did you or a member of your household buy a gun during the COVID-19 pandemic (in the past 12 months)? (coded 1 if "yes", 0 if "no")

- June: Did you or a member of your household buy a gun during the COVID-19 pandemic (since March 1, 2020)? (coded 1 if "yes", 0 if "no")

Existing owner

- September: Have you or a member of your household ever purchased a gun? (coded 0 if "No, and we do not own a gun" otherwise 1)

- All other waves: Do you or a member of your household own a gun? (coded 1 if "Yes", 0 if "No")

Reasons for Pandemic Gun-Buying

What were the reasons you or a member of your household decided to get a gun? (Please select all that apply)

- Hunting

- Target shooting

- rotection against crime

- Protection against the government

- Because of COVID-19

- Because of the lockdown and restrictions

- Because of the election

- Protection against someone I know personally

- Other

Coded as political reasons if 4, 6, or 7 was chosen.

A.2 Control Variables

Income

What was the total combined income of your household for the past year? Please give us your best estimate. (Rescaled so that each income is equivalent to a that of a 3-person household, then coded as "low" if less than \$56,000 (2/3 of the 2020 national median), "medium" if below \$156,000 (twice of the national median), or "high" otherwise)

College

What is the highest level of education you have completed? (coded 1 if "Bachelor's Degree" or "Graduate Degree"; otherwise 0)

Urban type

ZIP Code (coded as "urban", "suburban", or "rural" according to census designation)

Age in decades

Age (Respondent enters number of years; divided by 10 when coded)

Female

Gender (Coded 1 if "Female", 0 otherwise)

Race

Response options included "White", "Hispanic", "Black or African American", "Asian", and various other categories coded as "Other". At the time we began the survey, our survey provider did not separate out Hispanic ethnicity as a separate question nor allow respondents to check multiple options except by selecting "other".

Region

Based on state of residence, respondents were classified into 8 regions: "West Coast", "Rockies", "Southwest", "Great Plains", "Midwest", "South", "Mid-Atlantic", "New England"

Parent

Number of children under 18 in household (Coded 1 if at least "1", 0 otherwise)

Party

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...

- Republican

- Democrat

- Independent

- Other

Ideology

In general, do you think of yourself as...

- Extremely liberal (1)

- Liberal (2)

- Slightly liberal (3)

- Moderate, middle of the road (4)

- Slightly conservative (5)

- Conservative (6)

- Extremely conservative (7)

(variable analyzed as a 7-point scale)

COVID-19

This variable was constructed from positive responses to any of the following three questions:

- Have you ever been diagnosed with coronavirus (COVID-19)? (Coded 1 if "Yes, I was diagnosed by a medical professional" or "No, I was not diagnosed but I think I may have it now" or "No, I was not diagnosed but I think I had it previously and recovered")

- Have you been tested for coronavirus (COVID-19)? (Coded 1 if "Yes, and I tested positive for COVID-19 at least once")

- How many members of your household (other than yourself) have been diagnosed with (COVID-19)? (Coded 1 if at least "1"; All others coded 0.)

A.3 Trust Outcomes

How much do you trust the following people and organizations to do the right thing to best handle the current coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak?

- Your city government

- Your state government

- The White House

- Congress

Response options: A lot, some, not too much, not at all (Reverse coded 1-4)

A.4 Conspiracy Outcomes

Health conspiracy outcomes

Below are some statements about the current health crisis. To the best of your knowledge, are those statements accurate or inaccurate?

- Flu vaccines increase the chance of getting coronavirus

- Wearing a face mask increases the chance of getting coronavirus

- There is a cure for coronavirus that is being withheld from the U.S. public

- Coronavirus was created by U.S. health institutions

- (list included other conspiracy theories and true facts not analyzed herein)

Response options: "Accurate", "Inaccurate", "Not Sure" (coded 1 if "accurate," 0 otherwise)

QAnon

The QAnon question was constructed from two questions:

- Are you familiar with QAnon?

Response options: "I am very familiar with it", "I have heard about it, but not very familiar", "I have never heard about it"
    Those who had never heard about it were coded as 0. All others were shown the next question:

- Do you agree or disagree with the ideas promoted by QAnon?

Response options: "Strongly agree", "Somewhat agree", "Neither agree nor disagree", "Somewhat disagree", "Strongly Disagree"
    Those who responded "Strongly agree" were coded as 1. All others were coded a 0.

Election fairness

How confident are you in the fairness of the 2020 presidential election? (Coded 1 if "Not at all confident", 0 if "Not very confident", "Mostly confident", or "Very confident)

Trump won

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "If votes were fairly counted, Donald Trump would have won the 2020 election"? (Coded 1 if "Strongly agree", 0 otherwise)

A.5 Protest Outcomes

Protest (from Political Participation Battery)

Which of the following, if any, have you done in the last 6 months? (Please select all that apply)

- Volunteered for a candidate, political party, or other political organization

- Attended a rally or protest

- Called or wrote to an elected official

- Attended a town hall held by an elected official

- Posted about politics on social media

- Made a donation to a candidate, party, or other political organization

- I have not done any of the above

(Coded as 1 if "Attended a rally or protest" was selected, 0 otherwise.)

Protest (standalone question)

- September: In the past month, did you or anyone you know attend a rally, protest, or a vigil in person? (Please select all that apply) (coded 1 if "I did" is selected, 0 otherwise)

- January: Did you attend a rally, protest, or vigil in person at some point during 2020? (coded 1 if "yes", 0 if "no")

- April: When, if ever, did you last attend a rally, protest, or vigil? (coded 1 if "in the past month" or "More than a month but less than a year ago")

- June: Have you attended any protests since the start of the pandemic (since March 1, 2020)? (coded 1 if "yes", 0 if "no")

Protest Causes (racism/police violence, Covid restrictions, unfair election)

What was the rally, protest, or vigil about?

- Racism and/or Police violence

- Reopening, quarantine, or coronavirus restrictions

- Election Fairness

For each of the three causes, respondent were coded 1 if they selected the corresponding option (other causes not relevant to our focus were included). All other respondents, including those who said no to having protested and hence did not see this question, were coded as 0.

A.6 Support for Violence Outcomes

Support Violence Hypothetically

If it became clear to you that the 2020 presidential election was not conducted fairly, would you approve or disapprove of other people who reacted by... Using violence (several other options were listed)

- Strongly approve (5)

- Somewhat approve (4)

- Neither approve nor disapprove (3)

- Somewhat disapprove (2)

- Strongly disapprove (1)

The binary version of this variable used in the gun-buying reasons regressions were coded as 1 if greater than 3, otherwise 0.

Support Insurrection

On January 6th 2021, while Congress was certifying results from the 2020 election, a crowd stormed the Capitol building and interrupted the proceedings. Do you support or oppose the storming of the Capitol building on January 6th?

- Strongly support (5)

- Somewhat support (4)

- Neither support nor oppose (3)

- Somewhat oppose (2)

- Strongly oppose (1)

The binary version of this variable used in the gun-buying reasons regressions were coded as 1 if greater than 3, otherwise 0.

Approve of Attackers

We'd like to get your feelings towards different groups on a scale of 0 to 100, which we call a "feeling thermometer." On this feeling thermometer scale, ratings between 0 and 49 degrees mean that you feel unfavorable and cold (with 0 being the most unfavorable/coldest). Ratings between 51 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm (with 100 being the most favorable/warmest). A rating of 50 means you have no feelings one way or the other. How would you rate each of the following groups?

- The people who stormed the Capitol building on Jan 6

This item appears partway through a long list of groups. Responses were divided by 25 during recoding to place outcome on a 0-4 scale so that it would have the same range as the other violence outcomes. The binary version of this variable used in the gun-buying reasons regressions were coded as 1 if greater than 2 (the midpoint), otherwise 0.

Emotions about January 6th (elation, enthusiasm, pride)

To what extent do each of the following terms describe your feelings or emotions about the storming of the Capitol on January 6th?

- Elation

- Enthusiasm

- Pride

Response options: Very slightly or not at all (1), A little (2), Moderately (3), Quite a bit (4), Extremely (5). The binary version of these variables used in the gun-buying reasons regressions were coded as 1 if greater than 3, otherwise 0.

B Summary and Regression Tables

Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics

		Mean	Std. Dev.
pandemic gun-buyer		0.08	0.27
female		0.66	0.47
age in decades		4.50	1.71
college		0.42	0.49
ideology		3.93	1.66
parent		0.36	0.48
covid		0.25	0.44
existing owner		0.32	0.47
		N	Pct.
race	White	38653	71.9
	Hispanic	4231	7.9
	Black	6283	11.7
	Asian American	2817	5.2
	Other	1751	3.3
income	low	25179	46.9
	medium	23722	44.1
	high	4832	9.0
urban type	rural	8701	16.2
	suburban	31124	57.9
	urban	13910	25.9
party	Republican	14553	27.1
	Democrat	20530	38.2
	Independent	15373	28.6
	Other	3119	5.8

Table B.2: Trust (September 2020)

Dependent Variables: Model:	trust White House (1)	trust Congress (2)	trust state gov (3)	trust city gov (4)
Variables				
pandemic gun-buyer	0.17***	0.004	-0.07***	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
female	-0.15***	-0.10***	-0.09***	-0.12***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
race: Hispanic	-0.02	0.03	-0.0006	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
race: Black	-0.14***	0.01	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
race: AsianAmerican	0.07**	0.12***	0.10***	0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
race: Other	-0.10***	-0.04	-0.13***	-0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
age (in decades)	-0.008*	-0.007	0.07***	0.06***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
income: medium	-0.008	0.03	0.08***	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
income: high	-0.02	0.03*	0.06***	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
college	-0.07***	0.007	0.11***	0.16***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
urban type: suburban	-0.07***	-0.02	0.01	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
urban type: urban	0.01	0.06***	0.08***	0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
party: Democrat	-0.94***	-0.25***	0.02	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
party: Independent	-0.70***	-0.30***	-0.11***	-0.16***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
party: Other	-0.81***	-0.43***	-0.28***	-0.30***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
ideology	0.13***	-0.006	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
parent	0.15***	0.11***	0.02	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
covid	0.08***	0.04**	0.007	0.007
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
existing owner	0.04***	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Fixed-effects				
region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics				
Observations	19,133	19,100	19,120	19,142
Squared Correlation	0.29175	0.03863	0.07457	0.07802
Pseudo R^2	0.11735	0.01534	0.02914	0.03244
BIC	49,910.1	48,573.0	49,632.5	46,648.6

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table B.3: Trust (January 2021)

Dependent Variables: Model:	trust White House (1)	trust Congress (2)	trust state gov (3)	trust city gov (4)
Variables				
pandemic gun-buyer	-0.04	-0.09**	-0.13***	-0.12***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
female	-0.07***	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
race: Hispanic	-0.05	-0.001	-0.09**	-0.11***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
race: Black	-0.16***	-0.06*	-0.09***	-0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
race: AsianAmerican	0.004	0.09*	0.08*	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
race: Other	-0.08	-0.15**	-0.14*	-0.10
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
age (in decades)	-0.04***	-0.03***	0.07***	0.06***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
income: medium	0.01	0.02	0.06**	0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
income: high	-0.05*	-0.01	0.05**	0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
college	0.02	0.04**	0.13***	0.15***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
urban type: suburban	-0.01	-0.03	-0.007	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
urban type: urban	0.07**	0.08***	0.05	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
party: Democrat	-0.48***	0.005	0.17***	0.13***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
party: Independent	-0.48***	-0.22***	-0.07**	-0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
party: Other	-0.52***	-0.32***	-0.18***	-0.25***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
ideology	0.15***	-0.004	-0.04***	-0.03***
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
parent	0.18***	0.12***	0.06***	0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
covid	0.11***	0.04*	0.01	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
existing owner	-0.03	-0.12***	-0.11***	-0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Fixed-effects				
region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics				
Observations	9,250	9,235	9,236	9,258
Squared Correlation	0.16877	0.04096	0.07967	0.08445
Pseudo R^2	0.06406	0.01581	0.03026	0.03437
BIC	25,228.1	24,287.6	24,817.3	23,193.6

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table B.4: Trust (April 2021)

Dependent Variables: Model:	trust White House (1)	trust Congress (2)	trust state gov (3)	trust city gov (4)
Variables				
pandemic gun-buyer	-0.19***	-0.14***	-0.10***	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
female	-0.09***	-0.06***	-0.10***	-0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
race: Hispanic	0.03	-0.01	-0.07**	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
race: Black	-0.04	-0.03	-0.12***	-0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
race: AsianAmerican	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
race: Other	-0.15***	-0.14***	-0.18***	-0.23***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
age (in decades)	0.08***	0.0009	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
income: medium	0.01	0.01	0.07***	0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
income: high	-0.02	-0.04*	0.002	0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
college	0.14***	0.06***	0.12***	0.16***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
urban type: suburban	0.05**	0.02	-0.002	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
urban type: urban	0.10***	0.11***	0.04*	0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
party: Democrat	0.63***	0.41***	0.22***	0.21***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
party: Independent	0.18***	0.05**	-0.01	-0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
party: Other	-0.08*	-0.17***	-0.28***	-0.26***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
ideology	-0.14***	-0.07***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
parent	0.12***	0.17***	0.13***	0.15***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
covid	-0.006	0.04***	0.05***	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
existing owner	-0.07***	-0.10***	-0.08***	-0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Fixed-effects				
region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics				
Observations	14,586	14,559	14,573	14,600
Squared Correlation	0.24904	0.14512	0.08684	0.11303
Pseudo R^2	0.10055	0.05857	0.03411	0.04771
BIC	37,627.2	36,952.5	37,743.8	35,214.2

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Table B.5: Trust (June 2021)

Dependent Variables: Model:	trust White House (1)	trust Congress (2)	trust state gov (3)	trust city gov (4)
Variables				
pandemic gun-buyer	-0.13***	-0.10***	-0.09**	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
female	-0.08***	-0.08***	-0.09***	-0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
race: Hispanic	-0.05	-0.04	-0.10***	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
race: Black	-0.11***	-0.07**	-0.19***	-0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
race: AsianAmerican	0.11***	0.13***	0.04	0.08**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
race: Other	-0.11*	-0.06	-0.11**	-0.14***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
age (in decades)	0.07***	-0.004	0.06***	0.05***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
income: medium	0.05**	0.04	0.08***	0.14***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
income: high	0.05**	0.01	0.05**	0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
college	0.17***	0.12***	0.15***	0.17***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
urban type: suburban	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
urban type: urban	0.06**	0.09***	0.08***	0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
party: Democrat	0.65***	0.44***	0.27***	0.25***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
party: Independent	0.22***	0.10***	-0.0002	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
party: Other	0.01	-0.11**	-0.20***	-0.23***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
ideology	-0.11***	-0.04***	-0.02**	-0.02***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
parent	0.12***	0.16***	0.14***	0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
covid	-0.01	0.04**	0.03	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
existing owner	-0.12***	-0.13***	-0.09***	-0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Fixed-effects				
region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics				
Observations	9,867	9,843	9,866	9,868
Squared Correlation	0.22280	0.12476	0.09546	0.11205
Pseudo R^2	0.08975	0.05010	0.03755	0.04727
BIC	25,472.7	25,118.8	25,617.8	23,887.8

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table B.6: Trust (Pooled)

Dependent Variables:	trust White House	trust Congress	trust state gov	trust city gov
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Variables				
pandemic gun-buyer	-0.02	-0.08***	-0.10***	-0.04***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
female	-0.15***	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.12***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
race: Hispanic	-0.05***	-0.02	-0.07***	-0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
race: Black	-0.16***	-0.05***	-0.10***	-0.09***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
race: AsianAmerican	0.009	0.08***	0.07***	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
race: Other	-0.13***	-0.09***	-0.15***	-0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
age (in decades)	0.02***	-0.01***	0.07***	0.06***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
income: medium	0.03**	0.04***	0.09***	0.12***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
income: high	0.0004	0.01	0.05***	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
college	0.05***	0.05***	0.12***	0.17***
	(0.01)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
urban type: suburban	-0.02	-0.006	0.007	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
urban type: urban	0.06***	0.08***	0.07***	0.11***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
party: Democrat	-0.17***	0.09***	0.15***	0.11***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
party: Independent	-0.30***	-0.14***	-0.06***	-0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
party: Other	-0.44***	-0.29***	-0.24***	-0.27***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
ideology	0.01***	-0.03***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
parent	0.20***	0.16***	0.08***	0.10***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
covid	0.04***	0.05***	0.03***	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
existing owner	-0.06***	-0.11***	-0.08***	-0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Fixed-effects				
region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
wave	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics				
Observations	49,765	49,679	49,728	49,802
Squared Correlation	0.09415	0.06972	0.08100	0.09440
Pseudo R^2	0.03373	0.02728	0.03154	0.03922
BIC	141,313.5	128,337.8	129,323.8	121,288.8

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Table B.7: Covid Conspiracies

Dependent Variables: Model:	cure withheld (1)	flu vacccines inc. risk (2)	masks inc. risk (3)	Covid created (4)
Variables				
pandemic gun-buyer	0.07***	0.06***	0.08***	0.09***
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.01)
female	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
race: Hispanic	0.02**	0.0007	0.008	0.0004
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)
race: Black	0.04***	0.03***	0.01**	0.05***
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)
race: AsianAmerican	-0.02*	-0.02***	-0.009	-0.02**
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)
race: Other	0.03**	0.010	0.005	-0.0008
	(0.01)	(0.007)	(0.01)	(0.010)
age (in decades)	-0.02***	-0.009***	-0.006***	-0.01***
	(0.001)	(0.0008)	(0.001)	(0.001)
income: medium	-0.03***	-0.006*	-0.009*	-0.03***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)
income: high	-0.03***	-0.007**	0.002	-0.03***
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
college	-0.02***	0.01***	0.01***	-0.006*
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)
urban type: suburban	-0.01**	-3.1×10^{-5}	-0.01**	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)
urban type: urban	0.009	0.02***	-0.0005	0.02**
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)
party: Democrat	-0.04***	-0.01***	0.003	-0.04***
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)
party: Independent	-0.05***	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.04***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)
party: Other	-0.03***	-0.02***	-0.01	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.010)
ideology	0.006***	-0.0007	0.002	-0.0008
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
parent	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
covid	0.06***	0.05***	0.04***	0.06***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)
existing owner	-0.003	-0.01***	-0.006*	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Fixed-effects				
region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
wave	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics				
Observations	27,815	41,119	22,037	19,110
Squared Correlation	0.05934	0.05727	0.04454	0.05828
Pseudo R^2	0.09330	0.66923	0.25110	0.22307
BIC	16,821.9	1,506.8	3,274.7	4,263.0

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1

Table B.8: Electoral Conspiracies

Dependent Variables:	election unfair	Trump won	QAnon
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variables			
pandemic gun-buyer	0.04***	0.16***	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.008)
female	0.006	-0.02***	-0.05***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.003)
race: Hispanic	-0.04***	-0.02***	-0.01**
	(0.01)	(0.008)	(0.005)
race: Black	-0.06***	-0.05***	-0.01***
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.004)
race: AsianAmerican	-0.01	-0.003	-0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.009)	(0.005)
race: Other	0.07**	-9.2×10^{-5}	-0.02***
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.005)
age (in decades)	0.02***	0.01***	-0.001*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.0006)
income: medium	-0.04***	-0.01*	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.006)	(0.003)
income: high	-0.04***	-0.01*	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.006)	(0.003)
college	-0.06***	-0.04***	0.02***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.002)
urban type: suburban	-0.02*	-0.04***	-0.005
	(0.01)	(0.007)	(0.003)
urban type: urban	-0.04***	-0.02***	0.01***
	(0.01)	(0.008)	(0.004)
party: Democrat	-0.25***	-0.29***	0.01***
	(0.01)	(0.009)	(0.005)
party: Independent	-0.16***	-0.26***	-0.01***
	(0.01)	(0.009)	(0.004)
party: Other	-0.007	-0.25***	-0.01***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.004)
ideology	0.06***	0.04***	-0.006***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
parent	0.02**	0.03***	0.05***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.003)
covid	0.006	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.003)
existing owner	0.03***	0.03***	0.0004
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.003)
Fixed-effects			
region	Yes	Yes	Yes
wave	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics			
Observations	8,734	21,957	21,965
Squared Correlation	0.24899	0.23598	0.10954
Pseudo R^2	0.28465	0.28166	-0.25713
BIC	6,623.6	15,352.4	-12,179.3

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table B.9: Protest (Pooled)

Dependent Variables:	protest (from battery)	protest (standalone)	protest unfair election	protest racism/police	protest lockdown
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Variables					
pandemic gun-buyer	0.05***	0.10***	0.04***	0.09***	0.07***
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)
female	-0.02***	-0.04***	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.04***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
race: Hispanic	-0.01**	-0.005	-0.0008	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)
race: Black	0.009*	0.02***	-0.002	0.02***	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)
race: AsianAmerican	-0.02***	-0.01**	-0.002	-0.01*	-0.01***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)
race: Other	0.02**	0.02***	-0.001	0.02**	4.5×10^{-5}
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.004)
age (in decades)	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.0007	-0.02***	-0.004***
	(0.0010)	(0.0008)	(0.0005)	(0.0007)	(0.0004)
income: medium	0.007*	0.01***	0.006***	0.009***	0.008***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
income: high	-0.005	0.008***	0.003	0.006**	0.006***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
college	0.02***	0.03***	0.009***	0.03***	0.02***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
urban type: suburban	0.007**	0.003	-0.003	0.002	0.0008
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
urban type: urban	0.02***	0.02***	0.003	0.02***	0.01***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)
party: Democrat	-0.004	0.006	0.004	0.01***	0.010***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
party: Independent	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.003	-0.02***	-0.009***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
party: Other	-0.008	-0.01***	-0.005	-0.006	-0.01***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)
ideology	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.002*	-0.02***	-0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.0009)	(0.0010)	(0.0007)
parent	-0.01***	0.02***	0.02***	0.010***	0.03***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
covid	0.04***	0.07***	0.02***	0.05***	0.04***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
existing owner	0.010***	0.01***	0.005***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Fixed-effects					
region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
wave	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics					
Observations	30,198	49,691	17,177	49,699	49,689
Squared Correlation	0.05134	0.09476	0.03547	0.09515	0.10103
Pseudo R^2	3.6673	0.36816	-0.02532	1.2641	-0.13307
BIC	-848.02	8,813.9	-24,849.2	-713.67	-44,736.8

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table B.10: Support for Violence

Dependent Variables: Model:	hypothetical violence (1)	approval of attackers (2)	support insurrection (3)	Jan 6 elation (4)	Jan 6 enthusiasm (5)	Jan 6 pride (6)
Variables						
pandemic gun-buyer	0.28***	0.40***	0.52***	0.26***	0.24***	0.29***
	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
female	-0.23***	-0.36***	-0.45***	-0.33***	-0.35***	-0.34***
	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
race: Hispanic	-0.04	-0.14***	-0.30***	0.30***	0.14	-0.007
	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
race: Black	0.04	-0.14***	-0.20***	0.10	0.08	-0.007
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)
race: AsianAmerican	-0.05	-0.04	-0.10	0.01	0.03	-0.03
	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)
race: Other	0.33	-0.07	0.01	-0.16	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.22)	(0.04)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.14)
age (in decades)	-0.10***	-0.03***	-0.07***	-0.09***	-0.07***	-0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.004)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
income: medium	-0.07	0.01	-0.06	-0.09	-0.06	-0.10
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
income: high	-0.07	-0.03*	-0.04	-0.13**	-0.09*	-0.11**
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
college	0.06	0.07***	0.07*	-0.05	0.02	0.004
	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
urban type: suburban	0.05	-0.03*	-0.10*	-0.08	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
urban type: urban	0.11	0.08***	0.09	0.09	0.13**	0.17***
	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
party: Democrat	-0.0009	-0.33***	-0.23***	0.02	-0.07	-0.08
	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
party: Independent	-0.06	-0.30***	-0.22***	-0.06	-0.17***	-0.22***
	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
party: Other	-0.02	-0.27***	0.08	-0.11	-0.09	-0.16*
	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)
ideology	-0.02	0.07***	0.03	0.008	0.005	-0.004
	(0.02)	(0.006)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
parent	0.27***	0.35***	0.49***	0.38***	0.40***	0.41***
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
covid	0.17***	0.22***	0.19***	0.12***	0.15***	0.19***
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
existing owner	-0.003	-0.04**	-0.06	-0.04	-0.04	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Fixed-effects						
region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
wave		Yes				
Fit statistics						
Observations	1,910	21,122	2,878	2,840	2,835	2,841
Squared Correlation	0.11638	0.15320	0.17674	0.14442	0.15120	0.14648
Pseudo R^2	0.04480	0.05630	0.06206	0.05081	0.05649	0.05356
BIC	5,243.3	59,152.0	8,674.9	8,489.5	7,977.6	8,165.2

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table B.11: Association between Gun-Buying for Political Reasons and Trust in Government

Dependent Variables:	trust White House (binary)	trust Congress (binary)	trust state gov (binary)	trust city gov (binary)
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Variables				
reason_political	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.11***	-0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
female	-0.05**	-0.006	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
race: Hispanic	-0.08**	-0.04	-0.12***	-0.09**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
race: Black	-0.07**	-0.06*	-0.09***	-0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
race: AsianAmerican	0.07	-0.05	-0.07	-0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
race: Other	0.02	-0.07	-0.05	-0.08
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
age (in decades)	0.005	-0.03***	0.009	0.01**
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
income: medium	0.02	0.02	0.05*	0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
income: high	0.009	0.01	0.06**	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
college	0.07***	0.06***	0.06***	0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
urban type: suburban	-0.02	0.005	0.001	-0.003
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
urban type: urban	0.03	0.06**	0.0006	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
party: Democrat	0.10***	0.15***	0.07**	0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
party: Independent	-0.08***	-0.03	-0.08***	-0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
party: Other	-0.13***	-0.15***	-0.20***	-0.25***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
ideology	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
parent	0.09***	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
covid	0.03*	0.05**	0.06***	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
existing owner	-0.007	0.01	-0.03	0.0001
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Fixed-effects				
wave	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics				
Observations	2,633	2,625	2,626	2,633
Squared Correlation	0.10282	0.13805	0.09816	0.12167
Pseudo R^2	0.07474	0.10463	0.07344	0.09427
BIC	3,709.9	3,510.5	3,596.2	3,455.2

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table B.12: Association between Gun-Buying for Political Reasons and Conspiracy Beliefs

Dependent Variables:	cure withheld	flu vacccines inc. risk	masks inc. risk	election unfair	Trump won	QAnon
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
reason_political	0.06**	0.02	0.04**	0.14***	0.13***	0.007
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
female	-0.06**	-0.08***	-0.10***	-0.02	-0.10***	-0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
race: Hispanic	-0.02	-0.04	-0.0005	-0.03	-0.04	-0.08***
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
race: Black	0.06	-0.008	-0.01	-0.006	-0.10***	-0.09***
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
race: AsianAmerican	0.03	-0.12***	-0.06	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.04)
race: Other	0.09	0.003	0.04	0.21**	0.002	-0.07***
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.02)
age (in decades)	-0.04***	-0.02***	-0.02***	0.04***	0.02***	-0.004
	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.004)
income: medium	-0.004	0.005	-0.03	-0.05	0.02	0.06***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.01)
income: high	0.03	0.02	-0.004	-0.05	-0.03	0.05***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
college	0.02	0.03**	0.04***	-0.07**	-0.02	0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
urban type: suburban	0.03	-0.008	-0.05**	0.01	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
urban type: urban	0.0002	0.06**	0.04	-0.05	0.06*	0.07***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
party: Democrat	0.03	0.06**	0.04	-0.32***	-0.26***	0.09***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
party: Independent	-0.05	-0.03*	-0.09***	-0.18***	-0.27***	-0.05***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
party: Other	-0.0006	-0.02	-0.04	0.15*	-0.28***	-0.009
	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.03)
ideology	-0.003	-0.01**	-0.01**	0.06***	0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.01)	(0.007)	(0.006)
parent	0.04	0.10***	0.07***	0.04	0.07***	0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
covid	0.08***	0.09***	0.08***	0.05	0.09***	0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
existing owner	0.02	0.03	0.06***	0.05	0.10***	0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Fixed-effects						
wave	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics						
Observations	810	1,890	1,892	813	1,824	1,825
Squared Correlation	0.07653	0.17861	0.14866	0.30264	0.20319	0.35980
Pseudo R^2	0.08388	0.30600	0.19389	0.27207	0.16046	0.61627
BIC	838.26	1,001.8	1,424.4	918.09	2,325.4	664.49

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

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Table B.13: Association between Gun-Buying for Political Reasons and Protesting

Dependent Variables:	protest (from battery)	protest (standalone)	protest racism/police	protest lockdown	protest unfair election
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Variables					
reason_political	0.07***	0.06***	0.04***	0.03**	0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
female	-0.04**	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.14***	-0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
race: Hispanic	-0.08***	-0.05	-0.06**	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
race: Black	0.03	0.04	0.04	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
race: AsianAmerican	0.10	0.010	-0.06	-0.04	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
race: Other	0.08	0.04	-0.04	-0.009	0.04
	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
age (in decades)	-0.01**	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.007**	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
income: medium	-0.008	0.03*	0.02	0.03**	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
income: high	-0.02	0.02	0.002	0.002	0.04***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
college	0.03	0.08***	0.07***	0.07***	0.009
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
urban type: suburban	0.005	0.005	-0.009	-0.005	0.02*
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
urban type: urban	0.04	0.09***	0.07***	0.06***	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
party: Democrat	0.01	0.10***	0.09***	0.08***	0.04*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
party: Independent	-0.02	-0.03*	-0.03**	-0.05***	0.003
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
party: Other	0.02	-0.07**	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.05***
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
ideology	-0.02**	-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.03***	-0.02***
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
parent	0.003	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***	0.04***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
covid	0.07***	0.13***	0.12***	0.10***	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
existing owner	0.03	0.09***	0.07***	0.07***	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.010)
Fixed-effects					
wave	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics					
Observations	974	2,611	2,612	2,611	1,526
Squared Correlation	0.08503	0.31189	0.34752	0.35939	0.13810
Pseudo R^2	0.18136	0.36304	0.49109	0.67415	-1.0636
BIC	542.09	1,885.5	1,328.8	735.11	-286.07

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

Table B.14: Association between Gun-Buying for Political Reasons and Support for Violence

Dependent Variables:	hypothetical violence (binary)	support insurrection (binary)	approval of attackers (binary)	Jan 6 elation (binary)	Jan 6 enthusiasm (binary)	Jan 6 pride (binary)
Model:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variables						
reason_political	0.07	-0.02	0.07***	0.04	0.01	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
female	-0.13**	-0.30***	-0.19***	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.26***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
race: Hispanic	-0.20***	-0.15	-0.06	-0.09	0.09	0.03
	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.14)
race: Black	0.04	-0.01	-0.13***	-0.11*	-0.10*	-0.16**
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
race: AsianAmerican	-0.16**	0.10	-0.10	-0.25**	-0.28***	-0.33***
	(0.07)	(0.19)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)
race: Other	-0.11*	0.03	-0.13**	0.05	0.09	-0.08
	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
age (in decades)	-0.02	-0.02	-0.006	0.01	0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.008)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
income: medium	-0.05	-0.18**	-0.02	-0.09*	-0.08	-0.10
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
income: high	0.04	-0.11*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.07	-0.11*
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
college	0.07	-0.008	0.07***	0.07*	0.03	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
urban type: suburban	-0.02	0.10*	-0.02	0.004	0.07	0.15***
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
urban type: urban	-0.03	0.25***	0.08**	0.04	0.10	0.14*
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
party: Democrat	0.008	-0.03	-0.18***	0.13*	0.10	-0.0004
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
party: Independent	-0.14**	-0.18**	-0.15***	-0.04	-0.002	-0.11*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
party: Other	-0.23***	-0.19**	-0.08	0.04	0.04	-0.11
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)
ideology	-0.04	-0.05***	0.010	-0.04**	-0.05***	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.008)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
parent	0.23***	0.20***	0.15***	0.20***	0.12***	0.16***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
covid	0.10*	0.20***	0.14***	0.05	0.08*	0.09*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
existing owner	-0.02	0.10*	0.06**	0.10**	0.12***	0.10**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Fixed-effects						
wave	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fit statistics						
Observations	155	209	1,733	207	207	207
Squared Correlation	0.32597	0.47555	0.17228	0.44371	0.40746	0.41163
Pseudo R^2	0.46390	0.52028	0.13030	0.66271	0.60729	0.55855
BIC	171.53	231.22	2,343.8	168.44	176.71	193.43

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard-errors in parentheses
*Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1*

C   Ethical Considerations

Relevant to APSA's Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research, all research presented here was conducted with IRB approval. As we restricted participation to adult U.S. citizens who consented to participate and did not employ any element of deception, this research was determined to be exempt by the IRB. Participants gave their consent to participate in the research on the first page of the survey, and we did not collect any information from those who did not consent to participate. Participants were recruited via PureSpectrum, a firm that draws participants from a variety of survey vendors. As such, we did not compensate participants directly; participants were compensated by the survey vendors that recruited them. The risks of participation were minimal and we do not believe that participation differentially benefitted any participants. The survey design employed quota sampling to approximate a representative sample within each state by race, gender, and age group. The only deviation from these quotas being fully representative along these demographic targets was allowing for oversampling of respondents who identify as Black, Latinx, or Asian.