Northwestern
President Walter Dill Scott called it "the most important problem ever
presented to the Board of Trustees."
The problem to which he referred was the proposal in 1933 by Robert Maynard Hutchins, president of the University of Chicago, to merge the two institutions.
In the interests of secrecy, Scott formed a committee --originally designated the Special Committee on an Important Problem -- to thoroughly investigate and debate the matter, digging to the depths of Northwestern's soul.
In a memo accompanying his letter, Hutchins based the radical proposal on several assumptions, two being that the Depression would make it difficult to secure new money for education at the time and the operation of the two universities as one would create the greatest educational enterprise in the world.
The two presidents drafted an outline for the benefit of the merger committee, proposing a three-campus system with graduate work based in Hyde Park, undergraduate training in Evanston and professional education on Northwestern's Chicago campus. Scott and Hutchins sought a plan that would avoid duplications in educational administration and curriculum and thereby save money.
In the summer of 1933, Northwestern's merger team met with its counterpart at the University of Chicago. The two bodies framed the problem with four fundamental questions about the merger: Was it educationally desirable? Was it economically desirable? Could it be entered into legally without affecting Northwestern's tax-exempt status under its charter? And, was the mutual goodwill and competence of the two boards of trustees sufficiently strong to assure the plan's success?
As the debate spilled into the late fall, Northwestern opened the matter to a group of alumni and faculty. The faculty wing took up the task of determining the educational advantages and disadvantages of the merger on each of the schools within the University.
Inevitably, the behind-the-scenes ruminations spawned rumors regarding the motives of the proposal. Some alleged that the prime objective was to permit the University of Chicago to share Northwestern's tax-exempt status.
When the story hit the local press, it took on an added dimension. An anonymous author wrote in the Evanston Review of Jan. 18, 1934, that a $25 million endowment would become available from the Rockefeller Foundation on the condition there be only one university in the Chicago area.
The Evanston City Council and Chamber of Commerce asserted their opposition to the merger on the grounds that it would, as one business representative said, "deal a staggering blow to Evanston" through a decline in the volume of trade and a reduction of real estate values.
Not long after, opposition within the Northwestern community began to swell. Alumni feared the loss of traditional associations and loyalties, as well as the Northwestern name itself -- an early proposal called for the name The Universities of Chicago.
The strongest criticism of the move came from the Medical School. The objections of faculty and students were based mostly on differing educational philosophies. While University of Chicago medical faculty engaged largely in the research and teaching of theoretical aspects of medicine, Northwestern aimed to teach its students applied medicine. The faculty body echoed the displeasure of the students who at a mass rally burned the effigies of Scott and Hutchins.
It is thought that the death of Melvin A. Traylor, merger committee chair and Scott ally, signaled lost hope for the venture. Scott eventually concluded that the plans be scrapped as it was unlikely the board would vote for the merger. Hutchins agreed, and the deal died Feb. 25, 1934, when trustees from Northwestern and the University of Chicago voted to set aside the plans and discharge the committees.
Both presidents revealed their deep disappointment over the proposal's failure. Hutchins called it "one of the lost opportunities of American education."
Within weeks of the final vote, Scott wrote a letter to a board member. "The more I studied the merger, the more desirable I found it to be," he wrote. "It is a great regret to me that conditions were such that it could not become a reality. In my judgment the merger will become a reality at some future date.
